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Abstract 
The role of courts in shaping public policy has undoubtedly increased over at least the last two 
decades. Several factors have contributed to this trend, including the rise of democracy around 
the globe as previously authoritarian regimes open up and shift toward rule of law and 
democratic processes. Individuals and groups that have found themselves in a position to be 
discriminated against by the government and/or society, often due to their religious, ethnic, or 
cultural identity, have more frequently begun to take their grievances to domestic and 
international courts, as opposed to trying to grapple with solutions in the political realm. This 
process is known as judicialization.  
 While this trend of applying to international courts is on the rise by individuals and 
groups, the question arises about the efficiency and effectiveness of judicial processes in 
achieving hoped-for rights recognition. This is a reflection of state responses (specifically, 
implementation, execution, or compliance) to obligations as high contracting parties to such 
international human rights tribunals. This study examines 19 adverse judgments against Turkey 
in the European Court of Human Rights (1996-2016) that were brought forward by applicants 
that do not adhere to the majority religious identity in Turkey (Hanefi Sunni) to better understand 
what institutional factors have caused these cases to emerge and the elements that have helped or 
hindered full implementation in the post-judgment stage.   
 This examination demonstrates that identity construction, both self-produced and 
externally imposed, is inextricably linked to the formation of domestic policies towards non-
majoritarian religious groups in Turkey. Furthermore, it argues that institutional configuration 
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and path dependence have interfered with comprehensive changes towards a pluralistic and just 
domestic human rights regime, as envisioned and mandated by the Council of Europe.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Eylem Zengin was in the 7th grade in Istanbul in 2001. Much of her public-school education to 
date had included a mandatory course called “Religion, Culture, and Ethics.” The course was 
instituted in 1982, following the 1980 coup in Turkey that brought the military to power. The 
military believed that the educational system offered an opportunity to repair the political and 
social rifts that had been the source of the coup. They sought to accomplish this by combining 
two previously separate courses—an optional course in religion and a mandatory course in 
civics—into one compulsory course. With time, it became clear that the content of the 
curriculum had an increasingly Sunni Muslim slant, obliging students to recite Muslim prayers 
and memorize suras (verses) of the Koran, while only granting passing attention to other faiths. 
Many viewed the course as more of an indoctrination of religion rather than a neutral education 
about religions.  
Until 1990, no exemptions were allowed from the course; after that date, a decree was 
issued permitting Jews and Armenian and Greek Orthodox Christians to be exempt, subject to 
the provision of proof of their religious identity. On the surface, this seemed to accommodate the 
desires of non-Sunni students and parents to opt out of the course. However, the exemption 
ignored a significant segment of Turkish society—citizens other than Armenian and Greek 
Orthodox Christians and Jews who also do not adhere to Sunni Islam. This group includes a 
number of other belief systems, such as Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, atheists, agnostics, and 
the most populous group, the Alevi, with which Eylem Zengin and her parents identify.  
In 2001, Hasan Zengin applied to the Provincial Directorate of National Education at the 
Istanbul Governor’s Office for an exemption to the mandatory religion, culture, and ethics 
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courses for his daughter, Eylem, but the request was denied. Mr. Zengin applied to the Istanbul 
Administrative Court for judicial review, but the request was also dismissed. Once again, Mr. 
Zengin appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which decided to uphold the judgment of 
the court of first instance. In 2004, three years after the initial application and having exhausted 
all domestic remedies, Hasan and Eylem applied to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), located in Strasbourg, France. The case against Turkey related to infringement on the 
applicant’s rights as guaranteed by Turkey’s ratification of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and membership in the Council of Europe (COE).  
 Cases like the Zengins’ exemplify the experience of non-Hanefi Sunni Muslims1 (which 
constitute a significant majority of the population) in Turkey. That is to say, a significant 
majority of the Turkish population who do not adhere to Hanefi Sunni Islam face challenges to 
their identity and identity recognition in various aspects of their professional, social, personal, 
and political lives. Often, when domestic political and judicial recourse fails these individuals 
and groups, they seek rights recognition outside of Turkey at the ECtHR. This study has selected 
19 cases against Turkey (including the Zengin case) to examine the domestic institutional 
circumstances that have led to the judicialization of non-majoritarian belief rights recognition at 
the ECtHR, as well as the domestic institutional factors that determine Turkey’s compliance with 
adverse ECtHR judgments. 
                                               
 
1 The Hanefi School of Islam is the most widely followed of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. 
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1.1 International Courts and Religious Minorities in Turkey 
The role of courts in shaping public policy has undoubtedly increased over at least the last two 
decades. Several factors have contributed to this trend, including the rise of democracy around 
the world as previously authoritarian regimes open up and shift toward rule of law and 
democratic processes. In other countries, increasing greater distrust of government officials, 
especially in comparison to trust in the courts, has encouraged recourse to tribunals (Tate and 
Vallinder 1995, 3). This is evident in the emergence of numerous international human rights 
courts in the post-WWII era and the increase in applications that such courts receive, particularly 
the ECtHR (“ECHR Overview: 1959-2017” 2018). 
 International human rights tribunals are charged with the adjudication of inalienable and 
fundamental conditions granted to humanity by virtue of being human. Quite often, these rights 
are intrinsically linked to identity. Identity construction, whether imposed externally or self-
selected, and its manifestation shape social norms, rules/laws, and the organizations through 
which humans act and interact. As such, identity and human rights substantially impact one 
another, with identity giving shape to how rights are formed, and with human rights delineating 
how identity is manifest. Religious identity is one of the most sensitive identity categories 
because it involves concepts relating to deeply held beliefs as well as understandings or 
assumptions about individual or group placement in the world and in relation to others. It is also 
a sensitive category because it can be cause for and a result of practices linked to exclusion, 
discrimination, and denial of basic human rights.  
As a result, individuals and groups that have found themselves in a position to be 
discriminated against by government and/or society due to their religious, ethnic, or cultural 
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identities are increasingly taking their grievances to domestic and international courts, as 
opposed to trying to grapple with solutions in the political realm. This trend has been most 
salient within the scope of human rights because international courts such as the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the ECtHR govern the vertical relationship between states 
and constituents, in contrast to the horizontal state-to-state relationships in the domain of 
international trade or security (Hillebrecht 2014, 3). The increased function of the courts as 
policy makers is part of the process known as judicialization. Judicialization is simply defined as 
the transfer of power from representative institutions to the judiciary at both the domestic and 
supranational levels (Hirschl 2013, 21). 
 Since its founding in 1959, and especially since the establishment of a single, full-time 
court in 1998, the ECtHR has been part of the trend of international judicialization. Yet the 
ECtHR’s tendency to defer to high contracting states’ capacities to determine the most 
appropriate resolutions to adverse rulings through the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation has caused serious concerns about states’ full compliance in terms of their 
obligation to the ECHR. Though studies have shown that the ECtHR has a high compliance rate 
(49 percent) compared, for example to the IACtHR’s compliance rate of 34 percent (Hillebrecht 
2014, 11), questions still arise about the congruence between the expectations of the judgment 
and concrete implementation.  
 There are also concerns about efficiency. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) reports that there are nearly 10,000 cases waiting in the Committee of Ministers 
(CoM), the decision making and execution body of the COE, and the number of leading cases 
(those identified as exhibiting specific and common structural issues) “awaiting execution for 
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more than five years has increased” (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 2017, 3). 
As well, the average time to close a case generally exceeds four years (Muižnieks 2016). 
Looking at this more closely, in 2016, the average length of execution for leading cases closed 
was 4.7 years (4.2 years for cases under standard supervision; 7.2 years for cases under enhanced 
supervision). Significantly, this average has increased over the last two years (Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights 2017, 13). Returning to the issue of implementation, while 
2016 saw a record number of cases closed (2,066 total cases; 237 of which were leading cases 
and 45 of which were cases under enhanced supervision), the CoM’s annual report indicated that 
there are still a number of issues related to implementation (Council of Europe, Committee of 
Ministers 2018). In fact, approximately 74 percent of the Court’s judgments are not implemented 
(Karakaş 2017).  
 Turkey is no exception. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of PACE’s 
2017 report on implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments highlighted the serious structural 
problems that have existed for more than a decade in ten member states with the highest number 
of non-implemented judgments against them (in order: Italy, the Russian Federation, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova, and Poland) 
(Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 2017). The main issues identified in PACE’s 
2015 report for Turkey include: “failure to re-open unfair criminal proceedings; repeated 
imprisonment for conscientious objection to military service; violations of the right to freedom 
of expression and freedom of assembly; excessive length of detention on remand; actions of 
security forces; and issues concerning the northern part of Cyprus” (Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights 2015, 9).  
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 Indeed, the Council of Europe and its bodies recognize that it can legitimately take time 
to implement reforms, particularly when the states are tasked with the design of often politically 
or culturally sensitive amendments. They also recognize that the nature of the required reforms 
can be quite complicated and complex and involve a number of institutions (various ministries, 
the courts, regulatory agencies, etc.). However, Turkey has the highest number of judgments in 
the history of the COE (3,386 of 20,637 judgments from 1959 to 2017) and has the greatest 
number of cases finding at least one violation (2,988 of 17,307 cases) (European Court of 
Human Rights 2017). And as mentioned above, Turkey is among the top three countries with the 
highest number of non-implemented judgments against it. 
1.2 Research Questions and Theoretical Basis 
This study examines the European Court of Human Rights’ adverse rulings against Turkey. More 
specifically, the cases involve individual or group claims that the Turkish government has 
infringed on citizens’ freedom of thought, conscience, or religion (whether or not a belief is 
recognized by the Turkish government). The case selection was not limited to Article 9 of the 
ECHR (freedom of belief) violations, but instead included a wide variety of violations that 
directly and indirectly, regardless of the violation, relate to freedom of belief. Still, the contents 
of Article 9 provided the framework that guided case selection. Neither Article 9 nor ECtHR 
case law defines religion; this is a difficult task that would require flexibility to consider the 
historically constructed nature and multifaceted use of the category worldwide, but also demand 
specificity in its application to individual cases (Council of Europe, European Court of Human 
Rights 2015, 7). As such, established ECtHR case law has shaped the positive and negative 
obligations states hold to protect freedom of thought or belief. The negative aspect of this 
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obligation entails the right not to practice or reveal one’s beliefs and conscientious objection (the 
right not to act contrary to one’s conscience and convictions) (Council of Europe, European 
Court of Human Rights 2015, 18-21). A state’s positive obligations include permitting the 
“freedom to ‘manifest [one’s] religion’ alone and in private or in community with others, in 
public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares” (Council of Europe, European Court 
of Human Rights 2015, 22) and the broad applications thereof, including, but not limited to, 
education, family life, apparel, and houses of worship. Therefore, while there may have been a 
direct or indirect violation related to these positive and negative obligations, the Court may have 
chosen not to rule on Article 9, yet still consider non-majoritarian beliefs to have played a key 
role in the facts of each case. This is why the cases in this study are not limited to Article 9 
violations.  
The 19 cases that fit the selection criteria (listed in the methodology section) were 
analyzed to understand the following research questions: What are the similarities and 
differences in the cases brought to the ECtHR by non-Hanefi Sunni groups that have been ruled 
to be violations regarding religious freedom in Turkey and what are the explanations for these 
variations or similarities? What mechanisms have contributed to Turkey’s implementation/non-
implementation of these rulings (political reasons, nature of the reforms required, budgetary 
reasons, public opinion, judgment language/margin of appreciation, interference with obligations 
from other institutions)? Which types of cases have come closest to implementation? Which 
measures (if any) were selected to implement the judgement (general measures, individual 
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measures, just satisfaction, costs and expenses)?2 The cases are analyzed not only in reference to 
the language of the judgments, but also to Turkish domestic institutional arrangements during the 
relevant time frames, Turkish history, the activities of civil society organizations, the statements 
and actions of domestic political figures and parties, interviews with COE officials, and the 
reports of the COE’s CoM.  
These data were analyzed in light of the literature on a variety of theoretical concepts. 
The literature on identity provided a framework to explore identity formation, the intersection of 
identity and politics and the rights that do or do not emerge from them, and the role that identity 
plays in the nation-building process. In relation to nation building, the literature on 
institutionalism helped guide this research in defining what institutions are, how they are created 
and sustained, and how institutional structures (single institutions and a network of institutions) 
determine policy makers’ behavior and decision-making practices. Institutional arrangements 
determine the policy process. For this reason, institutional change was also taken as a theoretical 
lens through which to examine the manner in which policy changes occur and the mechanisms 
that impact the nature and pace of change. Because this study focuses heavily on the courts, the 
concept of judicialization was also taken as a framework to assess the impact of the international 
court system on domestic policy choices. Additionally, the question of compliance3 with 
                                               
 
2 All cases but one in this dataset were still pending in the Committee of Ministers at the time of the cutoff date of 
the study, which was July 15, 2016. 
3 Though some studies have been quite particular about the use of terminology to indicate that a state has acted in 
accordance with a judgment from an international tribunal, the current study opted to employ the words compliance, 
implementation, and execution interchangeably to signal that a state has taken concrete and acceptable measures to 
fulfill its obligations that stem from an international court ruling.  
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judgments weighed heavily on the examination of the data and, therefore, academic work on the 
subject of implementation of international rights tribunals was included to aid in addressing what 
compliance has meant in its practical application, the latent and overt causes of implementation 
and non-implementation, and the measurement of compliance.  
This study has six substantive chapters. Chapter 2 provides an extensive overview of the 
literature that guides the theoretical structure of the cases examined. Chapter 3 discusses the 
history and development of the Council of Europe and its institutions. The chapter concludes 
with a section on religious freedom case law in the ECtHR, with a specific focus on Turkey and 
its relationship with the ECtHR. Chapter 4 provides the reader with some historical context in 
which to understand the study. It includes information on the history of religion in the Ottoman 
Empire, the predecessor of the Turkish Republic; a general political history of the Turkish 
Republic from its founding to the present; and an explanation of religious classification in the 
Turkish Republic. Chapter 5 explains the analytical framework for this study, describing the 
methodology and methods for case selection and analysis. Chapter 6 reports the results of the 
analysis of the collected data. The collected cases are thematically categorized into six groups. 
These categories are not based on the article of the ECHR that was violated, but are instead 
organized according to the common issues addressed in the judgments. These categories are: 
domestic laws concerning the registration of faith-based non-governmental organizations 
(associational laws); property rights; places of worship and the public provision of religious 
services; identity cards; education; and conscientious objection. Each section of Chapter 6 begins 
with an overview of the domestic legislative, judicial, political, and civil contexts of the theme at 
hand. This is followed by a description of the domestic proceedings for each case prior to its 
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hearing by the ECtHR and the final judgment and obligations stemming from the ruling. Each 
section concludes with an analysis of the group of cases, including an examination of what 
actions have been taken by Turkey to execute the judgments and a review of the factors that 
influenced the implementation or non-implementation of the judgments. The study concludes 
with Chapter 7, which provides an overview of the key findings, the contributions to the 
literature, the limitations of the study, policy recommendations, and potential areas for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review 
This chapter begins with a survey of one of the most widely explored subjects where politics and 
sociology overlap: identity. The section on identity looks specifically at identity construction, 
identity politics, and, quite pertinent to this study, national and religious identities. The chapter 
continues with an examination of the literature on institutionalism, including how institutions are 
variously defined and how they shape and are shaped by other institutions and actors. This is 
followed by a review of theories surrounding the patterns and mechanisms of institutional 
change.  
The theoretical framework to examine cases that have come before an international 
human rights court inevitably touched on law and compliance (or non-compliance) with relevant 
laws. While there has been a wealth of published works on the intersection of religion, law, and 
politics, the focus of this study is an observable trend that has occurred over the past few 
decades: judicialization. Judicialization, commonly defined as a shift in policy making and 
decision-making authority to the judiciary, has received a fair amount of academic attention. Yet 
a common framework or definition has yet to be settled on. Still, the scope of these works have 
largely been centered on domestic judicialization. Additionally, there has been little attention 
paid to the judicialization of religious issues. Even more rare is the intersection of these two 
areas: the international judicialization of religious rights. This section presents an overview of 
the current literature on judicialization and carves out an initial niche for further exploration of 
said intersection. In relation to judicialization, the chapter concludes with a review of compliance 
or, as it is referred to in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the execution of 
judgments.  
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2.1 What Is Identity? 
Studying the ECtHR necessarily involves the examination of basic rights recognition in terms of 
collective and individual rights. More often than not, rights issues are tied up in questions of 
identity. A significant number of articles and protocols in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) address one aspect or another of individual or collective identity. Some examples 
include private and family life (Article 8); expression (Article 10); association (Article 11); 
discrimination (Article 14); and of course, thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9). This 
section provides an overview of the academic literature on how identity is defined, how identity 
is constructed, the differences between individual and group identities, and identity politics. The 
section concludes with a subsection that addresses two categories of identity that are pertinent to 
this study: national and religious identity. 
Identity is a pervasive aspect of our individual and social lives. It is an abstruse term, akin 
to the response of United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Stewart when compelled to 
define “obscenity”: “I know it when I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 [1964]). Fearon’s 
definition of identity (1999, ii, cited in Béland 2017, 3) will be used here. Identity refers to two 
separate and/or simultaneous meanings: “(a) a social category, defined by membership rules and 
(alleged) characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) socially distinguishing features 
that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or (a) 
and (b) at once).” As Fearon (1999, ii) argues, such a definition facilitates both explanations of 
political behavior and assertions that identities are socially constructed.  
The present examination of identity is less a review of identity theory and is more about 
the construction and sources of identities (individual and group), identity manifestations, and 
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how identity shapes and is shaped by politics. Rather than using an essentialist approach alone, 
where identity is a taken for granted quintessence, a constructionist approach will be taken under 
the assumption that identity is “made” and “done” iteratively over time. This is not to claim that 
essentialist notions of identity are not deliberately deployed in or forced upon various identity 
movements. However, at the core of constructionist epistemology is the recognition of the 
presence of variations in (internally and/or externally) essentialized identities.  
2.1.1 Essentialist vs. Socially Constructed Identity 
There are significant questions that citizens and policy makers alike face when examining 
identity. Recently, debates surrounding identity and identity politics are either, on one side, 
dismissed as superfluous expressions by an individual or group demanding “special treatment” 
while renouncing any binding universal (i.e., the way the Black Lives Matter movement is 
perceived by some) or, on the other side, a critical means to achieve equality, justice, and rule of 
law. Without engaging in a debate on how different societies have arrived at this point or the 
merits of which side is “right,” an examination of the sources of identity formation and the 
impact of said formation is in order.  
Traditionally, essentialism refers to categorization based on one’s innate, inherent, or 
unchanging “essence.” Employing essentialist classifications facilitates the use of heuristics, or 
cognitive shortcuts (see Kahneman 2011) by grouping (what is perceived as) like with like. By 
accepting that an individual or a group has an axiomatic essence (however imagined), one can 
delineate categories within which to discern them. Occasionally, essentializing an identity can 
mean little more than it being reliably fixed over time and relatively difficult to change or 
resistant to change. Essentialism becomes problematic, though, when taken to extremes, such as 
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in the creation of stereotypes, the reification of stereotypical characteristics, homogenization, or 
identity policing (Phillips 2010).  
The social constructivist approach to identity, which is often seen as the antithesis of 
essentialism, regards social and political life as “embedded in a web of social meanings produced 
and reproduced through discursive practices” (Fischer 2003, 13). These discourses synthesize 
and fuse to create narratives from which identity is derived. This represents a shift from 
representational (essentialist) narratives to ontological (socially constructed) narratives (Somers 
and Gibson 1994, 38). Stories and narratives are ubiquitous in the policy realm and are deployed 
as a means to define and contest a policy problem and its players (Stone 2012). Considering the 
plethora of narrative sources, individuals and groups possess (unwittingly or not) multiple 
identities—both imposed and sanctioned. Thus, the social constructivist approach acknowledges 
that an individual (or a group) possesses and expresses multiple identities devised and 
proliferated through social stories and must navigate through and with them, placing greater 
emphasis or salience on one or more under different circumstances.  
In this approach, narratives, ideas, and ideologies, thus, shape the “subjective mental 
constructs” that determine how individuals perceive the world and make choices. Narratives, 
ideas, and ideologies are, in turn, influenced by institutions (North 1990); this is discussed in 
greater detail in later chapters. These institutions (defined broadly as norms, rules, and 
organizations) can influence how target populations’ identities are constructed. For example, 
policy makers construct a positive or negative character of a group or individual and “distribute 
benefits and burdens so as to reflect and perpetuate these constructions” (Ingram, Schneider, and 
Deleon 2007, 93). As such, these identities become embedded (especially through legal means) 
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and are difficult to change (Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 2007, 111). Occasionally, however, 
some groups that agree upon their collective identity can navigate the opportunity structures of 
policy designs and influence their socially constructed identity (Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 
2007, 111).  
Based on Fearon’s definition of identity, one can conclude that identity can either be 
externally or internally (self-)imposed and include identified essentialist elements as well as 
socially constructed elements. This is not to say that essentialist and constructed identity theories 
are perfect; however, identity can be formed in both ways and the two need not be at odds. 
Indeed, identity formation can be both essentialist and constructivist and Calhoun prudently 
asserts that deconstructing and claiming identities exist in tension, but that each one requires and 
informs the other (Calhoun 1994, 22).  
2.1.2 Individual and Group Identity in Politics 
Individual and group identities can conflict, much in the same way that an individual must place 
primacy of one aspect of his or her identity above another in different contexts. This is 
particularly true in cases where groups attempt to create a categorical identity, revealing the 
inextricable linkages between the politics of personal identity and politics of collective identity 
(Calhoun 1994, 28). This manifests when politicians attempt to emphasize commonality within a 
group and differences between groups (Mols 2012, 331) to voice claims related to identity. In 
cases like this, identities are “deployed strategically as a form of collective action to change 
institutions” (Bernstein 2005, 62). The success of the narrative employed determines whether a 
claim or grievance is acknowledged (Fischer 2003, 54).  
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As Bernstein (2005, 50) notes, Taylor (1989), Young (1990), and Kymlicka (1995) 
demonstrate that acknowledging the social construction of group identities does not hinder 
collective organization; instead it “justifies demands for group-differentiated citizenship rights 
and challenges to negative representations.” This is the intersection of identity, politics, and 
policy. Identity politics refers to when institutions constrain and enable actors and their ideas, 
conferring or denying rights or privileges based on sanctioned or proscribed identities. 
2.1.3 Identity Politics and Rights Recognition 
The term “identity politics” has gained momentum in various scholarly fields since the term was 
first used in 1979 (Bernstein 2005, 47) to explain the collective political organization of 
individuals who advocate for issues related to a particular “identity”—be it an ideology, gender, 
religion, or a nation. By its very definition, “identity politics” emphasizes the inextricable 
relationship between identity, on the one hand, and politics and policy, on the other.  
 The classic liberal view of questions of identity centered on toleration4 by arguing that 
society should “tolerate” minority beliefs through the creation of a political realm that does not 
interfere with personal (namely, religious) practices. This would lead to the creation of a 
peaceful community of diverse identities. In his argument that the idea of liberal toleration was 
insufficient in theorizing about identity politics, Taylor claimed that a shift from toleration to a 
“politics of recognition” occurred in the late 18th century as a result of inevitable shifts: 1) the 
collapse of social hierarchies that were formerly the basis of “honor” (which was replaced by 
                                               
 
4 See John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” and John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice.” 
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“dignity”) and 2) the emergence of “individualized identity” and the “ideal of authenticity” 
(Taylor 1994, 26-31). Essentially, “What has come about with the modern age is not the need for 
recognition, but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail” (Taylor 1994, 35). 
Thus, recognition (and its antitheses, non-recognition or misrecognition) determines the 
discursive formation of social identities. Crucially, the “affirmative acknowledgment”—the 
recognition—of minority identities advances “people’s well-being, if it protects a collective 
identity they experience as deeply constitutive of their personal identities” (Hayward and Watson 
2010, 12). Taken together, these authors affirm that the state should be committed to neutrality 
and to protecting individual rights. Thus, a neutral state, and even a hyper-neutral state, is one in 
which even the rights of citizens with an identity differing from the majority (or state-endorsed) 
identity are protected and these identities acknowledged. 
Taylor’s strong multiculturalist perspective is in contrast to liberal theories related to 
existing and thriving in a multicultural society. In Multicultural Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka 
argues that a liberal conceptualization demands that minority rights be acknowledged in concert 
with one’s culture, either as a polyethnic or immigrant group, or as a national minority. These 
“group-specific rights” are allocated as: self-government rights (“devolving political power to a 
political unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority, and substantially 
corresponding to their historical homeland or territory”); polyethnic rights (rights that “help 
ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it 
hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society”); or 
special representation rights (a form of political “affirmative action”)  (Kymlicka 1995, 26-33) . 
Critical to acknowledging individual and collective rights for minorities are “internal 
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restrictions” and “external protections.” Internal restrictions protect the group from internal 
dissent while external protections protect the claims of the group from society at large. From a 
liberal perspective, however, the former are rarely justified for they circumscribe personal 
autonomy.  
 In sum, identity politics movements are both individual and collective, public and private, 
and externally imposed and internally imagined. These aspects make rights-related pursuits 
political because they “involve refusing, diminishing, or displacing identities others wish to 
recognize in individuals” (Calhoun 1994, 21). As such, tension is created by individuals’ and 
groups’ constant negotiation for recognition and can be exploited by political actors to frame 
policy choices as “us vs. them” (Mols 2012, 331). This strategy has frequently been used in 
nation-building processes to foster a common national identity and can include the exertion of a 
specific religious identity to bolster unity. 
2.1.4 National and Religious Identities  
Among the various categories under which identity is examined, two of the most prominent (and 
the two most critical for this study) are national identity and religious identity. Though each is a 
distinct discipline in its own right, national and religious identities are on occasion evaluated 
concurrently due to the number of nation-states that employ or have employed religion 
historically, either explicitly or implicitly, as a way to delineate national identity. 
A nation has traditionally been defined in legal terms as: 1) a group of people; 2) sharing 
a common, well-delineated territory; 3) under a shared set of rules or laws (government). In his 
influential book Imagined Communities, Anderson argues that a nation is an “imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006, 5). He claims that a 
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nation is a social construction of the imagination because short of face-to-face contact, very few 
members will ever know each other, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson 2006, 6).  
The origins and definition of the concept of “nation” and “nationalism” have been 
debated from various perspectives (Gellner 2006; Hayes 1951, 1960; Hobsbawm 1992; Kohn 
1965, 1967). The approach that has the widest applicability for this research is Calhoun’s 
features of a “rhetoric nation.” Calhoun argues that ideas and discourse around social solidarity, 
collective identity, and political legitimacy are critical in terms of the development of a 
“national” understandings of self and others (Calhoun 1997). He presents ten characteristics by 
which a nation may claim to define itself and create a collective identity (Calhoun 1997, 4-5): 
1. Boundaries, of territory, population or both.  
2. Indivisibility—the notion that the nation is an integral unit. 
3. Sovereignty, or at least the aspiration to sovereignty, and thus formal equity with other 
nations, usually as an autonomous and putative self-sufficient state. 
4. An “ascending” notion of legitimacy—i.e. the idea that government is just only when 
supported by popular will or at least when it serves the interests of “the people” or “the 
nation.” 
5. Popular participation in collective affairs—a population mobilized on the basis of 
national membership (whether for war or civic activities). 
6. Direct membership, in which each individual is understood to be immediately a part of 
the nation and in that respect categorically equivalent to other members.  
7. Culture, including some combination of language, shared beliefs and values, habitual 
practices. 
8. Temporal depth—a notion of the nation as such existing through time, including past and 
future generations, and having a history. 
9. Common descent or racial characteristics. 
10. Special historical or even sacred relations to a certain territory.  
With this list, Calhoun seeks not to define a nation, but rather to assist in the 
conceptualization of a nation through various combinations of these characteristics. It is also 
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worth noting that the concept of nation, as taken to mean the amalgamation of multiple aspects 
of the above list, implies that even within a single national identity, individuals may very well 
interpret these characteristics variously, placing greater import on one above another, or 
construing one or more characteristics as personal (private/individual) rather than collective (for 
a discussion, see Appiah 1994). Thus “national identity” becomes variegated and the concept of 
a “minority” emerges—namely in instances where national identity is either imposed from above 
or when individuals do not prescribe to an explicit or implicit national identity. There is currently 
no international treaty that clearly defines “nation” or “national minority,” making it difficult for 
courts to adjudicate when such issues arise5. This is particularly salient when the category of 
religion is deployed to promote national unity, consequently producing religious minorities, 
occasionally forcing courts to decide on what religion is, what a religious minority is, and if the 
said minority’s rights have been abridged. 
Apostolov’s characterization of religious minorities will be used for this study: “religious 
minorities are defined as social groups which are numerically inferior and non-dominant in the 
state they live in” (2001, 10). Apostolov acknowledges the challenges of defining “minorities” 
due to the subjective and objective criteria that can be assigned, as well as the different 
                                               
 
5 See Gorzelik et al. v. Poland ([Application No: 44158/98], ECtHR, 2004) for a discussion on how international 
treaties, particularly the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe, 
attempt to protect the rights of ‘national minorities,’ while simultaneously not providing a clear definition of how a 
‘national minority’ is defined. 
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approaches of sociology, law, and political science, each of which prioritizes or minimizes the 
importance of institutions, power, decision making, social organization, and rules and laws, 
according to their respective approach (2001, 10-13). As mentioned above, problems arise when 
religious identity becomes an opportunity for action by savvy politicians to pursue their own 
agendas (Apostolov 2001, 13). These “identity entrepreneurs” exercise great social influence to 
“redefine the audience’s collective self-understanding” (Mols 2012, 332).  
This raises the questions: What is religion? How is religion defined? Who creates these 
definitions? An emerging field, known as “critical religion,” explores such questions. Fitzgerald, 
a preeminent scholar of critical religion, describes the discipline as follows: “‘Critical religion’ is 
shorthand for the critical historical deconstruction of ‘religion’ and related categories [emphasis 
in original]. The category ‘religion’…acts in binary opposition to the ‘secular’ in its various 
forms” (Fitzgerald 2015, 303-304). The Critical Religion Association (with which Fitzgerald is 
an associated scholar) approaches critical religion from a positive critical standpoint and 
emphasizes five meanings of the term critical: “crucial; exercising careful observation and 
judgment; discerning the limits; of the nature of a crisis; and critical mass—a point at which 
some action, property or condition passes over into another” (Critical Religion Association n.d.). 
Under this umbrella, religion is critically deconstructed as a “power category” alongside 
“politics,” “science,” or “nature,” bringing into question the heretofore essentialized definitions 
of religion and secularism. It holds that these the concepts of “religious” and “secular,” as we 
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know them today, emerged as a symbiotic dichotomy in the 17th century alongside modern 
thought about the aforementioned power categories.6  
Similar to identity itself, the categorization of what qualifies as religion or not is both 
essentialized and contested and negotiated over time in the liberal secular nation-state (Fitzgerald 
2015, 314). It is essentialized because modern society (necessarily, secular liberal societies) 
distills the secular as modern and scientific and characterized by pure market economics 
(temporal), whereas the realm of the religious is cast as traditional and formed of irrational 
religious myths and communitarian values (ecclesiastical) (Fitzgerald 2015). However, the 
qualification “religious” is also constructed; it is dynamic, reflective, and iteratively imagined 
(however slowly) for both the collective and individual subjects. Accordingly, religion and 
secularism become tools of authorized experts and officials to frame positions and identities and 
implement specific policy objectives.  
Yet religion (or secularism) is experienced differently by those who develop and 
propagate information about religion as it relates to policy (expert religion); by those who 
practice religion as they interact with rituals, texts, and authorities and explore their meaning and 
place in the world (lived religion); and by those who hold positions of political or religious 
power (governed religion) (Shakman Hurd 2015, 8-15). This research is concerned with this 
third category—making religion a privileged political and legal category. In doing so, political 
                                               
 
6 For a comprehensive discussion on the history of religion as a category, see (Nongbri 2013). Throughout this 
study, while acknowledging the history of the category of religion and its literature, the word “religion” is taken as 
interpreted in Article 9 of the ECHR. Thus, it is a personal or collective set of beliefs, practices, or convictions that 
have attained “a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance.” (Council of Europe 1950). 
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and legal authorities are empowered to answer what religions are deemed legitimate, which 
versions of which religions are recognized, who is allowed to represent these bodies, and, by 
default, who and what are suppressed (Shakman Hurd 2015, 18, 38–40).  
Returning to the earlier discussion about essentialized versus constructed identities, if 
religion becomes a privileged and legal category, such as when it constitutes a core aspect of 
national identity or is embodied in law, it becomes externally essentialized. External actors 
(experts or governance authorities) impose the essence (historicity, sanctioned practices, 
sincerely held beliefs, etc.) of religion on society—including those who embrace a lived religion 
and those who do not. It contributes to a narrative of national identity that hardens and becomes 
more fixed over time as the narrative is infused in national legal systems, organizations, and 
social norms—it becomes institutionalized. As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, once 
an identity (or a narrative) becomes institutionalized, it is very difficult to change.  
2.2 Institutionalism 
Though experts may argue that globalization has become a ubiquitous force, the structure of the 
nation-state still holds great value—this includes not only the nation-state as an entity or idea in 
itself, but also the institutions that comprise it. National institutions remain important because 
they provide the framework through which nation-states interact in a globalized world (Campbell 
2004). Examples of institutions vary as widely as the US Congress, marriage, and driving on the 
right-hand side of the road. Institutions can include organizations, such as political bodies, 
economic bodies, social bodies, and educational bodies (North 1990). Institutions are 
ubiquitous—we produce them and they shape society and our behaviors.  
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The challenge in analyzing and studying institutions lies in scholars’ disagreement about 
how to define them, the fact that institutions are invisible, and that rules (institutions) are 
complex and multifaceted (Ostrom 1990, 22-23).  
According to North, “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, 3). Institutions can also be 
described as the “sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make 
decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed and constrained, what aggregation rules will 
be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and 
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions” (Ostrom 1990, 51). 
Institutional rules may be imposed by authority, or may be part of a code of socially acceptable 
and learned behavior (March and Olsen 1989, 38). Finally, according to March and Olsen, “an 
institution is the intermeshing of three systems: the institutions, the individual, and the collection 
of institutions” (1989, 57).  
 It is generally accepted that the study of political science is rooted in the study of 
institutions. This “old institutionalism” focused on “formal rules and organizations rather than 
informal conventions; and upon official structures of government rather than broader 
institutional constraints on governance” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 24). But in the 1980s, 
scholars began to recognize the challenge of studying institutions, as well as the substantial 
impact they have on political decision making. March and Olsen (1984), who are often credited 
with coining the term “new institutionalism,” again asserted that institutions determine behavior; 
can be historically inefficient; and underscored the “importance of symbolic action” within these 
institutions. They recognized that their framework was an ambitious attempt to construct a theory 
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of “new institutionalism,” while also acknowledging that the framework was based on empirical 
evidence. This new approach explored how institutions (as rules, norms, and structures) 
constrain and enable actors who make choices and the range of choices available to them 
(Campbell 2004).  
This study follows new institutionalism as Campbell (2004) outlined. For Campbell, new 
institutionalism is a combination of the three main strands of institutionalism: rational choice 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. Rational choice 
institutionalism assumes that actors are strategic and goal oriented (North 1990), and that 
institutional change depends on “conflict, struggle, and bargaining as configured by the 
distribution of resources among the actors” (Campbell 2004, 183). It is rooted in neo-classical 
economics, where individuals attempt to maximize utility and behavior is determined by 
strategic interactions. It views institutions as mechanisms that exist to reduce transaction costs. 
Rational choice institutionalism examines how individuals calculate their behavior to achieve an 
optimal outcome within the “rules of the game in a society” (North 1990) or an incentive 
structure. These rules of the game are created to achieve stability and reliable outcomes. 
In contrast, sociological institutionalism presents institutions not based on rationality or 
efficiency, but as socially constructed norms, rules, and structures. Sociological institutionalism 
explains how institutions create meaning. Individuals behave based on a “logic of 
appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989; Campbell 2004), which is “a sense of rights and 
obligations derived from an identity and membership in a political community and the ethos, 
practices, and expectations of its institutions” (March and Olsen 2013, 162-163). Actors adhere 
to a logic of appropriateness because such behavior is viewed as legitimate and expected (March 
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and Olsen 2004, 3). Furthermore, institutions are pervasive throughout society, providing an 
unspoken understanding of a society’s “cultural infrastructure” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 31-
32). 
Historical institutionalism is a hybrid between sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism in that it considers competition and rationality, while also taking society and 
culture into account by examining institutions over time. Thus, as the name implies, it is 
concerned with the historical and long-term context of actor agency (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 
32). Historical institutionalism views politics on a grand geographical scale, while fully 
considering a country’s complete institutional structure. The locus of analysis is the historical 
context in which institutions have emerged and evolved, with much attention paid to path 
dependence (Pierson 2000).  
Each of these three new institutionalisms share the perspective that a nation’s institutions 
both constrain and enable policy entrepreneurs (Campbell 2004; March and Olsen 1989; North 
1990; Ostrom 1990). Elected leaders design and choose institutional forms to achieve political 
goals most effectively and efficiently (March and Olsen 1989, 115). Institutions influence 
political actors by structuring the way in which political and social problems are perceived and 
by tightly controlling potential policy solutions (Fischer 2003, 28), thus benefiting those with 
bargaining power (North 1990).  
The new institutionalist approach demonstrates how institutions structure power, which 
can often be invisible, to benefit some groups, often at the expense of others (Fischer 2003, 29). 
In this sense, power is exercised through institutions by defining identities, whether individual or 
group, and “what it means to belong to a specific collective” (March and Olsen 1989, 17). Thus, 
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in the new institutionalist approach, institutions constrain and enable through rules, norms, 
identities, ideas, and narratives “which are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and 
accepted” (March and Olsen 2013, 5) as the “instruments of stability and arenas of change” 
(March and Olsen 2013, 8).  
2.3 Patterns and Mechanisms of Institutional Change 
As Campbell (2004) explains early on in his book, Institutional Change and Globalization, 
bridging the three streams of neo-institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism, and historical institutionalism) can provide a new perspective on institutional 
change. Most (contemporary) scholars of policy change agree that there are primarily three 
patterns of change: stasis, evolutionary, and revolutionary. Different terminology has been used 
to describe these patterns, including Hall’s (1993) “orders of change” and Campbell’s (2004) 
basic patterns of change: continuous (evolutionary); punctuated equilibrium 
(discontinuous/revolutionary); and punctuated evolution (discontinuous/evolutionary). This 
study employs a framework that is inspired by these two configurations: stability/stasis, 
continuous/evolutionary/incremental change, and revolutionary/punctuated change.  
In institutional analysis, policy stability is emphasized as the norm, implying 
insignificantly small or unrecognizably slow change, if any change takes place at all. As a result, 
policy change is regarded as exceptional. As will be explored below, there are a number of 
reasons why policy stasis or change can be interpreted as either normal or exceptional, such as 
the time frame and the institutional dimensions that are under scrutiny.  
If the time frame of analysis is quite narrow, change may be perceived as stasis, whereas 
if the scope of analysis is widened, policy change may be characterized in a way that allows for 
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greater change. In contrast, “events that seem important in the short run may have only minor 
consequences in the long run” (Campbell 2004, 43). The causes and consequence of each of 
these policies/institutions vary, depending on the context in which the change took place, the 
time frame within which it is analyzed, and the dimensions of the institutions that are examined.  
The selection of specific dimensions (which institutions, which levels of institutions [state vs. 
national; individual vs. group; etc.], and time frame [months, years, decades, etc.]) may indicate 
that there has indeed been policy change.  
If a longer time frame of evaluation is taken, policy change may be perceived as slow or 
incremental. Such gradual changes can be a result of the manner in which decision making 
occurs. Lindblom is credited with developing the theory of incrementalism in “The Science of 
‘Muddling Through’” (1959). He argued that policy actors will choose to make incremental 
changes to policies. This is the case because rational-comprehensive decision making is 
unattainable, in that it requires complete knowledge (value assessment, knowledge of the 
alternatives, and costs and benefits) to be able to enact a policy change. Even before Lindblom 
(1959) introduced the concept of incrementalism, Simon, in his book Administrative Behavior 
(1947), coined the term “satisficing,” a neologism that combined the words satisfy and suffice. 
Like incrementalism, satisficing is critical of rational choice decision making and claims that 
decision makers either do not have access to complete information or that too much information 
is required to be computed (bounded rationality). Because decision makers cannot possibly do 
either, change occurs at the margins and policy change moves along at a much slower pace.  
However, the theory of incrementalism has been partially discredited because of the 
assumption that the information used to make small adjustments at the margins was processed 
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proportionally, which in reality it is not. Bounded rationality precipitates disproportionate 
information processing, which can lead to punctuated changes in policy (B. D. Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005, 17). Punctuated-equilibrium theory aims to explain how stasis and 
incrementalism are fairly widespread in most policy areas, yet there can occasionally be “large-
scale departures from the past” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 155). The theory highlights 
the critical role of political institutions and boundedly rational decision making, while 
emphasizing issue definition and agenda setting as two related components of the policy process 
(True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 156).  
Another lens through which to examine punctuations in policy change is that of 
punctuated evolution. This theory views the periods of equilibrium between punctuated changes 
as evolutionary rather than static (Campbell 2004, 34). This evolution is reflected in slight and 
gradual adjustments to institutions within the constraints of the institution’s practices, rules, 
routines, and cognitive schema (Campbell 2004, 34). However, as mentioned above, this school 
of thought demands that institutional dimensions, time frame, and the order of change dictate 
whether or not the change is evolutionary or revolutionary (Campbell 2004, 35). 
In sum, experts would agree that policy change is generally an incremental process, 
punctuated by occasional yet drastic departures from the past. According to Campbell, change is 
evolutionary and not revolutionary because “innovations rarely start from scratch (they involve 
at least some recombination of already existing elements) but also because they are tailored to 
blend with local institutions, rather than replace them entirely” (2004, 87). To be sure, 
institutional arrangements can affect the magnitude of punctuations (True, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 2007, 163). Change is less likely when an institution is highly integrated into the 
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institutional environment and when change would require changes to other institutions (March 
and Olsen 1989, 106).  
Over time, socially constructed policy designs become institutionalized and “feed back” 
or “feed forward”, reinforcing and solidifying the social constructions of certain groups, power 
structures, and institutional settings through a mechanism known as path dependence (Ingram, 
Schneider, and Deleon 2007, 106). Pierson was influential in formalizing the concept of path 
dependency within the realm of politics (Pierson 2000). Path dependence explains why we may 
have arrived at a certain equilibrium, based on feedback loops over time and an initial condition. 
According to the concept of path dependence, once a particular course of action is chosen, 
deviations from this path are rare, but when they do occur, they are either self-reinforcing or 
provide positive feedback and can also substantially impact the course of a policy or institution. 
This positive feedback is what economists call “increasing returns” (self-reinforcement) (Pierson 
2000, 251). In a situation characterized by increasing returns, the more frequently a decision is 
made, the more likely that decision will continue to be made due to the positive feedback 
received. Once a policy (or an institution) is in a positive feedback loop, it is very difficult to 
veer from that path due to high set-up costs or the cost to change; coordination required to make 
the change; bounded rationality; the political and power-related desires of the players; and the 
density of the institutions surrounding the policy (Pierson 2000). This leads to institutions and 
policies that remain in the status quo long after exogenous (and even endogenous) factors could 
have or should have led to change.  
 These theoretical concepts regarding institutional change revolve around legislative and 
bureaucratic processes, leaving a peripheral role, if any, to the judiciary. However, when 
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countries become signatories or ratifiers of international agreements or regimes, for example, 
they commit themselves to adopting certain policies and programs, even to the point of 
international adjudication. Signatories are mandated to implement specific reforms to their own 
institutions as part of their obligations to these international tribunals. This is what Dolowitz and 
Marsh refer to as obligated transfer (2000, 14-15). The ECHR and its judicial arm, the ECtHR, 
which are the focus of this study, are such bodies. Obligated transfer is an intentional process, 
requiring high contracting parties to change domestic policies and institutions as a result of a 
judicial ruling, not due to domestic political impetus. The next section further demonstrates that 
judicial bodies have begun to play an increasingly influential role in institutional change. 
2.4 Judicialization 
“Certainly courts represent a distinctive institutional setting, whose actors, 
procedures, language, and processes of reasoning differ from those that prevail 
in legislatures and bureaucracies. Yet we can conceptualize court cases as 
processes of policy formulation, with plaintiffs, defendants, and amici as 
participants proposing alternatives, and judges as the decision makers. Courts 
thus offer a potentially fruitful comparative case for studies of the impact of 
institutions on policy formulation” (Jann and Wegrich 2007, 86) 
 
2.4.1 What Is Judicialization?  
In constitutional law, the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government has been a taken-for-granted arrangement where each body is charged 
with carrying out its respective responsibilities relatively independent of the others and each 
serving as a check on the others. However, over the past few decades, there has been a shift in 
the transfer of power from representative institutions to the judiciary at both the domestic and 
supranational levels (Hirschl 2013, 21). This phenomenon, known as judicialization, describes 
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the expansion of policy making authority to the judiciary, which had previously been agreed 
upon by most to be best handled by legislative and executive officials (Tate and Vallinder 1995, 
2). When the concept of judicialization first began to gain attention as a theoretical framework in 
the 1990s, it was generally agreed that there were two types of the judicialization of politics: 1) 
the expansion of the province of the courts or the judges at the expense of politicians and/or 
administrators (that is, the transfer of decision-making rights from the legislature, cabinet, or 
civil service to the courts) or, at least, 2) the spread of judicial decision-making methods outside 
the judicial province proper (Vallinder 1995, 13). As the phenomena has proliferated globally, 
states are signing on (voluntarily or by compulsion) to supranational agreements that allow their 
own judicial organs to arbitrate cases between states or cases brought by individuals against a 
state. Yet scholars continue to grapple with what precisely is meant by judicialization. Hirschl 
(2013, 3-5) has constructed what seems to be the most contemporary and all-encompassing 
definition, which he labels the three faces of the judicialization of politics: 1) “the spread of legal 
discourse, jargon, rules, and procedures into the political sphere and policy-making fora and 
processes”; 2) the “expansion of the province of courts and judges in determining public policy 
outcomes, mainly through administrative review, judicial redrawing of bureaucratic boundaries 
between state organs, and ‘ordinary’ rights jurisprudence” (these cases often concern civil 
liberties and formal equality issues and are pertinent to this study); and 3) “reliance on courts and 
judges for dealing with what we might call ‘mega-politics:’ core political controversies that 
define (and often divide) whole polities” (these cases often concern fundamental restorative 
justice dilemmas and formative collective identity and are, again, pertinent to this study). Hirschl 
(2006, 723-728, 2008, 5-6, 2013, 7-10) has further explored the judicialization of mega-politics 
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and clarified specific subcategories related to national security; corroboration of regime change; 
the judicialization of electoral processes; fundamental restorative justice issues; and the reliance 
on courts to contemplate a nation’s raison d’être, formative collective identity, or nation-building 
efforts. Such reliance on the courts in the final category is more common in societies that have 
wide rifts based on ethnicity, linguistics, or religion (Hirschl 2013, 10). In fact, though the last 
two categories seem to resemble each other considerably, they are distinct from each other in that 
the former is concerned with issues of procedural justice while the second deals with issues of 
national self-identity and other largely political issues (Hirschl 2006, 728).  
 Hamlin and Sala (2018) have astutely recognized that the discrepancies in the 
definition(s) and the lack of academic discussion about the scope of what judicialization is have 
impeded the development of a comparative theory of the concept. They have identified nine 
“categories” of judicialization, while acknowledging that some overlap and some have been 
previously conceptualized within different disciplines. The nine categories are:  
1. Judicial Review: refers to the establishment of judicial review around the globe after World War 
II. In this conceptualization, democracy and judicial empowerment are correlated, and judicial 
review is equated with judicial empowerment. As such, the judicialization of politics is a 
worldwide trend; however, it does not explain the power of courts in countries in non-democratic 
countries (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 4). 
2. Judicial Independence: takes into account the variations in judicial empowerment among 
democracies, and in non-democratic regimes, the conflation of the terms “judicial empowerment” 
and “judicial independence” (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 5–6). 
3. Judicial Activism: asserts that judicialization occurs when judges intentionally influence policy 
decisions, in contrast to legislative bodies referring to the courts for validation or invalidation of 
their legislative decisions (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 6–7). 
4. Constitutionalization: takes on two forms, the first of which is the establishment of constitutional 
rights whose interpretation is left largely to the courts, and the second of which can refer to an 
international context in which international courts enforce international conventions by 
compelling the ratifiers to satisfy the obligations of said treaties (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 8–9). 
5. Busy Courts: refers to the increased caseload of the courts, whether in one specific policy area or 
throughout the judicial system (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 10). 
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6. Judicialization of Megapolitics: a term coined by Hirschl (2008), it refers to the deferment of 
“political” issues from the legislative arena to the judicial (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 11–12). 
7. Legislative Anticipation of Judicial Decisions: can actually lead to a decrease in litigation, due to 
executive, administrative, and legislative bodies basing their decision making on predictions 
about judicial responses (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 12–13). 
8. Adverserial Legalism in Administrative Processes: judicialization in which administrative and 
bureaucratic bodies begin to emulate judicial processes and procedures (Hamlin and Sala 2018, 
14). 
9. Legal Referents in Cultural Processes: a discursive and symbolic use of legal jargon by groups to 
assert their legitimacy to the public (also conceptualized as “juridification” by Silverman (the 
process in which “areas of social life” “are increasingly controlled” by legal language (2009)). 
While there are certainly aspects of many of the aforementioned categories that are recognizable 
throughout this study, the most applicable definitions are that of Hirschl’s “Judicialization of 
Megapolitics” (2008), and #4 above, “Constitutionalization”. Because there is not one 
comprehensive and agreed-upon theory of judicialization, it is challenging to precisely pinpoint 
the causes, outcomes, and variations in judicialization. Yet because there is overlap between 
some of these conceptualizations, there are inevitably similarities in the processes and 
consequences of judicialization.  
2.4.2 How Does Judicialization Occur? 
Hirschl (2006, 2013) clearly outlined how to recognize judicialization and also most usefully 
explained, and not merely described, the influence of institutional, societal, and political factors 
that cause judicialization. While the courts are the focus of this power shift, there are endogenous 
and exogenous forces that combine to create and sustain judicialization. Drawing primarily from 
Hirschl’s work, but also the work of his contemporaries, the following factors explain the 
conditions under which judicialization flourishes.  
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Institutional Factors 
Democracy is a precondition, if not the main cause of judicialization (Hirschl 2008, 22); in fact, 
“it is very unlikely to encounter the judicialization of politics outside democratic polities” (Tate 
1995, 29). Simply put, with greater democracy comes expanded administrative and regulatory 
agencies, and inevitably, more courts (Hirschl 2008, 22, 2013, 17). In a similar vein, 
judicialization is also more likely to occur in governments where there is a clear separation of 
powers, that is, where independent and coequal legislative, executive, and judicial branches 
exist. Democracy and separation-of-powers systems on their own cannot account for each 
instance or variation in judicialization worldwide; they merely provide hospitable settings that 
further facilitate judicialization. It may seem counterintuitive that in systems that require such 
independent and coequal branches, the judiciary is meant to interpret and not make laws, which 
would prevent judicialization. Yet recall that “coequal status and personal and institutional 
autonomy for judges hardly require them to substitute their own policy judgments” (Tate 1995, 
29).  
However, democracy and separation-of-powers systems on their own cannot account for 
each instance or variation in judicialization worldwide—they merely provide hospitable 
conditions for settings that further propagate judicialization. Again, democracy creates multi-
layered governments with corresponding administrative and regulatory agencies; judicial review 
is necessary to efficiently and effectively monitor the expansion of the state (Hirschl 2013, 18). 
There is immense political power in judicial review, which is the authority granted to apex courts 
to annul statutes deemed to be in conflict with the constitution (Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002, 
8-9). What was previously acknowledged and accepted as natural and matter-of-fact 
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constitutional/statutory interpretation of the law is now depicted, and in some cases rightly so, as 
judicial law-making (Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002, 9). Though constitutions and judicial 
review cannot necessarily exercise power independently, they certainly restrict the “institutional 
flexibility of political decision-makers” (Hirschl 2004b, 11).  
Interestingly, another condition hospitable for judicialization is an independent judiciary. 
According to Hirschl (2013, 12), “At a bare minimum, the judicialization of politics requires the 
existence of a reasonably independent judiciary, with a well-respected and fairly active apex 
court.” This implies the presence of a constitution that has established such a framework. 
Without expanding on the literature on constitutionalism (and new constitutionalism in 
particular), suffice it to say that the concept of constitutional supremacy, where a state relies on a 
constitution, a constitutional court, and thus judicial review, is widespread. It is now the system 
of governance for more than one hundred countries (Hirschl 2006, 721). This has opened the 
doors for constitutional frameworks that can encourage judicial activism (Hirschl 2008, 2013) 
that “provides political actors who are unable or unwilling to advance their policy preferences 
through majoritarian decision-making arenas with an alternative institutional channel (the courts) 
to accomplish their policy goals” (Hirschl 2013, 12).  
Societal Factors 
Hirschl (2006, 745-746, 2008, 35, 2013, 12) refers to the aforementioned constitutional settings 
as “judicialization from below” or “bottom up judicialization,” alluding to the role that society 
plays in bolstering judicialization. Should individuals or interest groups perceive judicial 
institutions as more reputable, impartial, and effective decision-making bodies than majoritarian 
institutions, which may be perceived as “immobilized, self-serving, or corrupt,” it is only logical 
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that policy-making authority be afforded to the judiciary (Tate 1995, 31). Under these 
circumstances, “historically under-represented or disenfranchised groups and individuals” act 
strategically through the courts to achieve rights recognition (Hirschl 2008, 21-22). A politics of 
rights is likely to emerge in the presence of a constitutionally outlined bill of rights or the explicit 
recognition of certain individual/minority rights over that of the majority (Tate 1995, 29-30). 
“When legitimacy is accorded to a politics of rights, it spills over to the procedures associated 
with the work of the courts, who become key players in this politics” (Tate 1995, 30). Interest 
groups will either spark movements to initiate litigation that would change the case law of a 
specific area as it stands, or use the courts because current case law is in their favor (Shapiro 
2002, 48). As such, individuals and groups compete to frame their goals in such a way as to 
establish normative structures, which are the foundation of “social power relations” (Stone Sweet 
2000, 7). Power is exercised through ideas, symbols, and the strategic control of information 
(Stone 2012, 34), enabling individuals and groups to “define themselves, existentially and in 
community with others” (Stone Sweet 2000, 10). Through the legal codification of social norms, 
laws and courts are endowed with the authority to construct and characterize political 
communities (Stone Sweet 2000, 11-12). Hence, constitutionalization, and therefore 
judicialization, are merely “politics by other means” (Hirschl 2004a, 8). 
Political Factors 
Judicialization is employed as a politically expedient means to obtain or maintain power or 
achieve a political goal. Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation thesis” provides a comprehensive 
framework with which to understand how political elites behave in the legal arena when their 
positions of power are threatened. The thesis is based on the strategic interaction of three key 
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groups: threatened political elites wishing to preserve/enhance their political hegemony by 
insulating policy-making processes from democracy; economic elites who view 
constitutionalization of certain economic liberties as a means to promote a neoliberal agenda of 
open markets, etc.; and judicial elites and national high courts that seek to enhance their political 
influence and international reputation (Hirschl 2004b, 43-44). Any of these powerful elites may 
seek to preserve their hegemony using the judiciary when it is disadvantageous to follow 
majoritarian, democratic means to policy making or when their “worldviews and policy 
preferences are increasingly challenged in such areas”; when the judiciary holds a higher 
reputation for impartiality and integrity; when sociopolitical elites determine judicial 
appointments; and when the courts tend to favor secularist ideologies (Hirschl 2004a, 9). For 
example, in countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey, constitutional courts are 
increasingly used as the last bastion against theocratic governance (Hirschl 2008, 27). Such 
essential disputes over national/collective identity formation related to religion and state are 
often strategically delegated to the courts, especially if the political stakes are high (Hirschl 
2008, 27). Because the corresponding rulings rarely contradict deeply entrenched national 
narratives, plaintiffs that are dissatisfied with a domestic apex court judgment may seek recourse 
in the jurisdiction of an international, supranational, or transnational court.  
2.4.3 International Judicialization and Transnational Courts  
As mentioned above, judicialization is a global phenomenon, often attributed to the international 
trend of constitutional supremacy and the formulation of conditions favoring increased rights 
discourse (Hirschl 2013, 2). The powerful elite frequently strategize to transfer “fundamental 
collective-identity questions of ‘religion and state’ from the political sphere to the courts” 
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(Hirschl 2008, 27). Such a strategy often appeals to secular power-holders, as the courts become 
secularizing agents (Hirschl 2008, 27-29). However, this is not always the case, as evidenced in 
the number of cases that have come before the European Court of Human Rights that argue that 
the allegedly violating country infringed on basic religious liberties. Accordingly, it is important 
to examine domestic judicialization independently from international/transnational 
judicialization, the latter of which is a focus of this study.  
 The literature on the history of international adjudication typically begins with the Treaty 
of Westphalia (1648) that effectively ended the Thirty Years’ War and introduced a new system 
of co-existent sovereign states and the inception of modern international law. The first 
international courts that emerged in response served to resolve voluntary disputes through 
arbitration, slowly progressing toward compulsory jurisdiction.7 Eventually, compulsory 
jurisdiction became commonplace, deepening the practice by moving from general to specialized 
compulsory jurisdiction.  
The massive atrocities that occurred during World War II spurred a revolution that called 
greater attention to human rights and to preventing such tragedies from ever occurring again. The 
movement was a catalyst for the creation of new institutions that would foster cooperation, 
diplomacy, and peace amongst nations. First and foremost among these was the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (United Nations 1948). The following 
year, in May 1949, the Council of Europe (COE) was established, which drafted the European 
                                               
 
7 For a detailed historical overview, see (O’Connell and VanderZee 2014). 
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Convention on Human Rights soon after (1950; entered into force in 1953) and established the 
European Court of Human Rights (Ovey and White 2002, 1-6). The rights established in the 
ECHR were inspired by the Universal Declaration, but the European Convention was legally 
binding and the list of protected rights was more concretely outlined (Ovey and White 2002, 4). 
Ratifiers of the ECHR were now bound to protect human rights, with the ECHR superseding 
domestic legal arenas.  
Initially, governments could agree to the Court’s jurisdiction for short periods of time (for 
three to five years) and withdraw as they wished (Alter 2014, 69). However, the ECtHR has 
since evolved to become a fully compulsory jurisdiction court and states’ individual systems 
must comply with the legal rules of the ECHR. This has led to struggles of subsidiarity 
(acknowledgment that domestic authorities are better equipped to determine the nature of 
domestic norms and conditions in relation to obligations under the Convention) and margin of 
appreciation (the amount of leeway granted to states by the bodies of the COE in fulfilling their 
obligations as ratifiers of the Convention). These debates play out most evidently in the 
processes of both adjudication and implementation of court decisions.  
As mentioned above, international or transnational judicialization differs from domestic 
judicialization. While judicialization in general changes the arena for political decision making 
from legislative bodies to the courts, the judicialization of international decisions in particular 
has permitted courts to take on a role as “social actors,” suggesting that they contribute to 
changes in human behaviors and opinions (Sands 2017, 889). As debates surrounding human 
rights have expanded beyond domestic borders, international courts have become a mechanism 
through which to resolve these debates. The rulings issued by these courts, which increasingly 
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address questions of religion, are an attempt to codify best practices to address disputes over 
alleged human rights violations (de Galembert and Koenig 2014, 3). While these efforts have 
certainly not led to a “standardization of national regulations regarding religion,” (de Galembert 
and Koenig 2014, 11), the gradually increasing number of rulings from human rights tribunals 
have incrementally shaped how religion is dealt with by individual nation-states.  
From 1959 to 1993, not a single conviction was issued from the ECtHR based on Article 
9, which is the article relating to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Fokas 2015, 60). 
The first violation was against Greece in 1993 and involved its criminalization of proselytization 
(Kokkinakis v. Greece [Application No. 14307/88] 1993). Subsequent judgments relating to 
violations of Article 9 were largely made against newer members of the COE from Central and 
Eastern Europe (former Soviet-dominated nations) and Greece (Richardson 2015, 7).  
The challenge with the international judicialization of religion is that it is followed by 
implementation. This inevitably returns the issue at hand to domestic legislative bodies, placing 
the victors of rulings at the ECtHR at the mercy of domestic institutions (laws, norms, politics, 
and organizations) as these institutions determine how the ruling is actually executed. This is 
particularly relevant in cases where there is a wide margin of appreciation8 granted to the state. 
This is often the case and gives the offending state significant leeway in determining what they 
consider the most appropriate response to a negative ruling. As a result, there are inevitably 
variations in how different states respond to violations of religious freedom.  
                                               
 
8 See Chapter 3 for a description of margin of appreciation. 
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2.5 Implementation and Compliance in the European Court of Human Rights  
Variations in implementation exist across the several types of international courts, tribunals, and 
arbitral bodies. The literature includes multitudes of comparative case studies between 
international adjudicative bodies in an attempt to formulate a stronger theory of the factors that 
help and hinder compliance with international court rulings. This study, however, is limited to 
one body in particular: the European Court of Human Rights. According to Romano, Alter, and 
Shany’s (2014) typology of international adjudicative bodies, the ECtHR is a permanent, 
regional, human rights-oriented, judicial body with compulsory jurisdiction. As such, theoretical 
frameworks that attempt to describe or explain outcomes in different kinds of institutions may 
apply occasionally, but not universally.  
Recent scholarship has focused on examining domestic contexts to develop an 
explanation as to why there are such variations in implementation across the Council of Europe’s 
jurisdiction (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014, 206). One potential cause of these variations 
in implementation or compliance is the way in which compliance/implementation is defined. 
Differences in definition in part reflect disagreements about the utility of using compliance to 
measure effectiveness (Huneeus 2014, 439). A broad definition of implementation, which 
encompasses a wide margin of acceptance and shallow commitment requirements, (Huneeus 
2014, 439) can mislead researchers or practitioners into presuming a high rate of legal 
compliance. On the other hand, a narrow definition may not fully capture the impact of even 
modest changes to behavior by the relevant parties or peripheral actors (Huneeus 2014, 439-
440). Different terminology has also been employed to describe 
implementation/compliance/execution. In this study, the terms will be employed interchangeably 
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to indicate actions taken on behalf of a state to fulfill their obligations as laid out in ECtHR 
rulings.  
 Regardless of the manner in which implementation/compliance is defined, scholars 
generally agree that the implementation of ECtHR rulings is inherently a domestic and political 
process (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014, 207; Hillebrecht 2012, 279; Keller and Marti 
2016, 831). The national institutions and actors involved in this process lack the capacity to 
expeditiously and completely implement judgments. This is due to weak institutions such as the 
executive but also the judiciary (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014). Furthermore, when 
human rights awareness and expertise is concentrated (not diffuse) throughout all branches of the 
government, implementation is more likely to be slower (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014, 
223), taking months or years to close a case.9 
 In fact, the Parliamentary Assembly (the legislative body) of the COE has issued regular 
resolutions and reports on the implementation of judgments. The issue is so important because, 
over time, non-compliance with ECtHR rulings erodes the credibility and legitimacy of the Court 
and the Council bodies in general. Scholars agree that compliance is a fundamental aspect of 
adjudication and rule of law (Huneeus 2014, 440; Keller and Marti 2016, 830). When the law is 
applied universally and objectively, the rulings carry weight and merit and, consequently, so too 
does the adjudicative body. The countries that do not fully implement the rulings (understood as 
the non-closure of a case by the CoM) pose a threat to the integrity and authority of the Court. As 
                                               
 
9 Compliance or implementation is deemed satisfactory by the ECtHR when a case is closed by the Committee of 
Ministers.  
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a result, the COE has a clear interest in exploring the issue of non-compliance and working to 
address it.  
Resolution 1226 (2000) identified at least seven implementation problems present in the 
execution of the judgements of the ECtHR, including: political reasons; reasons to do with the 
reforms required; practical reasons relating to national legislative procedures; budgetary reasons; 
reasons to do with public opinion; ambiguous or unclear judgments; and reasons related to 
interference with obligations deriving from other institutions (Council of Europe 2000). 
Additionally, in the 10th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers (CoM) (Council of 
Europe 2016, 13), the major problems related to implementation were listed as: important and 
complex structural problems causing difficulties in identifying necessary reforms, including 
those required to stop the stream of repetitive cases, and in finding the means and resources for 
the implementation of the reforms; the absence of a common understanding as to the scope of the 
execution measures; slow or blocked execution as a result of disagreement between national 
institutions or amongst political parties regarding the substance of the reforms required and/or 
the procedure to be followed; and refusal to adopt individual measures or to pay just satisfaction.  
Progress has indeed been made to close cases, and a record 2,066 cases were closed in 2016 
(compared to 1,537 in 2015) (Council of Europe 2016, 9). Furthermore, all bodies of the COE 
have been cooperating to implement internal reforms to lighten the case load and ensure more 
complete compliance. For example, Protocol 11, which entered into force in 1998, made 
individual applications to the Court possible and shifted all judicial responsibility to a single 
Court that replaced the previous European Commission and Court of Human rights, and 
delegated supervision of the execution of judgments solely to the CoM. Protocol 14, which came 
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into force in 2010, was a major shift toward creating greater efficiency in judicial decision 
making. The pilot judgment procedure became codified through this process and helped states 
eliminate structural issues in repetitive cases by identifying these issues and supplying more 
clear recommendations on how to resolve the problems that caused the violations. Protocol 14 
also initiated measures for the CoM (under exceptional circumstances and with the support of 2/3 
of the body) to bring forward non-compliance proceedings against a state in the Grand Chamber 
formation of the Court. Additional mechanisms to secure more robust implementation have 
included: 
• The İzmir Conference (2011) 
• The Brighton Conference (2012) 
• The Oslo Conference (2013) 
• The Brussels Conference (2015) 
Taken together, these changes were intended to address the portion of member states of 
the Council of Europe that continue to face severe structural issues, some of which have not been 
resolved for 10 years. The top “offenders” are Italy, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Romania, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova, and Poland. These states have 
the highest number of non-implemented judgments (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights 2017).  
These measures have all affirmed the role of the CoM in securing implementation and 
simultaneously carved out a new paradigm of shared responsibility. Whereas, in the past, the 
CoM had been understood to be the primary agent responsible for coordinating with the 
offending member state to ensure implementation, these two alongside the ECtHR and other 
actors are tasked with ensuring the execution of judgments. Keller and Marti (2016) refer to this 
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paradigm shift toward expanded Court involvement as a reconceptualization of implementation, 
namely, the judicialization of the execution of ECtHR judgments. Within this framework, they 
propose examining the role of the court at three points: pre-judgment, judgment, and post-
judgment. The ECtHR plays a role in the pre-judgment stage by securing implementation prior to 
a decision on the merits of the case (or even its admissibility) through interim measures that are 
binding and can lead to an autonomous violation of Article 34 of the ECHR (Keller and Marti 
2016, 833). Interim measures can be seen as an adjudicator’s tool in securing restitution (a 
primary form of reparation, which might otherwise occur at a later phase) (Keller and Marti 
2016, 834). However, the Court rarely exercises this option and has not explicitly acknowledged 
interim measures to secure restitution early on (Keller and Marti 2016, 834). In the judgment 
phase, in spite of the principle of subsidiarity, for the last two decades the Court has provided 
more unequivocal details in its judgments and so has provided less of a declaration of general 
measures to be taken and instead outlined specific steps toward repairing the violation and 
complying with the judgment. This is also true for just satisfaction and individual measures 
(Keller and Marti 2016, 836-839). In doing so, the Court sets clear expectations and improves 
accountability; “in the Committee of Ministers, the diplomatic or political leeway for justifying 
non- or partial compliance shrinks and, in the domestic sphere, the government is more easily 
exposed to pressure from civil society” (Keller and Marti 2016, 840). Finally, the Court has 
played a definitively lesser role in the post-judgment phase due to the institutional arrangements 
of the ECHR, particularly the CoM’s oversight regarding the execution of judgments (Keller and 
Marti 2016, 845-846). The Court possesses the capacity to review compliance, though it has 
rarely exercised this ability. Keller and Marti suggest that should the Court play a more active 
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role in the first two phases, measuring compliance in the final phase would become more of a 
legal interpretation, thus requiring final judicial determination (by the Court) and making 
comprehensive implementation more compulsory (2016, 849). 
Another challenge to understanding compliance is the issue of how it is measured. 
Various factors such as inconsistent data collection, measurement, and evaluation procedures and 
a heavy case load contribute to the difficulty in determining state compliance with rulings. In the 
ECtHR, a state is considered to have fully complied with a judgment when the Committee of 
Ministers determines that the obligations set out in the judgment have been met. However, while 
the language ECtHR judgments typically use provides explicit obligations for just satisfaction, 
costs, and expenses, it provides clear obligations for general and individual measures less 
frequently. This leads to what Hillebrecht (2014) calls “a la carte compliance” where states only 
partially comply with a judgment. This is, in fact, the norm in the ECtHR. 
Hawkins and Jacoby (2010, 77-82) have indicated four types of compliance: 1) split 
decisions, in which a state takes action on some but not all measures required (for example, 
payment of just satisfaction but not taking steps to implement general measures); 2) state 
substitutions, where a state replaces the requisite measures with its own interpretation of those 
measures; 3) slow motion compliance, where a state partly moves toward implementation, 
suggesting that somehow it may take further action later; and 4) ambiguous compliance amid 
complexity, where the state is faced with exceptionally demanding or politically difficult 
circumstances that lead to a vast discrepancy between the terms of the judgment and execution. 
Greater clarity in the language of the judgment has been demonstrated to increase compliance, 
due to the ease with which non-compliance can be identified (Keller and Marti 2016, 840). This 
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also restricts the political or diplomatic “leeway” justifying partial or non-compliance that is 
occasionally exercised in the Committee of Ministers, forcing states to perform their definitive 
obligations stemming from the judgment (Keller and Marti 2016, 840). 
When states do implement, either fully or in part, it is due to a combination of exogenous 
and endogenous factors. Hillebrecht (2014, 33-39) has identified four broad explanations for 
compliance: 1) the epiphenomenal nature of international law, with the states having 
preconceived expectations about enforcement and compliance; 2) compliance as top down 
coercion or enforcement from a regional or global hegemon, frequently coming in the form of 
“naming and shaming”; 3) international law shaping new norms and socializing states into those 
norms, by understanding states under one court’s jurisdiction as a social environment in which 
the “community’s standards and norms are prescriptive” and as such, “encourag[ing] states to 
change their underlying preferences and behavior”; and 4) explanations stemming from domestic 
politics. Other scholars have added that compliance is more likely when there is domestic 
capacity and political will (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014; Donald and Leach 2016).  
The implementation of judgments “has become increasingly internationalized and 
judicialized by the ECtHR in recent years” (Keller and Marti 2016, 820). Yet does 
implementation or full compliance with a judgment from an international court necessarily imply 
effectiveness? First, one must define effectiveness. According to Meyer (2014, 94), effectiveness 
in the context of international law “refers to whether the law has changed a state’s behavior from 
what it would have been in the absence of the law.” It is important to point out that this definition 
differs from compliance, in that the latter “refers to whether or not a state’s conduct meets the 
prescribed legal standard.” There are four possible outcomes for compliance and effectiveness: 
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1) high compliance and high effectiveness; 2) low compliance and low effectiveness; 3) high 
compliance and low effectiveness; 4) low compliance and high effectiveness (Meyer 2014, 94). 
It is typically either the tribunal’s policy area or the type of lawmaking (adjudicated or 
negotiated) that determines the outcome (Meyer 2014, 96). Often times, human rights treaties 
such as the ECHR can produce high levels of effectiveness, even when compliance seems low 
(Meyer 2014, 97). This theoretical concept directly aligns with two aspects of the 
aforementioned theories of institutional change, namely, Campbell’s (2004, 43) concern with the 
time frame under analysis (recognizing that change occurs incrementally over time as opposed to 
taking only a snapshot of a specific period); and Pierson’s (2000) path dependence, where the 
more frequently a decision is made, the more entrenched that decision becomes. For Pierson, 
however, change can be observable over time.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Judicialization, therefore, has expanded beyond its initial conceptualization within domestic legal 
spheres and now plays a role in international and transnational adjudication. That said, the 
judicialization of international legal bodies is a relatively new phenomenon that has opened new 
doors for theoretical and practical examinations of its processes and impacts, particularly in the 
area of human rights. The growth of rights discourse and other conditions favorable for 
judicialization have led individuals and groups to realize that the courts are another path of 
recourse to perceived wrongs. By pursuing policy goals through the courts, individuals and 
groups that cannot take action legislatively have an alternative institutional means to accomplish 
their policy goals (Hirschl 2013, 12). In turn, courts at all levels, and international human rights 
courts in particular, have become overburdened. Increased case loads and low levels of 
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implementation have both called the legitimacy and efficacy of international human rights courts 
into question.  
The next chapter takes a closer look at the European Court of Human Rights. The chapter 
first discusses the history of the establishment of the COE, which is Europe’s preeminent human 
rights organization. This is followed by a discussion of the administrative and legislative bodies 
that comprise the COE, with a heavy focus on the procedures and processes of the two bodies 
that decide upon the judicial and execution arms—the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Committee of Ministers. The chapter wraps up with a review of the Court’s case law on religious 
freedom and Turkey’s history with the Court.   
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CHAPTER 3: A History of the Council of Europe and the European 
Court of Human Rights  
Human rights are the inalienable and fundamental conditions granted to humanity, merely by 
virtue of being human. After WWII, a consensus emerged about the need to develop mechanisms 
to identify, promote, and protect such rights around the world. A number of international and 
regional human rights organs and their respective conventions and courts were created as a 
result. One of the first among these was the Council of Europe (COE), the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This chapter 
provides a history of the COE, starting with the impetus for its establishment. This is followed by 
concise descriptions of the COE’s administrative and consultative bodies and, naturally, a more 
in-depth description of the COE’s legal and decision-making bodies: the ECtHR and the 
Committee of Ministers (CoM). The chapter concludes with an overview of the religious 
freedom case law of the ECtHR and Turkey’s history with the ECtHR, including comparative 
statistics on applications and execution. 
3.1 Establishment 
In 1945, in the dark aftermath of WWII, the United Nations (UN) was founded to prevent 
another international catastrophe and secure peace around the world. Soon thereafter, in 1948, 
the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was 
the first formal document dedicated to the universal protection of fundamental human rights. The 
member states of the COE (founded in 1949) followed suit and drafted the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (better known as the European 
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Convention on Human Rights) in 1950. The Convention consists of articles outlining specific 
rights which the ratifying states are bound to respect. These rights include education, non-
discrimination, freedom of conscience and religion, and the right to fair trial.10 Of the current 47 
countries that are members of the COE, 28 are members of the European Union.  
3.2 Bodies 
The COE has a number of administrative and consultative entities, each with a very different 
scope. Collectively, they are charged with carrying out the overarching aim of the COE “to 
achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the 
ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social 
progress…through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and 
by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and 
administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (Council of Europe 1949, Chapter 1, Articles 1a,b).  
The Secretary-General of the COE is the highest ranking representative of the body and is 
“elected for a period of five years by the Parliamentary Assembly from a list of candidates drawn 
up by the Committee of Ministers” (Ovey and White 2002, 10). The Secretary-General is 
responsible for heading the Secretariat, which has three directorate generals—Human Rights and 
Rule of Law, Democracy, and Administration. A separate election is held for Deputy Secretary-
General, also a five-year-term. The Secretariat is the depositary of all Council treaties while the 
                                               
 
10 For the full text of the European Convention on Human Rights, see 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  
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Treaty Office is responsible for the custodianship, administration, registration, and ratification of 
treaties (Treaty Office, Directorate of Legal Advice and Public International Law 2009, 1). In the 
context of the COE, the European Treaty Series encompass conventions, agreements, charters, 
codes, framework conventions, and outline conventions—all of which are instruments as defined 
by the Vienna Convention11 (Council of Europe, Treaty Office 2018). 
There are four consultative bodies within the COE. The Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities ensures the application of the European Charter of Local Self-Government12 and 
advances “consultation between national governments and local and regional authorities” 
(Council of Europe 2018b). The Conference of INGOs (international non-governmental 
organizations) forges relationships with NGOs throughout Europe to strengthen their role in civil 
society with a distinct focus on the promotion of public participation in decision making 
(Council of Europe 2018a). The Commissioner for Human Rights, instituted in 1999, is an 
independent body that is “a non-judicial institution to promote education in, awareness of and 
respect for human rights, as embodied in the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe” 
(Resolution (99)50 on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 1999, Article 1). 
The Commissioner performs its functions outside of the scope of the supervisory bodies of the 
COE. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) consists of 324 
representatives from the parliamentary bodies of the COE’s member states. While PACE does 
not have the power to pass binding laws, it does have the authority to “demand action from 47 
                                               
 
11 The Vienna Convention (1961) codified diplomatic and consular relations worldwide. 
12 European Charter of Local Self-Government, European Treaty Series No. 122, Strasbourg, 15.X.1985 
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European governments, who must jointly reply;” conduct inquiries to reveal new facts on human 
rights violations; negotiate the terms of new member states joining the COE; and sanction 
current member states through exclusion or suspension, among other powers (Council of Europe 
2018c).  
While all entities play significant roles in the functioning of the COE, the two bodies that 
are the primary focus of this study are the European Court of Human Rights (the legal body) and 
the Committee of Ministers (the decision-making body). The Convention created established a 
judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)13, to arbitrate cases brought to the 
court by individuals or other entities, or by one state against another. 
3.3 The ECtHR and Committee of Ministers 
In 1998, Protocol 11 replaced what was previously a two-tier, part-time control mechanism of 
the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights, with a single, permanent court: the 
European Court of Human Rights. This allowed individuals to bring applications directly to the 
Court. Protocol 11 also mandates acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for all COE 
members. The Court consists of judges elected by the Parliamentary Assembly from three 
candidates nominated by each state for a non-renewable nine-year term. The composition of the 
Court changes from case to case, which can be heard in one of four ways: 1) “manifestly 
inadmissible cases are examined by a single judge”; 2) the admissibility and merits of cases that 
fall under well-established case law are head by a three-judge Committee; 3) cases may be heard 
                                               
 
13 Not to be confused with the European Court of Justice, the highest court in the European Union, which is 
concerned with the interpretation and application of European Union law across member states.  
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by a seven-judge Chamber, determined by majority vote; 4) on rare occasions, cases may be 
heard by the 17-judge Grand Chamber (European Court of Human Rights 2014, 4-5).14 The 
Court is divided into five administrative Sections. The Chambers are the judicial formation in 
each Section and include a President, Vice-President, and other judges. In cases where questions 
about interpretation of the Convention or Protocols arise or where a ruling would be in conflict 
with previous case law, Article 30 of the Convention permits a Section to move the case to the 
Grand Chamber (Ovey and White 2002, 398). The cases examined in this study have all either 
been heard by one of the Chambers or by the Grand Chamber. 
An application to the ECtHR must meet certain admissibility criteria.15 First, the 
complaint must be against a contracting state to the Convention and the applicant must have 
suffered a significant disadvantage. Finally, if an individual or an entity has exhausted all 
domestic legal recourse regarding a complaint of a violation of their Convention rights, and their 
country has ratified the Convention, they may apply to the Court. Applications to the ECtHR, 
however, must be submitted within six months of the final decision of the domestic courts. 
Therefore, all cases that come before the ECtHR have been heard by the highest domestic court, 
according to jurisdiction, in the relevant country, allowing the defending party an opportunity to 
seek redress domestically prior to being heard by the ECtHR.  
Once an application is received by the Court, it is assigned to a lawyer in the Registry. 
This lawyer’s tasks are “to conduct correspondence with applicants and governments, to prepare 
                                               
 
14 See Appendix D, Case Processing Flow Chart. 
15 See Appendix C, Life of an ECtHR Application Flow Chart. 
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cases for examination, to advise the Court on questions of national law and the law of the 
Convention, and to assist in the drafting of judgments and decisions” (Ovey and White 2002, 
399). The Registry lawyer then requests detailed information about the case and an application 
form from the applicant. The case is then assigned to a judge, who serves as the rapporteur and 
determines whether the case will be heard by a Committee or a Chamber. If the application will 
be considered by a Chamber, the appropriate Chamber contacts the government of the state 
concerned to provide written observations. If the case is then deemed admissible, “a written 
decision containing summaries of the facts and the parties’ arguments, and brief reasons for the 
Court’s decision” is prepared and adopted (Ovey and White 2002, 404-405). An attempt is 
initially made to resolve the issue through a friendly settlement; however, if this is not possible, 
the Chamber requests additional written observations from the parties and determines whether 
there will be a hearing or not.  
The Court then examines the facts of the case, determining whether or not there has been 
a violation of one or more of the Articles of the Convention. If there is a finding of no violation, 
the applicant may request to re-examine the case. If the request is denied, the case is dismissed; 
if the request is accepted, the case is referred to the Grand Chamber. If the judgment in either 
Chamber determines one or more violations, the offending state is mandated by the Convention 
to comply with the judgment of the Court. This means that the state is obliged to, for example, 
pay material damages to the applicant, return the applicant to a position had there not been a 
Convention violation (restitutio in integrum), take measures (changes to laws, regulations, etc.) 
to ensure that a similar violation will not occur (also known as general measures), and publish 
the judgment in applicable domestic publications. The offending state is given wide discretion in 
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how some obligations are to be carried out. This is called the “margin of appreciation” and is 
discussed in greater detail below. If restitutio in integrum is impossible, and domestic laws do 
not allow for complete reparation, the Court will award just satisfaction (according to Article 41 
of the Convention). This may include pecuniary damages, non-pecuniary damages, and costs and 
expenses. Pecuniary damage is awarded based directly on restitutio in integrum, including actual 
damages, diminished gains, or expected losses. Non-pecuniary damage is awarded for non-
monetary damages, such as emotional or physical suffering. Costs and expenses are awarded 
based on evidentiary proof of financial burdens incurred by the applicant at both the domestic 
and ECtHR levels, including fees such as legal retainers and court fees.  
According to Rule 77 of the Rules of the Court, the judgment of a case is either read at a 
public hearing or transmitted in writing to the Committee of Ministers, with the Registrar 
delivering copies to the relevant parties. The contracting state and the applicant then have three 
months to apply for an appellate hearing before the Grand Chamber, which is final. Article 44 of 
the Convention indicates that the judgment of a Chamber becomes final (a) when the parties 
declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; (b) three 
months after the date of the judgment, if no request has been made to refer the case to the Grand 
Chamber; or (c) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under Article 
43 (Council of Europe 1950, Article 44). The judgment is then submitted to the CoM, which 
supervises the execution of the judgment (Article 46(2) of the Convention).  
The Committee of Ministers is the decision-making body of the COE and meets at the 
ministerial and the deputy levels. Each COE member has one ministerial representative, typically 
the state’s minister of foreign affairs. There is at least one annual ministerial session per year. 
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Each minister of foreign affairs is charged with appointing one deputy as a representative for the 
three meetings per month that are held outside of the regular ministerial meeting. It is at these 
meetings that the CoM supervises the implementation of each case that is passed along to them. 
The case is assigned to either enhanced or standard supervision, the former of which indicates 
that the CoM gives priority to supervision. Enhanced supervision is typically applied to cases 
where there are urgent individual measures to be resolved, pilot judgments, cases with major 
structural issues, interstate cases, or cases with unique reasons to elevate supervision from 
standard to enhanced.  
Pilot judgments are “repetitive cases” where cases brought before the Court repeatedly 
revolve around a particular structural issue at the national level. To reduce the high volume of 
cases that are heard by the Court each year, one “leading case” is chosen and it receives priority 
attention. By selecting a leading case, the Court has the capacity to put some cases on hold 
temporarily so that the respondent government can implement the appropriate steps to meet the 
requirements of the judgment. Once the leading case is decided, that judgment is applied to all 
cases with similar structural issues. 
“Once the Committee of Ministers has received the judgment, it invites the respondent 
State to inform it of the measures taken in order to comply with its undertaking to abide by the 
judgment. Such measures may be individual or general. Documents submitted to the Committee 
of Ministers are public unless the Committee decides otherwise in response to a reasoned request 
for confidentiality” (Sharpe 2010, 88). The offending state must take action to ensure the 
judgement is executed. This study groups aspects of the judgements into the following categories 
of measures: general measures, individual measures, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, and 
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costs and expenses. General measures can encompass a broad range of actions, but generally 
require the state to review its legislation, regulations, judicial practices/structure, or even 
constitution, with the expectation that the state will take action to remedy the aforementioned 
laws, codes, or constitutions to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. Individual 
measures can include actions ranging from the translation and publication of the judgment in 
national media, removal of the applicant’s name from official records, the return of property, the 
reopening of domestic proceedings, or the revision or revocation of a domestic order. Article 41 
of the ECHR allows for the award of three forms of just satisfaction (should domestic procedures 
not allow such actions) to the applicant: pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary damage, and costs 
and expenses. The aim of pecuniary damage is to place them, “as far as possible, in the position 
in which he or she would have been had the violation found not taken place” (restitutio in 
integrum), including actual loss and diminished gain. Non-pecuniary damage encompasses harm 
that is non-material in nature, such as mental or physical harm that cannot be precisely appraised. 
Costs and expenses incurred domestically and at the ECtHR can be included in the applicant’s 
reimbursement request to the Court. They, but must be unavoidable, actual, tangible costs (such 
as legal assistance, travel, court fees, etc.) and, for reimbursement, must be reasonably incurred, 
as deemed by the Court. The payments of just satisfaction are often explicitly outlined in the 
judgment in terms of deadline, currency, recipient, and default interest, while the terms of 
general or individual measures often are not.  
While the aforementioned issues are generally not addressed directly in the judgment, 
there has been a recent tendency by the Court to provide guidance on more precise execution 
measures, which has been welcomed by the CoM (Sharpe 2010, 91). In recent years, the Court 
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has begun to take a less ambiguous approach in its judgments, outlining in greater detail the 
implementation expectations of the judgment (Keller and Marti 2016, 836). The Court also takes 
into account case law, practices of the CoM, and domestic circumstances when appraising cases 
(Sharpe 2010, 90).  
 The consideration of domestic circumstances is referred to in two ways: the principle of 
subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. Subsidiarity “implies that the primary responsibility 
for ensuring the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention rests with the national 
authorities” (Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly 2000). The margin of appreciation is 
the understanding that High Contracting Parties of the ECHR are allowed a significant amount of 
discretion in the application of a judgment from the Court. This occurs through the occasionally 
vague rulings that are handed over by the Court itself. Rulings are frequently in declaratory terms 
as opposed to mandatory and overt expectations of the execution of a judgment. The concept of 
margin of appreciation was first outlined in the landmark Handyside v. United Kingdom case 
when the Court specified: “By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces 
of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ 
of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them…Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) 
leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given both to the 
domestic legislator (‘prescribed by law’) and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are 
called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force” (Handyside v. United Kingdom [Application 
No. 5493/72] 1976, par. 48). The Court uses this principle extensively under the assumption that 
international human rights tribunals must take the local situation into account (Ovey and White 
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2002, 40-41). One area in which the local context can vary widely across all COE states is 
religion. 
3.4 Religious Freedom Scope and Case Law in the ECtHR 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which relates to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Council of Europe 1950). While Article 9 is 
the ECHR’s primary article dedicated to explicitly outlining the scope of religious freedom, 
issues of belief, philosophical conviction, and conscience can be considered in relation to a 
number of other Convention rights, as seen in this study. In fact, not even half (nine) of the 19 
cases in the current study were found to be Article 9 violations. The remainder are violations of 
Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association); Article 1 of Protocol 1 (protection of 
property); Article 2 of Protocol 1 (right to education); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination); 
Article 3 (prohibition of torture); and/or Article 6 (right to a fair trial). This is true not only in 
cases involving Turkey, but throughout COE member states.  
 Because of the discrepancy in what cases are admitted, and what cases related to religion 
are heard under Article 9, the ECtHR rulings related to freedom of religion may seem 
inconsistent. This is due to the particular issues that arise in each case, and more significantly, to 
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each member state’s unique constitutional and legal arrangements, history, and national identity 
(Murdoch 2012, 83). Naturally, this is why the concept of a “margin of appreciation” is so 
critical. Yet there is a generally agreed upon “test” for cases that seem to fall within the scope of 
Article 9. Murdoch (2012) works to narrow the interpretation of Article 9 freedoms (and other 
associated articles) with five questions:  
• What is the scope of the particular guarantee? 
• Has there been any interference with the right guaranteed? 
• Does the interference have a legitimate aim? 
• Is the interference “in accordance with the law”? 
• Is the interference “necessary in a democratic society”? 
The scope of Article 9 is quite wide, encompassing not only privately held beliefs, but 
also the manifestation of those beliefs, as well as the individual and collective aspects of that 
manifestation. While the term “religion” is not defined in Article 9 or in case law, the latter has 
narrowed the scope of the meaning of “belief” in the case of Campbell and Cosans v. the United 
Kingdom ([Application Nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76] 1982, §36) in that the belief must “attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance” and relate to a “weighty and 
substantial aspect of human life and behavior.” The foundational case law for the freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion originates with Kokkinakis v. Greece ([Application No. 
14307/88] 1993), Greek courts had convicted Mr. Kokkinakis, a Jehovah’s Witness, of criminal 
proselytism in 1988. In 1993, the ECtHR ruled that there had been an Article 9 violation, as it 
relates to a restriction of individual manifestation. The case further identified that non-belief falls 
within the scope of Article 9, including atheism and pacifism. It further recognized that while 
religious belief is primarily concerned with private philosophical beliefs, individuals hold the 
right to manifest their beliefs individually and in community with others, in public and in private.  
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While the scope of Article 9 is quite broad, the Court has demonstrated that on occasion, 
it is more appropriate to consider rights guarantees under other articles, rather than Article 9 
alone or even at all. This determination is based on whether the Court establishes that there is an 
“interference” with Article 9, which is distinct from a “violation” (Murdoch 2012, 26). The 
interference is determined, in part by the positive and negative obligations of the state under the 
Convention. “What distinguishes positive obligations from negative obligations is that the former 
require positive intervention by the state, whereas the latter require it to refrain from 
interference” (Akandji-Kombe 2007, 11). The state’s negative obligation in terms of religious 
freedom is seemingly inherent in Article 9 itself: the state should refrain from interfering with 
the right to hold beliefs in private or in public, individually or with others. More subtle 
interpretations of this include the related right not to forcibly disclose one’s beliefs (Sinan Işık v. 
Turkey [Application No. 21924/05] 2010; Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy [Application No. 39128/05] 
2009; Vogt v. Germany [Application No. 17851/9121] 1995). On the other hand, the state has 
positive obligations. These are the legitimate aims for interference with manifestation of religion 
or belief, including “public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals, or the 
protection of rights and freedoms of others” (Council of Europe, European Court of Human 
Rights 2015, 13). 
In these cases, the state must demonstrate that the interference was justified under one or 
more of the aforementioned aims. They must address the question of “whether the interference 
pursues a legitimate aim, whether the interference is ‘prescribed by law,’ and whether the 
interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’” (Murdoch 2012, 35). The Court’s dedication 
to the notion of a pluralist and democratic society, and the importance of state neutrality and 
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impartiality in this context, was laid out in the case of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia 
and Others v. Moldova ([Application No. 45701/99] 2001). The Church complained that 
domestic authorities refused to recognize it, preventing the Church from gaining legal 
personality and in turn, depriving it of their right to access the courts to seek a ruling on its 
rights, namely property rights.  
As noted above, there are a number of factors that are considered by both the Court and 
the CoM when making judgments and monitoring the execution of those judgments, 
respectively. The Court views the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as one of the 
foundations of a democratic society, as well as its inseparable concept of pluralism. However, 
this guarantee is not absolute. There must be a balance between the right to exercise the 
aforementioned freedom, and the state’s right to restrict this under certain circumstances. This is 
an argument Turkey often puts forward.  
3.5 Turkey and the ECtHR 
Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and signed the ECHR in 1950, 
which came into effect domestically with the adoption by the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
(TBMM, Turkish Grand National Assembly) in 1954. However, in the late 1950s, the TBMM 
passed a number of statutes that were contrary to the ECHR and ultimately led to the 1961 coup 
(Özden Kaboğlu and Koutnatzis 2008, 455-456). Following two other coups and two 
constitutions (1961 and the current 1982 Constitution), Turkey accepted the right to individual 
petition to the Court in 1987. It was among the last countries to recognize that right, and also the 
very last member to accept the ECtHR’s compulsory jurisdiction, which was accepted in 1990 
(Özden Kaboğlu and Koutnatzis 2008, 458). 
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According to an ECtHR statistical report on violations per COE state, Turkey has had the 
greatest number of judgments of any state by far, with 3,386 from 1959 to 2017, 2,988 of which 
found at least one violation16 (European Court of Human Rights 2017). Turkey, which is the 
third most populous state in the COE (behind the Russian Federation and Germany) and whose 
population constitutes approximately 10 percent of the total COE population, was party to 16 
percent of the total number of judgments at the ECtHR in the same time period (European Court 
of Human Rights 2017). In 2017, the Court received 31,053 applications from Turkey and 
delivered 116 judgments from the 990 applications that were accepted (“Country Profile: 
Turkey” 2018). This is a significant jump in decided applications from previous years (3,218 in 
2015 and 4,160 in 2016) (“Country Profile: Turkey” 2018), a majority of which likely originate 
from the Turkish government’s crackdown on “dissidents” following the 2016 attempted coup.  
In terms of new cases that have been transmitted to the Committee of Ministers for 
supervision, in 2016, Turkey had two leading cases under enhanced supervision, ten under 
standard supervision, and three awaiting classification. On top of this, there were 26 repetitive 
cases under enhanced supervision, 45 under standard supervision, and 28 awaiting classification 
(Council of Europe 2016, 56). In the same year, Turkey had a total of 182 leading cases under 
supervision in the CoM (34 under enhanced supervision, 144 under standard supervision, 4 
awaiting classification) and 1,248 repetitive cases (422 under enhanced supervision, 799 under 
                                               
 
16 Behind Turkey in this list were Italy (2,382 judgments; 1,819 judgments with at least one violation) and the 
Russian Federation (2,253 judgments; 2,127 judgments with at least one violation) (European Court of Human 
Rights 2017). 
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standard supervision, and 27 awaiting classification) (Council of Europe 2016, 57-59). Turkey 
was able to close one leading case under enhanced supervision and ten cases under standard 
supervision, as well as 195 repetitive cases under enhanced supervision and 68 under standard 
supervision. The average number of closed leading cases was six, placing Turkey above that 
average. Turkey also had the highest number of closed repetitive cases by far. In spite of these 
seemingly positive developments, Turkey still remains above average for the length of execution 
of leading cases closed (5.6 years; overall average: 4.7 years), particularly for cases that are 
under enhanced supervision (13.5 years; overall average: 7.2 years). This is the core issue that 
this study seeks to examine: what are some of the institutional barriers that prohibit (or more 
rarely, encourage) Turkey to comply with violation rulings from the European Court of Human 
Rights?  
The next chapter explains the context within which this question can be explored by 
providing a comprehensive look at the history of the Turkish Republic from late-Ottoman times 
to the present. The chapter begins with an explanation of the place of religion during Ottoman 
rule. This is followed by a periodic survey of the modern Turkish Republic (1923-1950, 1950-
1980, 1980-2002, and 2002-2016). Chapter 4 wraps up with a picture of religious governance 
since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the mechanisms for doing so, and the 
classifications of the belief groups that are the subjects of the cases in this study.  
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CHAPTER 4. Turkish History and the Role of Religion: Ottoman 
Empire to the Present 
Turkey has a unique and complex place in world history. The modern day Turkish Republic is 
geographically the remnant of the once vast and powerful Ottoman Empire. Yet it is not just 
geography that ties this once glorious Empire to modern Turkey. The deep history, traditions, 
culture, politics, and even religious praxes have also been carried forward, and have influenced 
contemporary cultural, political, and religious institutions. This chapter begins with an account 
of the governance of religion within the Ottoman Empire. This is followed by a sweeping 
overview of Turkish history from 1923 to 2016 in four distinct periods (1923-1950, 1950-1980, 
1980-2002, and 2002-2016). The chapter concludes with a description of the governance 
structures of religious classifications in modern Turkey, including a detailed description of the 
primary mechanism for this, the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs, 
better known as the Diyanet), and a brief review of the religious categories included in this study.  
4.1 Religion in the Ottoman Empire 
In terms of its geography and longevity, the Ottoman Empire (1301-1922) was one of the most 
expansive empires in world history. The Empire was inspired by Islam early on and became the 
Sunni caliphate after the conquest of the Mamluks in 1517 (Finkel 2007, 110). It is not 
considered a theocracy because Islamic law was not the only source of legislation and the 
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Ottoman ulema17were civil servants at the service of the sultan (Kuru 2009, 203). A successive 
line of sultans were more concerned with conquering more territory as the “perceived need for 
innovative interpretations of Islamic law declined” (Albright 2006, 119). The Ottomans 
continued to expand their reach, but due to the vast geographic scope of the Empire, they were 
compelled to create a system under which a religiously, culturally, and ethnically diverse 
population could flourish. This led to the creation of the millet system. The word millet is derived 
from the Arabic word for “nation” (Lewis 2002, 335). Each millet was organized by religion, and 
was allowed to operate loosely under its own rules and leader, but was forced to pay a special tax 
(or ceza). This arrangement is frequently hailed as the first form of religious pluralism. Religious 
minorities were not granted full rights and the arrangement contributed to relatively peaceful 
relations amongst the minorities, as well as between the ruled and the rulers. The Ottoman millet 
system did, however, deny Muslim ethnic minority groups separate legal status on the grounds of 
ethnic or linguistic differences (Aktürk 2009, 905). Such a scheme denied some non-Sunni 
groups the right to their own millet. The Alevi, a distinct and significant cultural and religious 
minority who are occasionally categorized as Shia,18 are perhaps the most significant of these 
groups. This denial of rights was likely a result of the Ottoman Shia alignment with Shah Ismail I 
and the Shia of the Safavid Empire, and the latter’s subsequent classification of the Alevi as 
“apostates” and “heretics,” which led to their massacre throughout the Empire (Kehl-Bodrogi 
2003, 54).  
                                               
 
17 Scholars of Islamic law and theology. 
18 This is discussed in greater depth below.  
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The slow decline of the Ottoman Empire necessitated a new form of government, and the 
tanzimat (reform) period was initiated in the early 1800s. These reforms abolished the millet 
system to create a more unified and centralized government. It was during this period that 
minorities (non-Sunni, non-Turks) were forced to homogenize their identity into that of 
“Ottoman citizen.” This was the most odious breach of Islamic tradition. The “toleration” of the 
Ottoman period was grounded in the “separate but inferior” status of non-Muslim citizens; to 
shift to a state in which all were equal was seen an “offence against both religion and common 
sense” (Lewis 2002, 107). The Young Ottomans emerged as liberal constitutionalists who sought 
to forge a multinational Ottoman patriotism (Mango 2004, 19), in opposition to the tanzimat 
reforms. But the tanzimat reforms were so comprehensive and far-reaching that, by 1871, they 
had reached a point of no return: modernization and Westernization were the only paths forward 
(Lewis 2002, 128). The Young Ottomans’ failed pursuit was followed by a new iteration of these 
attempted political revolutions: the Young Turks. To defend the empire from further dissolution, 
the Young Turks launched the Young Turk revolution in 1908 with the participation of figures 
that would become instrumental in the founding of the Republic, including Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk himself.  
World War I erupted in 1914, with the Ottomans joining Austria-Hungary, Germany, and 
Bulgaria to form the Central Forces. By 1918, the Ottoman forces capitulated and signed the 
Armistice of Mudros. This was followed by the drawing up of the Treaty of Sèvres, which 
marked the beginning of the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and its lands. Under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Turkish forces resisted the Allies’ usurpation of former 
Ottoman Territories and launched the Turkish War of Independence. The Turks emerged 
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victorious and signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which became a foundational document of 
the future Republic of Turkey, the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. While Greece and 
Turkey had already arranged a population exchange of the Muslim population residing in Greece 
and the Orthodox Christian population residing in Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne outlined the 
rights of minorities in both countries in unequivocal terms. These protections included the right 
to the free exercise of religion, equal civil and political rights, and the right to establish and 
maintain “any charitable, religious, and social institutions” (Treaty of Lausanne 1923). 
4.2 The Turkish Republic 1923-2016 
4.2.1 1923-1950 
There has been an enduring debate about the relationship between religion and the Turkish state 
since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Republic in 1923. Atatürk, the Republic’s 
first president, introduced sweeping political, legal, cultural, social, and economic policy changes 
in an attempt to create a modern, Westward-looking, democratic, representative, unified, and 
secular republic.  
Atatürk’s drastic reforms included the abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate, as well 
as other changes to religious affairs. Furthermore, Atatürk aimed to construct a wholly new 
“Turkish” identity by removing religious affiliation (millets) as the organizing principle of 
society (Aktürk 2009, 895). These changes were inspired by the French concept of laïcité, or 
secularism, which aims to implement an absolute and strict separation of religion and state. The 
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selection of this term by the early Turkish Republic Kemalists19 is instructive. According to 
Öztürk: “Laicite/laicism/laic is the term used to describe state control of religion in the public 
sphere, as opposed to secularism, which implies merely the separation of state and religion” 
(2016, 624).20 However, Turkey’s approach to laïcité differed from the French interpretation in 
that the government is not entirely removed from regulating religion’s influence in private life. 
The Turkish model of laïcité created a “sterilized” Turkish Islam with new institutions and vision 
(Köse 2013, 595). Such a loose interpretation of secular identity inevitably led to the 
marginalization and/or homogenization of the religious minorities that were forced to adopt this 
newly mandated identity. Once again, foremost among these religious minorities was the Alevi 
population. The Alevi constituted approximately one-fourth to one-third of the population 
(Kieser 2001, 97)21 and were the largest religious minority under the Ottoman Empire’s 
provinces in Asia Minor (modern day Turkey).  
The newly constructed Turkish identity was predominately Sunni, particularly Hanefi 
(Aktürk 2009). In an attempt to secure public order and uniformity, the central government 
                                               
 
19 Kemalists are those who embrace Kemalism. “Kemalism is the name of the Turkish state ideology, characterized 
by its state-centric corporatism, a homogenizing nationalism, and an authoritarian secularism. As a political program 
it was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, since 1934 known by the honorary name Atatürk (‘Father 
of the Turks’), who is recognized as the founding father of Republican Turkey” (Dressler 2013, xvi). 
20 Though the validity of the theory of secularization has been widely disputed in recent years, and the discourse of 
religious change in sociological and historical terms has shifted, it was once the dominant theory to explain 
empirically recognized parallel shifts towards “modernity” and the marginalization or disappearance of religion. 
Some of the preeminent philosophers that have examined this phenomenon include Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, 
Auguste Comte, and Talcott Parsons. 
21 Sources citing a precise count of the Alevi population under the Ottoman Empire are difficult to find for factors 
mentioned throughout this study. This particular estimate was cited in Kieser’s (2001) article, which references a 
report titled “The Shia Turks” (G. E. White 1908). For a history of Alevi genealogy and signification, see Dressler 
2013. 
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became more and more centralized and rigid. The belief in Turkey as a “unified society without 
class or privilege” was an important element in the early republican era (Buğra and Savaşkan 
2014, 32). The political system and society at large were redesigned to create a highly 
centralized system (Can 2014, 34). Unfortunately, these same reforms, which aimed to create 
unity and harmony, resulted in greater violence and inspiring uprisings by the diverse 
demographic, cultural, religious, and ideological groups that were to be collected under the 
banner of the new Republic (Can 2014, 35). In the pre-Republic period, this included revolts by 
and against Armenian, Syrian, and Greek Christians, and in the immediate post-Republican 
period, by and against Alevis and Kurds.  
Atatürk’s modernization reforms were rooted in the theory of secularization, in which a 
society that identifies as highly religious, gradually progresses through a process of 
modernization, eventually leading to a decline in religiosity and the removal of religion from 
public life.22 Atatürk and his Cumhuryiet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s Party), which 
was a social-democratic party, as the founders of the republic, were able to shape political and 
economic institutions in their favor. By writing a constitution that held secularism as its core 
principle and establishing institutions to reinforce this ideology (i.e. Diyanet; a strong military; 
                                               
 
22 Though the validity of the theory of secularization has been widely disputed in recent years, and the discourse of 
religious change in sociological and historical terms has shifted, it was once the dominant theory to explain 
empirically recognized parallel shifts towards “modernity” and the marginalization or disappearance of religion. 
Some of the preeminent philosophers that have examined this phenomenon include Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, 
Auguste Comte, and Talcott Parsons. 
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universal suffrage; statist economic policies), the Kemalists controlled the distribution of 
resources and empowered those who embraced a similar doctrine.  
These initial conditions are instructive to the path that Turkey followed. Once the choice 
was made for a specific set of institutions, the Kemalists had strong incentives to continue on 
that path because the first steps gave them an advantage. This positive feedback then locked the 
country into an arrangement that perpetuated secular dominance. The high density of institutions 
became self-reinforcing. This is known as path dependence (Pierson 2000). Most importantly, 
Pierson notes that: “In the long-run, the outcome that becomes locked in may generate lower 
payoffs than a forgone alternative would have” (2000, 253). As the period from 1950-1980, 
explored below, demonstrates, this lock into statist economic policy and a zealous commitment 
to secularism may have generated lower payoffs than an alternative, but the challenge of 
interrupting entrenched path dependence proved too great to overcome. 
4.2.2 1950-1980 
As mentioned above, CHP was able to shape political and economic institutions in their favor 
until the second free and fair elections in 1950, which were won by the Demokrat Partisi (DP, 
Democrat Party), a conservative-leaning party. The CHP was a well-known party that had 
developed positive valence based on Atatürk’s reputation for “saving” the republic from its 
Ottoman past. The DP differentiated itself from the popular CHP by promising significant 
changes to economic policy. CHP remained on its statist path, while DP campaigned on broader 
privatization of state industries. This differentiation resonated with the populace and DP won 
elections with overwhelming majorities again in 1954 and 1957. The DP attempted to shift away 
from Kemalist/militaristic governance; the popularity of this shift was reflected in its ability to 
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garner broad political support across Anatolia. This was quite unlike the majority of CHP’s 
support, which came from the urban and industrial centers of Istanbul and Ankara. The DP’s 
minor changes to economic policies, however, were no better at improving the distribution of 
resources. Instead, inflation rates climbed. This fact, combined with the perceived increase in 
religiosity under the DP, led the Turkish military to overthrow the DP in a military coup in 1960. 
The DP was subsequently abolished.  
The “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” began to take shape in the decade following the coup. 
The concept of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was generated by nationalist and Islamist 
intellectuals who sought to amend the “Kemalist” philosophy and create a Turkish national and 
religious identity based on Sunni Islam, thereby countering the emergence and proliferation of 
leftist ideologies (Ciddi 2009, 70; Jongerden 2003, 79). This was achieved by 1970 through the 
establishment of the Aydınlar Ocağı, the Intellectuals’ Hearth, which was an association that 
included representatives from the political, business, and intellectual elites (Jongerden 2003, 79). 
At the same time, the Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP, National Order Party) was founded as an 
Islamist party that thoroughly embraced a perspective of morals based on Islamic values, and the 
outright rejection of Western ideology, including secularism.  
The 1961 elections placed the CHP back in parliament, with the newly formed Adalet 
Partisi (AP, Justice Party), founded by former members of the DP, trailing closely behind. 
Turkey’s political situation was relatively unstable until 1965, with various coalition 
governments in and out of power under military-appointed Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü. Thus, 
the secularists maintained de jure power, shaping political institutions through İnönü, a former 
military general, former President, and first Prime Minister (under Atatürk). All of these 
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positions were very closely affiliated with the secular CHP and Atatürk. The AP was a more 
moderate right-wing party than the DP and handily won both the 1965 and 1969 elections under 
the leadership of Süleyman Demirel. Demirel, a relatively progressive conservative figure, 
expanded the AP base to include farmers, the rural population, and smaller industrialists of 
central Anatolia. Yet the AP’s policies also failed to improve the economic condition of its 
supporters and ultimately caused another recession.  
The AP’s attempt to redistribute resources was, therefore unsuccessful, and the AP was 
unable shape Turkey’s political institutions in their favor. Furthermore, the left-right and secular-
conservative divide became more pronounced, with students and laborers on the left, and 
Islamists and nationalists on the right. This led to an increase in violence, including bombings, 
kidnappings, and assassinations, and the military once again intervened in 1971, forcing the 
resignation of the AP. Prior to allowing elections, the military used its de jure power to design 
the political institutions to further exert its control over the country. These reforms included 
greater state opposition to collective action, more restrictions on education, and tighter control of 
the media.  
The coup proved ineffective at quelling the divisions and violence, which continued in 
Turkey throughout the 1970s as right-wing, ultra-nationalist groups sparred with leftists. Over 
4,000 were killed over the course of a decade.23 What is often presented as an ideological 
                                               
 
23 Calculations vary on the precise number killed during this period depending on the time frame examined and 
whether or not security forces or terrorists are included. The estimate of approximately 4,000 cited here is drawn 
from Gunter, who wrote that: “During these times, a total of 4,040 people lost their lives as a result of violence, a 
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conflict between left and right was heavily influenced by the divide between Sunnis and Alevis 
(Kinzer 2001, 64). The military allowed elections to be held in 1973 and, perhaps through the 
mobilization of the secular elite, the CHP won. However, they were forced to form a coalition 
with the conservative Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Salvation Party). The coalition only 
lasted for 10 months. Polarization escalated, as did the country’s economic crisis. The reliance 
on import substitution was failing, the gap between investments and domestic savings widened, 
and significant government intervention in economic development continued (Erçel 2006). These 
factors combined to generate high unemployment, low production, and triple-digit inflation, 
creating the most acute economic crisis in modern Turkey’s history. The crisis provoked 
violence between the left and right, which some claim the military allowed to escalate to provide 
a pretext for what would become the 1980 coup.  
Thus, by the late 1970s, society was polarized along ethnic, sectarian, and ideological 
lines. However, the immediate trigger for the 1980 coup was a political meeting of MSP, held on 
September 6, 1980 in Konya. There, a large group of Turkish and Kurdish-Islamist attendees 
refused to pay homage to the Turkish national anthem and chanted slogans supporting the 
restoration of an Islamic government in Turkey. There groups were clearly exploiting the 
apparent weaknesses of the state in this period to voice their long pent-up demands. The military 
perceived this behavior as an open challenge and decided to end the cycle of left-right and Alevi-
Sunni violence by once again intervening directly in Turkish domestic politics (Yavuz 2003, 68). 
                                               
 
figure which includes the members of the security forces who were killed but excludes those from the ranks of the 
terrorists.” (Gunter 1989, 69). 
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4.2.3 1980-2002 
Following the military coup of 1980, which was the most comprehensive military takeover in 
Turkish history (Ciddi 2009, 66), state elites employed the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” to solve 
the social, cultural, and political left-right/conservative-liberal conflicts that had prevailed in the 
1970s. The “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” has roots in a movement and ideology that attempted to 
reconstruct the “Kemalist” ideology and reunite Turkish nationalism and (Sunni) Islamic identity 
(Çetinsaya n.d.). The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis continued throughout the 1980s, expanding the 
scope of Islamic institutions, politics, and policies. Instead of exhibiting their routine enmity 
towards religion, the military used Islam to quell the violent left-right divide that had engulfed 
the country. Three factors shaped the military’s policies of culture and identity (in order of 
importance): perception of the threat of leftist movements; the personal Islam of General Kenan 
Evren (the leader of the military administration); and the availability of resources (Yavuz 2003, 
69). Because many Kurdish and Alevi activist groups were allied closely with Marxist 
organizations and movements, the military coup leaders felt compelled to use Islamic institutions 
and symbols as a legitimizing counterweight (Yavuz 2003, 69). 
The most explicit shift in Turkey’s political and economic history occurred in the 1980s. 
The 1980 coup has been labeled the most brutal of Turkey’s coups, resulting in 650,000 people 
taken into custody; 230,000 people put on trial; 1,683,000 people blacklisted; 517 people 
condemned to death; 50 were hanged; 299 inmate deaths from “indeterminate” reasons; 14 
inmate deaths from hunger strikes; and 171 deaths from torture (Hürriyet Daily News 2012). The 
military implemented institutional and legal changes designed to minimize further dissent and 
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conflict. As was the case after the previous coups, the military also closed down and seized the 
assets of any parties in government at the time of the coup.  
By the 1980s, the pious population felt it had long been denied a voice in politics and the 
economy. The Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party) recognized this, as well as more 
general need for a reform-minded party that was more representative of the general population, 
and won the 1983 general elections. In addition to government being more religiously 
conservative, this meant favoring a liberal market economy and so decreased government 
intervention in the economy. ANAP was led by Turgut Özal, whose name soon became 
associated with Turkey’s positive economic transformation. Even if the reforms aimed to reduce 
government intervention, the shift in political structures under ANAP unquestionably increased 
the prime minister’s power over discretionary spending without the approval of Parliament 
(Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 51).  
Özal was above all perceived as a pragmatist who maintained his distance from insulated 
secular ideologies, and also refused to be heavily influenced by Islam or particular Islamic 
groups when shaping his policies. Thus, his decisions regarding the distribution of resources 
were based on objective economic criteria (Heper 2013, 142). In reality, the ANAP’s reforms 
touched a much broader segment of society than had previous reforms, namely Muslim small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) of central Anatolia.  
 Perhaps unwittingly, Özal’s reforms, alongside the suppression of left-wing political 
activity, encouraged the further development of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.” To quell the 
violence between left and right, the state sought to impose a “nationalist, Turkish” form of Islam 
from above. The wider distribution of resources and the silencing of the left also allowed the 
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Muslims of central Anatolia, who had previously felt disenfranchised and excluded from 
political and economic life, to collectively organize. Thus, in 1990, a group of conservative SME 
owners founded the Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (MÜSİAD, Association of 
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen). This group of “Anatolian Tigers,” as they came to 
be known, altered the perception of the relationship between religion and the economy. Though 
knowing the “right” political people remains a significant determinant of capital accumulation, 
success is far less dependent on political relationships than on “mutual collaboration in network 
formation” (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 56). A key characteristic of MÜSİAD’s success was and 
is the creation of an internal norm of “close internal solidarity” amongst the group and a strict 
observance of ethical business practices, both of which constructed an internal credible 
commitment to cooperate. According to the New York Times, “Companies that break these 
ethics, for instance, by cheating customers or suppliers, and are deemed unrepentant, are 
summarily expelled from MÜSİAD’s membership” (Keay 2004). The ability to establish internal 
credible commitment granted MÜSİAD substantial de facto power.  
The 1991 elections were dominated by center-right parties, one of which was the Refah 
Partisi (RP, Welfare Party), led by Necmettin Erbakan, former leader of the MNP and MSP.24 
There had not been a religious party in parliament since Erbakan and the MSP held seats in 1977. 
RP capitalized on the sentiments of disenfranchised Muslims, “alienated by the republican 
mission to secularize an Islamic society” (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 54), and employed rhetoric 
                                               
 
24 Erbakan also served as leader of the Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party) and Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party). 
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to build its identity around Turkey’s new political economy. This new rhetoric was parallel to 
that of MÜSİAD, which emphasized the coexistence of religious ethics and economic 
development (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 55). Yet the RP and MÜSİAD’s economic policies 
differed. The former, in an attempt to secure cross-class appeal, had a platform of a “Just Order” 
to bring “justice” (as opposed to “power”) to the electorate by replacing a capitalist system with 
one based on Islamic precepts; the latter favored a neoliberal outlook with a positive view toward 
international trade—particularly with Muslim-majority countries. Still, the new synthesis of 
religion and politics was used in an attempt to redesign socioeconomic institutions, and the 
identity associated therewith shaped allegiances and rivalries within the business community 
(Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 55). 
The RP unquestionably laid the groundwork for future Islamist political parties to 
participate as active players in Turkish politics. Ideological divisions within the party and the 
silent “post-modern coup,” during which Necmettin Erbakan resigned as Prime Minister in 1997, 
caused a split in the party. In 2001, one segment of the party, which included Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, formed the current governing party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and 
Development Party).  
4.2.4 2002-2016 
The AKP won a sweeping victory in the national elections in November 2002. Erdoğan could not 
immediately become prime minister because, in 1998, as the RP’s mayor of Istanbul, he recited a 
poem inciting religious hatred in 1998 and was subsequently banned from political office and 
imprisoned. Nonetheless, a special by-election was held for an open seat and Erdoğan replaced 
the sitting PM and co-founder of AKP, Abdullah Gül. In subsequent elections (both local and 
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general), the AKP’s portion of the vote continually increased, allowing former Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (now President) to declare a “mandate” to implement policies previously 
challenged by opposition parties.  
Since coming to power, the AKP has passed laws and made proclamations that many in 
the secular camp and opposition consider indicative of the party’s creeping Islamist tendencies. 
In light of the AKP’s current reputation of authoritarianism, it is ironic that the platform upon 
which the AKP initially differentiated themselves from other parties was rooted in an emphasis 
on democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008, 47). 
These issues had been neglected by previous iterations of Islamic-leaning parties and genuinely 
resonated with the general population that was disillusioned by religious parties. Furthermore, in 
2002, the population was still suffering from the policies that had caused the 2001 economic 
crisis and was thirsty for a party that presented itself as distinct from the recent coalition 
government. The AKP delivered (in both word and deed) on their commitment to the European 
Union process, the further privatization of state owned enterprises, liberal market policies, and a 
diversified export market. In fact, annual GDP growth rates since the AKP came to power were 
6.8 percent (2002-2007), 0.7 percent (2008), -4.80 percent (2009), 8.85 percent (2010-2011), 2.2 
percent (2012) (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 65), 4.79 percent (2012), 8.49 percent (2013), 5.17 
percent (2014), 6.09 percent (2015), 3.18 percent (2016) (“Turkey: Growth of the Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from 2012 to 2022” 2018).  
Improved economic performance increased the AKP’s popularity, which allowed the 
party to shape political institutions in its favor, further consolidating its de jure power and thus 
its ability to adjust economic institutions. For example, from 2003 to 2013, the AKP changed the 
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procurement law 29 times, making over 100 amendments and revising the clauses that regulated 
exceptions (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 79). These changes benefitted those in positions to profit 
from the procurement process who had been loyal to the AKP. Additionally, although the central 
government retained authority in many government contracting projects, in 2004 and 2005, the 
AKP passed a number of laws to give municipalities greater authority in infrastructure 
investments (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 87). This decentralization is sometimes viewed as a 
reward the municipalities that supported the AKP in their early years.  
In 2013, millions of citizens gathered across the country to protest the government’s 
increased authoritarianism and threats to the freedom of speech, in what came to be known as the 
Gezi Park protests, named for the area in which the protests began. Over the course of four 
summer months, the disproportionate police response led to the death of 11 citizens and 
thousands of injuries. Unfortunately, because of the protestors’ incredibly diverse interests and 
profiles, they were unable to effectively solve their collective action problem and capture greater 
de facto power that would have forced the government to resign. The backgrounds of the Gezi 
protestors were disparate (environmentalists, architects, left-wing Islamists, secularists, students, 
and the elderly, for example); the only shared perspective of the protesters was an anti-
government stance and a willingness to risk life and limb in the face of a vehement police 
response, which was not sufficient to cement a solid base for effective collective action. The 
Gezi Protests remain a merely memory and the AKP has continued to make the most significant 
institutional changes in the history of the republic, namely, the direct election of the president. In 
2014, abandoning his role as prime minister, Erdoğan became the first directly elected president 
and Ahmet Davutoğlu became prime minister and party leader. 
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Both the secularist and conservative camps that opposed Erdoğan remained committed to 
the Kemalist ideology that favored the absence of faith in public life and embraced rigorous state 
control of all activities related to religion. This authoritarian secularism inevitably invoked a 
sense of disenfranchisement among the Sunni majority. In Fields of Blood: The History of 
Religion and Violence, Armstrong (2014) asserts that “Almost every secularizing reform…would 
begin with an aggressive assault on religious institutions, which would inspire resentment, 
anomie, distress and, in some cases, a violent riposte” (277). The rise of the AKP is an 
illustration of how authoritarian secularism stimulated the progression, and eventually the 
ascendency of, a conservative, (Sunni) Islamist party. As the dominant ideology since the 
founding of the Turkish Republic, Kemalism represented the center and those who cannot 
identify with that ideology or are opposed to it “have suffered political, economic, and 
ideological exclusion and peripheralization” (Gülalp 2001, 434). Thus, the AKP is rooted in a 
base of “counter-elites” who aim for upward mobility against the historically privileged who 
were loyal to the Kemalist state and ideology (Gülalp 2001, 434). Regardless of the ideology of 
the party in power, what has remained constant throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey 
is the marginalization and de facto and de jure non-recognition of non-(Hanefi) Sunni citizens. 
What follows is a contextual account of these groups in Turkey, and the primary institution that 
has regulated their existence: the Diyanet.  
4.3 Religious Classifications in the Turkish Republic 
4.3.1 The Diyanet  
According to most sources, 99 percent of Turkey’s approximately 80 million citizens are 
Muslim; the US government estimates that approximately 77.5 percent of these Muslims are 
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Hanefi Sunni (United States Department of State 2016, 2). Other religious groups self-report as 
constituting approximately 0.3 percent of the population, while other reports indicate that as 
much as 2 percent of the population is atheist (United States Department of State 2016, 2). The 
legal framework for handling religious issues is centered around the Diyanet, the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs. The Diyanet was first established in 1924 and was first recognized in the 1961 
Constitution. It is responsible for “the delivery of service to citizens without discrimination in 
regard to religious sect, or understanding or practice of religion” (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
2012). From its foundation until approximately the 1980s, the Diyanet was regarded as a 
mechanism to “justify and consolidate” the state’s staunch secularist character and oversee “state 
hegemony” over religious practices (Öztürk 2016, 620). It is important to recall that Turkey 
considers itself a laic state, preferring to employ the French term laïcité. French laïcité refers to 
state control over religion, in contrast to the separation of state and religion. Therefore, as an 
administrative government institution, the Diyanet functions as a “hegemonic manager” of 
religion (Öztürk 2016, 622). 
In practice, the institution regulates the beliefs, practices, and principles of Sunni Islam; 
administers the country’s more than 85,000 mosques; educates Sunni clerics; issues the subject 
matter for sermons to be read at Friday services (cuma hutbesi); assists in developing the 
curriculum for the mandatory Religious Culture and Education courses in public primary and 
secondary schools; and supports pilgrims going on the hajj (the requisite Muslim pilgrimage to 
Mecca), among other activities. The Diyanet budget increased fourfold from 2006 to 2015 
(Lepeska 2015); from 2015 to 2016, the allocation went from ₺3.6 billion TRY to over ₺5.9 
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billion TRY25 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başkanlığı, Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı 2016). Turkey has also 
added almost 10,000 new mosques since 2006, meaning that there were 87,381 in 2016 (Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Başkanlığı, Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı 2016). 
 Notably, these massive hikes in budget allocations, staffing increases, and expanded 
scope have occurred under the current AKP government. While the Diyanet was established as 
an institution to regulate and control the practice of Islam in defense of the Republic’s secular 
nature against religion, there has been a tangible shift toward a patent promotion of Hanefi Sunni 
Islam, both domestically and abroad (Lepeska 2015). The transformation in the Diyanet’s raison 
d’être began in the 1980s during the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis,” (see above) and intensified 
after the election of the AKP government in 2002 (Öztürk 2016). It is widely accepted that after 
the 2011 elections, the governing party adopted more authoritarian tendencies, including more 
actively controlling the Diyanet both overtly and covertly through the aforementioned widening 
of its scope of activity and budget, making it essentially an extension of the party itself. One 
manifestation of this came in the form of the removal of Prof. Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu, who was an 
appointee of devoted secularist and then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, as head of the 
Diyanet.26 He was replaced by Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez, who has acquiesced more easily to 
AKP demands (Öztürk 2016, 627). The AKP’s hold over the Diyanet is also evident in the 
“instrumentalization” of sermons; just prior to the June 2015 elections, media published stories 
                                               
 
25 Care has been taken throughout this study to differentiate between currencies. The New Turkish Lira (Yeni Turk 
Lirası, ₺/TRY) came into circulation on January 1, 2009. References to the Turkish currency prior to this date are 
labeled “TL”. 
26 See Section 6.1.2 for a brief description of the end of Bardakoğlu’s term at the Diyanet. 
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that imams (who, it is important to remember, are paid employees of the Diyanet) used their 
mimbar (pulpit) to subtly campaign for the AKP. They are reported to have stated: “Muslims, we 
will be voting on Sunday. This election will not only affect Turkey, but also the world. We must 
give our votes to Muslims” (T24.com 2015). The final phrase was a not-so-thinly veiled 
reference to the AKP. Other appointed AKP officials have toed the party line in defense of the 
Diyanet’s enlarged scope and budget. For example, Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ announced 
that anyone who launched complaints against the Diyanet’s budget are “against the presence of 
the institution itself” (Lepeska 2015). The tightening command of the AKP over this institution 
has been cause for concern by the groups that do not identify with the Hanefi Sunni identity that 
the Diyanet has conspicuously solidified and supported. What follows is a brief description of 
the Turkish faith communities that lie outside the government-buttressed Hanefi Sunni identity 
and are parties to the cases before the ECtHR analyzed in this study.  
4.3.2 Alevi 
Of the faith communities examined in this study, the Alevi community is the largest, making up 
anywhere from 10-25 percent of Turkey’s almost 80 million people. The precise number of 
Alevi in Turkey is disputed for many reasons related to identity, perhaps including the practice of 
takiye.27 The Alevi are the second largest religious group in Turkey, after Sunni Muslims, and by 
far the largest religious minority (Erman and Göker 2000, 99). In spite of the large size of their 
                                               
 
27 See “Definitions” for an explanation of takiye. 
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population and deep roots in the history of Turkey, the Alevi continue to face discrimination due 
to the fact that they do not fall within the de facto prescribed identity of the Sunni Turk.  
The origins of the word Alevi stem from reverence for Ali, the fourth Islamic caliph and, 
according to Shia Islam, the successor Imam to Muhammed.28 Though they share etymological 
roots and syncretic beliefs, the Alevi are not to be confused with the Alewites, who are a distinct 
sect of Twelver Shia Islam. The Alevi are unique to Turkey and are generally characterized as 
heterogeneous, with distinctive beliefs and practices drawn from a broad scope of sources; some 
of these include reverence for Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammed), the 
twelve imams, and Haci Bektaş Veli, or take inspiration from Sufism or other religious and 
cultural practices. Alevilik (Alevism),29 therefore, encompasses a broad set of beliefs but also a 
common cultural experience of Alevis in Turkey. Various Alevi groups emphasize different 
aspects of their self-definitions, choosing to accentuate either social, political, or cultural facets 
of their identity.  
The ethnic and religious origins of Alevilik are difficult to define, likely due to Turkey’s 
hegemonic version of laicism that has, in essence, installed state-controlled Sunni Islam as the 
semi-official religion of the country within the scope of a secular constitution (Dressler 2013, 
xii). There are two widely acknowledged views about Alevilik: 1) Alevilik is a part of Islam, 
though located on the margins; and 2) Alevilik is an intrinsic part of Anatolian and Turkish 
                                               
 
28 The schism between the Shia and Sunni branches of Islam that exists today was caused by a disagreement over 
who Muhammed’s successor would be. 
29 See the “Definitions” section at the end of this study for a more complete definition of Alevilik. 
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culture, dating back to Central Asian Turkic history (Dressler 2013, xii). Some Alevi do not 
embrace the unidimensional religious definition because it ignores the cultural aspects of Alevi 
identity, as well as the influence of Sufism. Other Alevi discard Islam entirely and consider 
Alevism to be a unique culture. This syncretism and differences of opinion make it difficult to 
define Alevi theology. Additional difficulties related to definition are rooted in the group’s 
leadership structure and its historically secretive nature. The discrimination and threats the Alevi 
face have also played a significant role in the failure to formulate “a fully articulated shared code 
of theology or conduct” (Yavuz 2003, 66).  
Alevi identity in Turkey is communal in nature, with shared culture, moral values, rituals, 
and common collective emotions, all of which make this group very distinct from the Sunni 
majority (Köse 2012, 576). Their liberal positions on gender equality, alcohol consumption, and 
their religious practices (which often include music and dancing) do not strictly follow the five 
pillars of Islam (declaration of the unity of God and Muhammad as His Prophet; ritual prayer 
five times per day; almsgiving; fasting during the Holy Month of Ramadan; and pilgrimage to 
Mecca). As a result, the Alevi have often found themselves the victims of Sunni Muslim 
prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Erman and Göker 2000, 101).  
The community that is now recognized as the Alevi has a history in Turkey dating back 
to Ottoman times. In the first three hundred years of the Ottoman Empire, all dervishes and 
tekkes (dervishes’ houses of worship) were consolidated under one religious figure, Haci Bektaş 
Veli (Melikoff 1998, 5), a 13th century mystic and saint. During this period, the Alevi were 
divided into two groups: the Bektaşi, who were relatively sedentary, and the Kızılbaş, who were 
nomadic or semi-nomadic (Melikoff 1998, 5; Yavuz 2003, 66). The Kızılbaş and Bektaşi share 
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similar beliefs. However, the Kızılbaş identity arose from the tension “between [the] sedentary 
and nomadic lifestyles of Turkic tribes, the rivalry between Ottoman and Safavid empires, and 
the presence of heretical ideas in Anatolia” (Yavuz 2003, 66). The nomadic Kızılbaş struggled 
against the Ottoman Empire to retain their customs and conventions as the state attempted, even 
then, to impose Sunni Islam upon the population (Yavuz 2003, 66). The Bektaşi order was 
abolished by Sultan Mahmut II in 1826 (Vorhoff 1998, 25), which resulted in the closure of the 
tekkes and the dervishes being exiled.  
The oppression of the Bektaşi was relaxed during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), but 
the Alevi had the memory of Ottoman oppression fresh in their minds and were generally 
supportive of Atatürk’s reforms—namely the disestablishment of Sunni Islam and the 
implementation of strict secularism (Yavuz 2009, 66). Atatürk and his colleagues attempted to 
unify the diversity of religions, ethnicities, and cultures under a wholly new identity of “Turk.” 
These political, legal, cultural, social, and economic policy changes were an attempt to create a 
modern, Westward-looking, democratic, representative, unified, and secular republic. Some 
components of Alevi identity were included to construct the newly envisaged Turkish identity, 
with the Young Turks idealizing the Alevi as “true Turks” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2003, 57). For 
example, the use of Turkish in the call to prayer (ezan) was in line with the Alevis’ use of 
Turkish as its liturgical language in contrast to Sunnis, who prefer Arabic. Alevis consider 
themselves Turkey’s “true democrats” (Kinzer 2001, 64) because of their influence on Atatürk’s 
reforms. 
No sooner had these reforms been implemented, that further secularization laws were 
passed in the name of nation building. This included the legislation package in 1925 that closed 
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all Sufi lodges (dergah) and Alevi places of worship (cemevi) and banned the use of religious 
titles for both Sunnis and Alevis (Kuru 2009, 221), which are essential to Alevi religious 
structure. This forced an “internalization of faith” and the need for Alevis to distance themselves 
from the religious aspects of Alevism, adopting an identity focused more on culture rather than 
religion. 
 Alevis remained relatively unnoticed until the 1960s. The debate over what it meant to be 
“Alevi” still centered on actual beliefs and whether Alevism was a religion, a denomination of 
Islam, or a Sufi tarikat (sect). As a result, Alevis adopted the aforementioned “Turkish” identity 
as form of legitimization (Massicard 2005, 121). In 1963, President Cemal Gürsel inquired about 
the establishment of a “mezhepler dairesi” (denominational department) within the Diyanet so 
that “all Muslim communities be treated equally” (Massicard 2005, 119). This proposal sparked 
outrage among conservatives who claimed that such a project would “bring ‘mum söndü’ 
ceremonies into the mosques.”30 They further argued that Alevism was not a mezhep 
(denomination) but a tarikat, which remained an illegal institution (Massicard 2005, 119). It was 
also in the 1960s that Alevi associations began to form and the Birlik Partisi (BP, Unity Party; 
later changed to Türkiye Birlik Partisi) was established as the first “confessional” Alevi political 
party, winning 2.8 percent of the vote31 and eight seats in Parliament in 1969 (Yavuz 2003, 67).  
                                               
 
30 There is a fairly widely known misrepresentation of the ceremonies that occur in cemevi, which is occasionally 
propogated as Alevi congregants “turning out the lights” (mum sönmek, which literally means “to extinguish a 
candle”) and committing acts of incest and adultery.  
31 The current 10 percent electoral threshold that is in currently effect was not implemented until 1983, following the 
1980 coup.  
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 Political, cultural, and religious tensions increased throughout the 1970s. What was 
primarily framed as a struggle between left and right in fact had deeper undertones of religious 
animosity between ultranationalist Sunni fundamentalists and the Alevi. Towards the end of the 
decade, the Alevis were victims of a number of brutal assaults. In April 1978, eight Alevis were 
killed and approximately one hundred injured over three days of violence in Malatya. Later that 
year, in September, 12 Alevis were killed and approximately 200 injured in an attack on an Alevi 
neighborhood in Sivas. The most violent attack, known as the Kahramanmaraş (Maraş) 
Massacre, took place in December 1978. This single event took the lives of more than 100 Alevis 
and injured thousands. Some claim that these massacres were carried out by the state; at the very 
least, the state stood by in silent complicity (Kılıç 2011). The same accusation is made in relation 
to nationwide tension that peaked in 1980 and led to the coup that ushered in three years of 
military rule.  
  It is important to recall the identity politics that so heavily influenced the 1980s to 
appreciate the Alevi experience during this time. Alevi identity underwent a revival in this 
decade and began to more firmly assert their identity. Part of this process included the 
revitalization and reformation of Alevi institutions and the development of new networks aimed 
at ending their social and institutional discrimination, “as well as their recognition as a 
community legitimately different from the Sunni majority population” (Dressler 2013, xi). This 
revival was likely the result of a reaction to the further homogenization and solidification of a 
Sunni Turk national identity that came about as part of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis following 
the 1980 coup. Thus, by the 1990s, the Turkish state’s homogenization project was being 
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countered by the resurgence of ethnic and religious groups, including the Alevis and also the 
Kurds (Çelik 2003, 141).  
Minority resurgence coincided with an upsurge in fundamentalist Sunni Islam, as 
reflected in the 1994 local elections and 1995 parliamentary elections when the Islamist RP 
increased first its proportion of provincial mayorships and then parliamentary seats significantly 
(Hale and Özbüdün 2010, 4). The rise of fundamentalist Sunni Islam can also be seen in a series 
of violent events that took place before and after these elections. In July 1993, Alevi intellectuals 
assembled at the Madımak Hotel in Sivas to honor the work and life of 16th century Alevi poet 
Pir Sultan Abdal. Just after the Friday prayers, a mob of pro-RP activists burst through security 
and set the hotel on fire. Video recordings of the Madımak Incident indicate that “police clearly 
sided with the mob and did not use force to disperse it” (Yavuz 2003, 77). Thirty-seven were 
killed and more than 50 injured. The police were again slow to react to the 1995 attacks in the 
Alevi-majority Gazi neighborhood in Istanbul where 23 people were killed and more than 1500 
injured over four days of rioting. After this incident, Alevis began to assert their identity and 
mobilize politically (Yavuz 2003, 78, 242).  
When the AKP government was first elected to office in 2002, many Alevis felt 
discriminated against. The AKP government had ignored or denied Alevi claims for rights 
recognition and then-PM Erdoğan made no mention of the Alevi in his speeches or in the party 
platform (Köse 2010b, 147). In response to Alevi discontent, during the AKP’s second term of 
office (2007-2011) the government initiated what became known as the Alevi Opening, a 
dialogue between the government and the Alevi community to identify and attempt to 
accommodate Alevi identity claims within Turkey’s political and legal setting (Soner and Toktaş 
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2011, 420). A series of workshops were conducted in 2009 and 2010 that gathered participants 
from the Alevi organizations, government representatives, academics, journalists, and members 
of civil society organizations to address the Alevi’s major demands:  
• State support for Alevi institutions comparable to support for Sunni Islamic 
institutions,  
o or, alternatively, as some Alevi organizations demanded, the state’s 
complete retraction from the organization of religious affairs (i.e., 
complete detachment from the Diyanet);  
• the abolition of mandatory school classes on “Religious Culture and Ethics,”  
o or, alternatively, adequate and positive representation of Alevism therein;  
• the recognition of cemevi as “houses of worship,” a status that is granted to 
mosques, churches, and synagogues (i.e., to the houses of worship of those 
religions that are recognized in traditional Islamic discourse as din [religions] and 
had already been privileged within the Ottoman state);  
• some form of state recognition and material support for Alevi ritual leaders 
(dede);  
• and conversion of the Madımak Hotel in Sivas (the site of the Madımak Incident) 
into a museum to commemorate the tragedy (Dressler 2013, xii-xiii). 
The Alevi community claims that no concrete steps have been taken to meet their demands for 
recognition and that the “opening” was simply an electoral ploy by the government (Doğan 
2014). The number of domestic and ECtHR cases that the Alevi have brought forward to date are 
an indication that Alevis continue to face barriers to recognition of their identity and the free 
exercise of their political and associational rights.  
4.3.3 Lausanne Minorities: Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Jews 
Turkey’s long-standing policy toward religious minorities is based on the Lausanne Treaty of 
1923, which is considered a foundational document of the Turkish Republic. The treaty takes a 
simplistic view on national minorities and defined them as “non-Muslims.” The treaty, however, 
only included the Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Jewish communities (Treaty of 
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Lausanne 1923, Articles 37-45). These religious minorities’ distinct and recognized status is due 
to the fact that they were the three largest millets during the Ottoman Empire (Toktaş and Aras 
2009, 700).32  
The relevant articles of the Lausanne Treaty outline the rights and freedoms these 
minorities possess. These rights were reinforced in subsequent constitutions, at least in writing, if 
not in practice. While non-Muslim citizens are granted citizenship rights, the Lausanne Treaty 
has been interpreted in ways that place restrictions on minority individuals. The government’s 
refusal to recognize the leadership or administrative structures of the Lausanne Treaty 
communities has forced them to depend on their own independent foundations with separate 
governance boards for their properties. The subjective interpretation of Lausanne has also posed 
a problem in terms of the election of leaders. For example, religious clergy of any faith (even 
Islam) are required to be Turkish citizens, posing challenges for the selection of qualified clergy 
since Turkey has prohibitively restrictive laws on training and selecting clergy. 
These three “Lausanne” communities have a long-standing history and presence in the 
territory of modern Turkey, distinct characteristics, and are concerned with preserving their 
common identity, all of which are elements of what the Additional Protocol to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has defined as a “national 
minority” (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1993, Section 1, Article 1). They remain 
                                               
 
32 In 1925, The Bulgarian-Turkish Treaty of Friendship extended recognition to Bulgarian Christians of Turkish 
origin, though this has few implications since there is no significant Bulgarian population in Turkey (Toktaş and 
Aras 2009, 700-701). 
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present and active today, although their populations have dwindled significantly over the years 
for various reasons.  
Armenian Orthodox 
Turkey’s Armenian Orthodox community is the country’s largest Christian denomination with a 
population of approximately 90,000 (60,000 of which are Turkish citizens, and 30,000 are 
undocumented immigrants from Armenia) (United States Department of State 2016, 2). Most of 
the community resides in Istanbul, which is the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, one of the two autonomous Sees of the Armenian Apostolic Church (the other is 
in Jerusalem).  
The Patriarchate is led by the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, a position that is 
currently vacant. Archbishop Mesrob Mutafyan was elected patriarch for life in 1998, but 
stepped down in 2016 due to health concerns. The selection of a new Armenian Patriarch is 
complicated by the fact that the relationship between the Patriarchate and the Turkish 
government is still (de facto) governed by an 1863 Ottoman regulation. Though there are 
differing views of whether this regulation is still valid, the Patriarchate assumes it is (Yıldırım 
2010a). The problem is that the regulation does not stipulate what to do when a patriarch falls ill, 
as is the case with Mutafyan; it only explains a procedure to follow when a patriarch dies or 
resigns (Yıldırım 2010a). Though there are no Turkish laws that address this issue specify how 
this process is to take place, the Turkish Ministry of Interior has repeatedly interfered with the 
nomination and selection process. This process that is complicated by the fact that the 
community is divided about how and when to hold an election, in part due to the government’s 
repeated interference. As of February 2018, while Patriarch Mesrob is “incapacitated” and 
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unable to fulfill his duties, the “established practice” of seeking the state’s permission to conduct 
elections remains. The Turkish Ministry of Interior, however, has informed the community that 
the necessary conditions have not been met to hold a new election (i.e., Patriarch Mesrob is still 
living) (Yıldırım 2018). It is also worth noting that the Turkish government refuses to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate outside Turkey and denies its use of the title “Patriarch 
of Constantinople” and instead uses “Armenian Patriarch.”  
The complicated and delicate relationship between the Armenian Orthodox community 
and the Turkish government is also tainted by late-Ottoman history. The long-standing animosity 
between Turks and Armenians, both domestically and in the diaspora, dates back to World War I 
when the Ottoman Armenian population sided with Russia against the Ottomans. This resulted in 
a massive relocation campaign of the Armenians living in Ottoman territory and the subsequent 
arrest and death of what some estimate reached nearly 1.5 million. Armenians, particularly those 
in the diaspora, aim to have Turkey officially recognize what happened in 1915 as genocide. 
While 28 countries (Armenian National Institute 2018) and a number of international bodies, 
including the European Parliament, the COE, and the Catholic Church, have made official 
proclamations of genocide recognition, Turkey does not acknowledge the events as such.  
Greek Orthodox 
Byzantium, which became Constantinople to honor the Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire, 
Constantine the Great (the first Christian Emperor) and later became Istanbul, was officially 
recognized as the Patriarchate of Constantinople at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. At this 
Council, the Roman Catholic Church, Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Oriental Orthodox 
Church divided over “Christology.” The Oriental Orthodox Church rejected the outcomes of the 
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Council, one of which was the declaration of the dual nature of Christ as divine and human. It 
was then that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople representing the Eastern Orthodox 
Church, which is an autocephalous communion of churches, was recognized as the “first among 
equals” of all of the bishops, and the Roman Catholic Church remained in communion33 until the 
Great Schism of 1054. The Ottomans’ 1453 Conquest of Constantinople marked the fall of the 
Byzantine Empire and Orthodox Christians were absorbed into what would become the millet 
system. At its peak, the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul was 350,000 (see Figure 1, 
below); but, much like the Armenian Orthodox population, this had dwindled by the end of the 
Ottoman Empire. In 1923, Turkey and Greece agreed to a population exchange where many 
Greek Orthodox citizens would be returned to Greece and Muslims to Turkey. The Lausanne 
Treaty solidified the rights of the approximately 100,000 Greek Orthodox Christians that 
remained in Turkey and their religious institutions. The same applied to the Muslim population 
in Greece.  
 In September 1955, violence erupted in Turkey over claims that Atatürk’s birth home in 
Salonika (Thessaloniki), Greece, had been burned. Known as the Istanbul Pogrom, these attacks 
on the Greek population in Istanbul spurred the return of many ethnically Greek Turkish citizens 
to Greece. Nine years later, another mass expulsion of thousands of ethnically Greek Turkish 
citizens occurred due to the Cyprus conflict, when Turkey halted an agreement that had been in 
place that permitted ethnic Greeks to reside in Turkey (Walz 1964).  
                                               
 
33 “Communion” here referring to the common acceptance among churches and individuals holding common beliefs, 
not to the sacrament of Holy Communion.  
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Figure 1. Greek-Orthodox population of Istanbul (1844-1994) & percentage of total population 
Source: “Greek Orthodox Population of Istanbul: 1844-1997” 2017 
The Ecumenical Patriarchate remains in Istanbul and serves the approximately 300 
million Orthodox Christians worldwide. As in the case of Armenian Christians, the Turkish 
government refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate outside of 
Turkey and does not acknowledge the title “Ecumenical Patriarchate”; instead, the government 
uses the title “Patriarch of Fener,” in reference to the neighborhood in Istanbul in which the 
Patriarchate is located. The Halki Theological College (the higher education branch of the 
Patriarchate), which had been operating on an island just outside Istanbul since Ottoman times, 
has been closed since 1971 after the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that private higher 
education institutions must be affiliated with a state-operated university. In 2004, the reopening 
of the seminary was indefinitely suspended due to “concerns of the Turkish military and the 
National Security Council that the Greek Orthodox minority constitutes a potential security 
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threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish State” (Prodromou 2005, 19). Furthermore, the 
Turkish government mandates that the designated Patriarch must be a Turkish citizen, in spite of 
the fact that this contradicts the Lausanne agreement. The elimination of clergical training 
opportunities for Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens, requiring that the Patriarch be a Turkish 
citizen, and significant hurdles put in place by the government for the actual appointment process 
pose incredible challenges in the community’s appointment of spiritual leaders. These direct and 
indirect discriminatory practices have led the Greek Orthodox population to flee Turkey, as seen 
in Figure 1. The approximately 2000 Greek Orthodox Christians who remain today (Bulut 2017) 
are primarily elderly and living in Istanbul.  
Jews 
The history of Jews in Anatolia dates to the 4th century BCE, as indicated by remnants of 
settlements discovered along the Aegean coast (American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise 2018). 
Since then, there has been a continuous Jewish presence on the land that currently constitutes 
modern-day Turkey. Though the Jewish population is included among the recognized Lausanne 
minority groups, unlike the Armenian and Greek minorities, the Jewish minority in Turkey is not 
ethnically or linguistically homogenous (Karimova and Deverell 2001, 10). Most of the 
population consists of Sephardic Jews exiled from Spain during the 15th century Inquisition who 
speak Ladino; a smaller group of Askenazi Jews from central and northern Europe who speak 
Yiddish; and an even smaller group of Karaite Jews who speak Greek (Karimova and Deverell 
2001, 10).  
 In 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany, Turkey offered safe haven to a 
number of Jewish scholars, and during WWII, Turkish diplomats secured citizenship 
  
 
 
100 
documentation, protection, and repatriation to Jews in France and Greece (Bishku 2017, 441). In 
spite of the fact that the Jewish population in Turkey grew to around 125,000 during the war, the 
1942 Varlık Vergisi (Capital Tax), which was imposed for two years, had a severe impact on the 
Jewish and Christian populations of Turkey, forcing business owners who were unable to pay the 
tax into forced labor, causing a number of businesses to declare bankruptcy, and pushing Jews to 
flee Turkey after the war (Bishku 2017, 441).  
Jews migrated en masse to Israel when the state was established in 1948 (Toktaş and 
Aras 2009, 704). Another wave of emigration occurred after the 1967 Arab-Israel War, when 
right-wing nationalist/anti-Semite groups in Turkey, who viewed the war as a religious conflict, 
took sides with the Palestinians (Bishku 2017, 443-444). Today, there are approximately 17,000 
Jews residing in Turkey (United States Department of State 2016, 2), mostly in Istanbul. While 
the Jewish population has faced comparatively fewer acts of violence or discrimination and 
reports that it is able to practice and worship freely, the community is still targeted by hate 
speech in online and print media, and occasionally in speeches by Turkish government officials 
(United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2016, 188). The most overt 
attack occurred in 2003 with the bombing of two Istanbul synagogues. Still, there are positive 
developments. In 2015, the Great Synagogue in Edirne reopened and services were held for the 
first time in nearly 50 years. Hanukah was also celebrated publicly with government officials in 
attendance (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2016, 204). It seems, 
however, that the population is headed for another drastic decline. From approximately February 
2016 to May 2017, nearly “4,700 Turkish Jews applied for or received passports from Spain, 
Portugal, and Israel” (O’Brian 2017).  
  
 
 
101 
4.3.6 Protestant  
While it may not be explicitly recognized as such, the territory of the Republic of Turkey has a 
rich Christian history. For example, according to the Bible, believers were first called 
“Christians” in Antioch (modern Antakya).34 As well, two-thirds of the 27 books of the New 
Testament were written either on the way to or from Asia Minor (modern Anatolia) (Wilson 
2010, 13). This is likely due to the fact that, as the Gospels were being disseminated from Israel 
toward Rome, the disciples, especially Paul, spent significant amounts of time proselytizing to 
the communities in Turkey on their way.  
 Today, while there are more than 140 small and large Protestant fellowship communities 
in Turkey, consisting of five religious foundations and 34 church associations, the Protestant 
community is small (approximately 6-7,000 people) and situated mostly in Istanbul, Ankara, and 
İzmir (Association of Protestant Churches 2017, 2). Interactions between Turkish citizens and 
Protestants are rooted in the 200-year history of evangelical missionary work in Turkey 
(Özyürek 2012, 100). Missionaries have been considered a threat to national unity and identity 
since Ottoman times, and the Turkish state remains paranoid about (Protestant) Christian 
missionary activities. Missionizing was prohibited for a period of time, but was permitted again 
in the 1980s under Turgut Özal’s reforms (Özyürek 2012, 102).  
                                               
 
34 Acts 11:25-26: “Then Barnabas went to Tarsus to look for Saul, and when he found him, he brought him to 
Antioch. So for a whole year Barnabas and Saul met with the church and taught great numbers of people. The 
disciples were called Christians first at Antioch.” 
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In 2016, as in previous years, the Protestant community reported continued hate crimes 
against them, including physical attacks, church vandalism, and hate speech directed at the 
clergy (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2016, 189). The same 
year, citing security concerns, Turkish officials prohibited the public celebrations of Christmas 
and Easter (Association of Protestant Churches 2017, 3-4). The 2016 Human Rights Violations 
Report of the Association of Protestant Churches (of Turkey) lists numerous examples of the 
various ways in which Protestants in Turkey face discrimination and violence, including 
problems related to places of worship, the right to propagate religion, education and compulsory 
religious classes, the training of religious leaders, legal personality and the right to organize, and 
obligatory declarations of faith (as it relates to the Turkish national identification card) 
(Association of Protestant Churches 2017, 4-9). One recent story that has garnered attention is 
the detention of and charges laid against Reverend Andrew Brunson, a US citizen who has lived 
in İzmir and led a small church there for more than 20 years. The Turkish government alleges 
that he has ties to the Gülen Movement, recognized by the Turkish government as Fetullahçı 
Terör Örgütü (FETÖ, the Fetullah Gülen Terrorist Organization).  
4.3.7 Jehovah’s Witness 
Formed in the United States in 1931, the Jehovah’s Witness movement is relatively new. The 
official website of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Turkey declares that there has been a consistent 
presence of Witnesses in Turkey since that date, with 40 active congregations and more than 
3,000 members (out of approximately 7 million worldwide) (Jehovah’s Witnesses 2018). 
Accordingly, Jehovah’s Witnesses has been categorized as a “new or relatively new” religion 
under Article 9 of the ECHR, meaning that the organs of the Convention have implicitly or 
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explicitly acknowledged a “certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance” to 
the convictions of the group and afford them protection under Article 9 (Council of Europe, 
European Court of Human Rights 2015, 7-8).  
 Jehovah’s Witnesses share some similarities with Christianity, and even consider 
themselves Christian, but are non-Trinitarian (i.e., they deny the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, 
that God is triune—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in one “body”). They recognize all 66 books of 
the Bible (New and Old Testaments) as the inspired word of God, but will only use their own 
New World Translation (NWT). They refer to God as “Jehovah,” which is a transliteration of the 
name Yahweh, spoken in the narrative of the burning bush in Exodus (Patheos 2017). One of the 
core rituals is attendance of five meetings each week (home Bible study and Watchtower study) 
and committing to a minimum of ten hours per month of door-to-door proselytizing (Patheos 
2017). 
 While the group claims that they have had a presence in Turkey since just after the 
founding of the Turkish Republic, they also claim that they did not face religious persecution 
until the 1980s (Jehovah’s Witnesses 2018). Like many other non-Hanefi Sunni groups, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses have faced challenges to obtaining legal recognition and establishing places 
of worship and religious activity, though they did receive favorable domestic court decisions in 
2007 that permitted their official registration (Jehovah’s Witnesses 2018). Though Jehovah’s 
Witnesses should legally be granted the right to establish Kingdom Halls (the place of worship of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses), Turkish municipal authorities frequently deny this right (see Association 
of Solidarity with Jehovah’s Witnesses et al. v. Turkey [Application Nos. 36915/10 and 8606/13] 
2016).  
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Yet one of the recurring challenges to the community is Turkey’s non-recognition of 
conscientious objection to military service. Jehovah’s Witnesses have brought three cases to the 
ECtHR since 2011. In each case, the Court ruled that Turkey had violated the right to 
conscientious objection. Nevertheless, Turkey remains the only member of the Council of 
Europe that does not recognize this right and continues to prosecute those who refuse to perform 
mandatory military service.  
4.3.8 Atheism and Pacifism 
While some may not consider atheism or pacifism “beliefs” in the strict sense of the term 
because they are considered philosophical convictions, they fall within the scope of Article 9 of 
the Convention. The organization American Atheists states that: “Atheism is not an affirmative 
belief that there is no god nor does it answer any other question about what a person believes. It 
is simply a rejection of the assertion that there are gods. Atheism is too often defined incorrectly 
as a belief system. To be clear: Atheism is not a disbelief in gods or a denial of gods; it is a lack 
of belief in gods” (American Atheists n.d.). In its rulings, the ECtHR has been unequivocal that 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is “a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics 
and the unconcerned” (Kokkinakis v. Greece [Application No. 14307/88] 1983, §31).  
 Due to continuous repression of atheists in Turkey, it is very difficult to obtain 
information or statistics about atheism or atheists in Turkey. For example, the website of the 
Atheist Association, which was founded in 2014 in Istanbul, was blocked in March 2015 by a 
court, citing Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code which prohibits “provoking the people for 
hate and enmity or degrading them” (Middle East Eye 2015); 47 other websites were also shut 
down at the same time with the same argument (D. Jones 2015). The founding member of 
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Turkey’s Atheism Association, Onur Romano, told VOA that “Through Facebook, Twitter, 
emails, and to our call center, we have received a couple of hundred death threats already,” (D. 
Jones 2015). On two occasions in the past few years, then-PM and current President Erdoğan has 
conflated “terrorists” and “atheists” in an attempt to criticize those with non-Hanefi Sunni beliefs 
or those who defend them (Hürriyet Daily News 2014; Hürriyet Daily News 2015).  
 Another group that is included in this study is pacifists. Though pacifists are not subject 
to the same severe level of outright discrimination and violence as other minority belief 
communities, they still face challenges. While it is virtually impossible to find information and 
statistics on pacifism in Turkey, Turkish pacifists and atheists share a common challenge: 
conscientious objection. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines pacifism as a broad 
commitment to peace and opposition to war (Fiala 2014). The ECtHR has also acknowledged 
that pacifism is protected under Article 9 as one among other “various coherent and sincerely-
held philosophical convictions” (Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom [Application No.7050/75] 1978, 
§69). Article 9 is not always included as a violation in judgments related to conscientious 
objection (the most common application category of cases by pacifists). It is often read in 
conjunction with Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment) and/or Article 6 (right to a fair trial), depending on the nature of the cases.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, Turkey has had a complicated and complex history. Some of the challenges that 
have arisen since the founding of the Turkish Republic are rooted in the institutional 
arrangements that were carried over from or influenced by the institutional settings of the 
Ottoman Empire. This is particularly true for the approach to the governance of religious 
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classifications. The Diyanet remains the monolith of the state’s heavy-handed influence, or even 
authority, over religion in Turkey. The institution’s intent is to manage (Hanefi) Sunni Islamic 
practices and manifestations; yet as illustrated in some cases here, it also interferes in the 
interpretation, practices, and manifestations of other belief systems in Turkey.  
 The next chapter provides the methodological framework through which this study was 
conducted. It includes a review of the study’s purpose and research questions. Next is a section 
acknowledging the difficulties in any analysis of measuring compliance with the judgments of a 
supranational court. The research approach is then justified and explained with this in mind. The 
chapter concludes with a description of the data, instrumentation, collection, and analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5. Methodology 
The conclusion of Chapter 3, which described Turkey’s experience with the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), introduced the issue of high volume of applications made against 
Turkey, as well as challenges surrounding implementation. Taking these issues into 
consideration, this chapter will explain how this study systematically approached the research 
questions it seeks to answer. The chapter begins with a contextual examination of ECtHR 
compliance and a reiteration of the aim of the study through a review of the research questions. 
This is followed by an overview of the challenges surrounding the measurement of compliance 
with supranational judicial bodies, the ECtHR in particular, and a justification for the chosen 
research approach. The chapter closes with a description of the data, instrumentation, data 
collection, and data analysis. 
5.1 Context and Aim of the Study 
State compliance with adverse rulings in the ECtHR varies across European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) articles and issues and is contingent on the nature of the issue and the 
state involved. Compliance is a multi-faceted process, largely determined by domestic political 
circumstances and involving a number of actors with conflicting interests in relation to the 
mechanisms and outcomes of implementation (Anagnostou 2010; Hillebrecht 2012, 2014; 
Huneeus 2014). The fact that effective execution remedies are largely a domestic issue was even 
acknowledged in the ECtHR’s 2017 Annual Report (European Court of Human Rights 2018, 7). 
The most recent report of the Council of Europe’s (COE) Committee of Ministers (CoM) 
demonstrates that while the Court and CoM continue to increase the number of cases closed each 
year, owing to structural changes that have been made in the Court and CoM, executing these 
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judgments in a timely and comprehensive manner remains a challenge. While structural and 
operational issues within the COE certainly contribute to non-implementation by High 
Contracting parties, certain “repeat offender” states have reinforced the idea that domestic 
institutional arrangements also play a significant role in inhibiting the full implementation of 
adverse judgments.  
This study aims to examine precisely these domestic institutional factors that both 
prevent Turkey’s compliance with the obligations of implementation and have led to greater 
judicialization at the ECtHR on issues related to thought or belief in Turkey. The research 
questions that guided data collection and analysis35 are identical to the ones initially formulated 
in Chapter 1: 
• What are the similarities and differences in the cases non-Hanefi Sunni groups have 
brought to the ECtHR that have been ruled to be violations regarding religious 
freedom in Turkey and what are the explanations for these variances or similarities?  
• What mechanisms have contributed to Turkey’s implementation/non-implementation of 
these rulings (political reasons, nature of the reforms required, budgetary reasons, 
public opinion, judgment language/margin of appreciation, interference with 
obligations from other institutions)? 
• Which types of cases have come closest to implementation, which measures (if any) were 
selected to implement (general measures, individual measures, just satisfaction, costs 
and expenses)? 
From these questions, six factors were identified as responding to the research question. These 
were significantly guided by the language of Resolution 1226 of the COE Parliamentary 
Assembly (Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly 2000). Resolution 1226 identified some 
                                               
 
35 All cases in this dataset except one were still pending in the Committee of Ministers. 
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of the major issues regarding non-implementation of judgments. The six selected factors and the 
questions they inspire are: 1) political reasons: are there active or passive political coalitions that 
are pro- or anti-reform of the issue at hand? Which political party was in government while the 
case was open? Did the political party in power seek to avoid political responsibility for a 
contentious issue or did they take ownership of it to appear responsive to external pressure 
(domestic or international)?; 2) reasons to do with required reforms: what was the relative 
difficulty or ease in changing the judicial, constitutional, administrative, legislative, executive, or 
military laws, structures, or operations; 3) budgetary reasons: were there financial barriers 
related to individual reparations (compensation, return of property)? If so, why? Were there 
constraints on the national budget that prevented the implementation of the requisite general 
measures (financial/revenue concerns regarding changing laws, administrative procedures, or 
other institutional structures)?; 4) reasons to do with public opinion: what is the identity of the 
minority involved (their historical reputation and treatment by society)? Were there simultaneous 
exogenous events that swayed public opinion during the execution of the case (wars, attacks, the 
issuance of other international rulings regarding the group involved)? Did the Turkish 
government seek to demonstrate a respect for human rights or evade responsibility thereof 
(related to public opinion)?; 5) judgment drafted in an ambiguous or explicit manner: is the 
language used in the judgment regarding the expectations and/or obligations for compliance with 
the ruling explicit or vague?; and 6) reasons relating to interference with obligations deriving 
from other institutions: what is the weight of institutional dependence (what is the impact of the 
number and type of other domestic and international institutions that are involved)? 
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5.2 Challenges to Measuring Implementation 
Measuring implementation of adverse rulings from human rights tribunals is not merely related 
to case closure. Implementation can often be subjective and is occasionally political, particularly 
in the case of the ECtHR where the Committee of Ministers (CoM), a body consisting of the 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of COE member states, is the ultimate arbiter 
of case closure. Inconsistent data collection, the failure to define standard measurement 
benchmarks, and the volume of cases create even more obstacles to accurately assessing 
compliance (Hillebrecht 2014, 41).  
 If a violation is found, the Court’s default is toward subsidiarity in guidance for a state to 
take particular measures. On the one hand, this gives the state the opportunity to fashion a 
solution that is best suited to domestic circumstances; on the other hand, the Court and the 
CoM’s less clear expectations can make it difficult for the state to understand what an optimal 
and acceptable solution (according to the Court and CoM) would be—not only for case closure, 
but also to ensure that similar structural issues do not come before the Court again.  
 Another challenge to measuring implementation is accessibility to information. Although 
the CoM has taken measures in recent years to increase the transparency of the execution 
process, it is still relatively difficult to gather information on the status of cases. The HUDOC-
EXEC database (hudoc.exec.coe.int) stores documentation related to the status of case execution, 
government action plans and action reports, communications and submissions about the cases, 
CoM decisions, and final resolutions. However, the HUDOC-EXEC system was only officially 
launched in January 2017 and does not include complete documentation for each case. In fact, 
CoM decisions only date from January 1, 2011 onwards; this means that searches for CoM 
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meeting decisions prior to that date (and in some cases even after that date) require the use of the 
CM Search (search.coe.int/cm), a non-intuitive system that demands a proficient knowledge of 
search parameters and key words.  
 The databases of the CoM are also sparsely populated due to the fact that some states fail 
to submit action plans and reports in a timely manner, or even at all. Considering this is the 
primary medium through which the states and the CoM stay abreast of execution developments, 
the lack of robust official and public communication signals that either the states are not 
submitting the documents or simply not taking action to report any measures that have been 
taken to execute a judgment. Importantly, the provision to submit an action plan was introduced 
into the CoM working methods in 2004, and became obligatory in 2011. Regulations 
surrounding the submission of action plans have become definitive as the working measures 
have been updated and clarified. Currently, the Execution Department of the CoM can request 
follow-up through the Secretariat if the state does not comply with the six-month time limit for 
submission of an action plan or report and the subsequent reminder and three-month extension. It 
is unclear how often this procedure is followed in practice due to the outdated or absent action 
plans/reports for the cases included in the current study.  
5.3 Research Approach 
This is a qualitative case study of 19 cases of violations Turkey committed related to freedom of 
belief or religion that have been heard before the ECtHR and were either closed or are still 
awaiting closure by the CoM. A qualitative case study is most appropriate design to explore this 
issue because statistics alone cannot answer why Turkey has such a high number of cases against 
it. A qualitative approach to examining these cases will allow for a multifaceted, contextual 
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analysis of the circumstances under which these cases have been brought to the ECtHR and the 
possible causes for the outcomes. Qualitative research also allows for the exploration of 
intangible factors beyond statistical evidence, including abstruse and obscure elements such as 
social norms, deeply entrenched historical narratives, cultural and religious identities (whether 
imposed or chosen), or latent institutional frameworks. Furthermore, a qualitative case study 
facilitates the examination of phenomena through multiple lenses to reveal the range of 
conditions that can produce certain outcomes, while binding the type of cases to certain criteria.  
As for case studies, according to Yin (2003, cited in Baxter and Jack 2008, 545) a case 
study is most appropriate when: “(a) the focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study; (c) you want to 
cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under 
study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and the context.” These 
criteria suit the study at hand. The current study is considered a multiple-case, explanatory and 
exploratory case study because it compares outcomes across multiple cases; it seeks to explain 
“presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or 
experimental strategies, linking program implementation with program effects”; and explores the 
cases in which there is “no clear, single set of outcomes” (Yin 2003, cited in Baxter and Jack 
2008, 547-548). Cases relating to the international judicialization of religion fall squarely within 
these criteria because they explore “how” and “why” international judicialization occurs, as well 
as “how” and “why” cases are executed, or not.  
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5.3 Data, Instrumentation, and Collection 
Before explaining the current study’s data, instrumentation, and collection, it is important first to 
define “implementation” to understand more clearly what is being examined. While some 
scholarship conflates compliance, implementation, and execution, this study chooses to use these 
terms interchangeably. “Some juxtapose ‘compliance’ as adherence to a legal rule, to 
implementation as the behavioral change that such adherence produces; others see compliance as 
an advanced phase of instrumental (as opposed to principled) conformity, in the continuum from 
the coincidental abiding with a rule to its full internalization domestically; yet others see 
compliance as referring to the degree of a state’s deviation from the central tenets of a treaty but 
also extending to the depth of a state’s commitment to it” (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 
2014, 211-212). For the sake of this study, these three words (compliance, implementation, and 
execution) will refer to the process in which an offending state works toward its obligations 
under the ECHR to remedy adverse rulings from the ECtHR in a way that is ultimately deemed 
satisfactory by the CoM, resulting in closure of the case. It is worth noting that while the CoM 
may decide to close a case or set of cases, this is in no way an indication that similar cases may 
not come forward and be deemed admissible by the Court, but only that foreseeable structural 
issues have been resolved domestically.  
While the European Court of Human Rights case judgments and their associated 
documentation in the Committee of Ministers were the primary sources of data for this study, the 
study is also informed by interviews conducted at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France, 
other government documents, media sources, books, and archival material. The use of a number 
of data sources allows for triangulation, thus increasing the data’s reliability, as well as 
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elucidating themes within and across various categories of cases. This research project has been 
exempted from approval by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board due to the 
nature of the research and data intended to be collected.  
5.3.1 ECtHR Court Cases and CoM Documents 
Knowing Turkey to be a repeat offender at the ECtHR, the initial search for cases to be included 
in this study began at the HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int) site. The search criteria were initially 
delimited by cases where Turkey had violated Article 9. After reviewing the results from this 
query, and recognizing that a number of cases related to freedom of belief and religion were not 
included, the search was expanded to include violations of other articles. At the same time, a 
query for cases brought against Turkey in the database of the Strasbourg Consortium 
(www.strasbourgconsortium.org)36 was conducted. These two databases contain case 
information dating from the 1950s (1955 for HUDOC and 1957 for the Strasbourg Consortium). 
The two lists were compared for matches or missing cases. The number of cases was narrowed 
further by applying the following criteria:  
• The case must have been heard and decided on by the ECtHR Grand Chamber or other 
chamber (excluding cases that have been deemed inadmissible, communicated, or 
settled out of court) and been ruled to be a violation; 
• The case must not concern the military, with the exception of conscientious objector cases; 
                                               
 
36 The Strasbourg Consortium is an association of academic institutions interested in freedom of religion or belief 
primarily maintained by the International Center for Law and Religious Studies at Brigham Young University’s Law 
School. It is a good resource for news, research, discussion, and the status of cases at the ECtHR.  
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• The primary issue of the case must not be related to terrorism or recognized terrorist groups 
(Kurdistan Worker’s Party [PKK], Hizbollah, etc.); 
• The primary issue of the case must not be related to a political party; 
• The case must not concern belief expression related to attire or jewelry; 
• The case must have been brought against Turkey directly (i.e., no cases related to Cyprus); 
• The case must have been brought by an individual or group who claimed their thoughts, 
religion or conscience were infringed upon (whether or not the belief is recognized by 
the Turkish government); 
• The case must concern an individual or group that does not identify as Hanefi Sunni. 
The decision to only include cases that had been heard and ruled to be a violation was made 
to be able to examine the execution phase of the case. Cases that were deemed inadmissible, 
were communicated, or settled out of court (friendly settlements) are not necessarily indicative of 
measures Turkey had taken to resolve the issues that were raised in the case. Excluding cases 
related to the military37 (with the exception of conscientious objectors), terrorism/terrorist 
groups, and political parties was deemed appropriate so as not to conflate issues of belief or 
conscience and direct political ideologies, military objectives, or terrorist intentions. Also, cases 
related to religious attire or jewelry were excluded due to the extensive amount of research that 
has already been conducted on this issue in the Turkish context.38 Finally, the limitation that the 
                                               
 
37 In the late 1990s, approximately 15 cases were brought forward by individuals and groups from Turkey alleging 
that their dismissal from the military was due to their religious fundamentalism and/or their wives wearing the 
Islamic headscarf. These cases were deemed inadmissible by the ECtHR.  
38 Most notable in this category is the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (Application No. 44774/98) where the ECtHR 
ruled that Turkey did not violate Article 9 for a ban on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities. 
Şahin applied to have the case heard by the Grand Chamber, which upheld the decision of the Fourth Section (the 
court of original jurisdiction). On the same day that the decision of the Fourth Section was announced, the ECtHR 
also unanimously struck out the case of Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey (Application No. 41556/98) at the applicant’s 
request. The application emerged from a related ban on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf for clinical training at 
nursing colleges in Turkey. There are other cases of religious attire or jewelry for which Turkey was ruled to be in 
violation of at least one of the articles of the ECHR. Ahmet Arslan et al. v. Turkey (Application No. 41135/98), for 
example, involved 127 applicants who were members of the Azcimendi Tarikatı. However, because this and other 
cases involved Sunni applicants, they were not included in this study. Additionally, in the case of Melek Sima Yılmaz 
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case must have been brought to the ECtHR by an individual or group claiming infringement of 
their belief was necessary to examine cases of relatively well-established belief systems, 
excluding those related to Sunni Islam39; this resulted in the inclusion of Alevi, Armenian 
Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witness, Protestant, Jewish, atheist, and pacifist beliefs.  
 The cases from HUDOC and the Strasbourg Consortium were measured against the 
above criteria, 19 of which cases fell with the established parameters. Cases were then grouped 
into six categories according to the issues they addressed: associational laws (non-profit 
foundations and associations), property rights, places of worship/public provision of religious 
services, identity cards, education, and conscientious objection. Interestingly, the time period in 
which these 19 cases were brought to the ECtHR generally coincided with the Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi’s (AKP, Justice and Development Party) time in power. The earliest case was 
filed in 1996 and the most recent was in 2011. Three of the most recent final judgments were 
issued in 2016. The cutoff date for inclusion was July 15, 2016, the date of the attempted military 
coup in Turkey. After that date, the government declared a state of emergency; under Article 15 
of the ECHR, this allows parties to the Convention to take measures that deviate from their 
                                               
 
v. Turkey (Application No. 37829/05), a teacher was tried for repeatedly violating the public headscarf ban at the 
school where she taught. The Court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) due to the 
failure of the government to relay an official opinion of the Council of State to the applicant. The Court held that 
this violation superseded any rights claimed by the applicant under Articles 7, 9, and 14. This case was also 
excluded due to the fact that it primarily dealt with government regulation of Sunni beliefs and practices. 
39 Sunni Muslim applications were excluded from the case selection because most (if not all) cases that would not 
have been excluded under other criteria and were Sunni Muslim applicants were the abovementioned cases that 
focus on the manner in which Sunni Islam is practiced. The primary inquiry of this study is on non-majoritarian 
groups and not the manner in which the Turkish government regulates the majority religion. 
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obligations providing that these are not inconsistent with other obligations under international 
law. Articles 2, 3, 4, or 7, however, must be respected.40  
 In addition to the judgments in each case, all documentation related to each case under 
supervision by the CoM (all 19 cases) was downloaded from the CoM’s Department of 
Execution HUDOC-EXEC database. Because this database is relatively new and not a fully 
robust database, the website of the Department of Execution was also searched to find relevant 
documents for each case. The documents include proceedings of the meetings of the CoM; 
interim resolutions; action plans; action reports; and communications from the Turkish 
government, the plaintiff, and NGOs.  
The time each case spent in the CoM was also measured. This was calculated from the 
date of the final judgment to the cutoff date of July 15, 2016. However, this cannot serve as a 
reliable indicator of ease of implementation due to the fact that the cases arrived at the CoM on 
different dates and all but one case are still pending before the CoM.  
5.3.2 Interviews 
To further understand the context, processes, and statuses of the cases that were selected, 
interviews were conducted at the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of 
Ministers in May-June 2017 in Strasbourg, France, where both bodies are located. Participants 
were selected through snowball sampling, also known as chain referral sampling. Snowball 
                                               
 
40 The state of emergency (olağanüstü hal) was extended by a parliamentary motion for the sixth time in January 
2018 for an additional six months. Therefore, Turkey has been under a continuous state of emergency since the July 
2016 attempted coup.  
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sampling is a method in which the researcher uses existing contacts as references to find other 
potential primary data sources to interview. In this study, a committee member provided two 
individual contacts (Dr. Samim Akgönül, a professor at the University of Strasbourg with 
expertise in religious minorities in Turkey, and Mr. Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar at 
the ECtHR). Initial meetings were arranged with these two individuals, who provided further 
contacts with the following other individuals: Vice-President of the ECtHR and President of the 
Second Section (January 1, 2015-April 30, 2017) Işıl Karakaş; Senior Lawyer and Head of 
Division Dr. Atilla Nalbant; Head of Division, Department for the Execution of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Mr. Özgür Derman; and Lawyer at the Registry of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Mr. Gökçe Türkyılmaz. Interviews with other individuals 
within the COE system were briefly conducted; however, the interviews were discarded due to 
the irrelevant nature of the interviewees’ the area of expertise and professional responsibilities.  
The individuals that were included for interviews in this study all worked directly on the 
selected cases and/or had expertise on the issues covered in those cases, either at the admission, 
hearing, or execution stages. Each individual was contacted with an e-mail invitation to 
participate in an interview. The invitation included information about the researcher’s academic 
profile (university and department), the scope of the study, and the nature of the interview. 
Arrangements were made to meet with participants at a mutually agreed upon location, either at a 
COE location or nearby. During the interviews, participants were informed once again of the 
scope of the study, and signed a “Participant Consent Form,” which outlined the purpose and 
objectives of the research, procedures, potential risks and benefits, confidentiality issues, data 
storage, and the right to withdraw. Each interview was conducted in person in Strasbourg and 
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lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. Interviews were audio recorded with participant 
consent and the researcher also took notes on an iPad. The interviews were conducted primarily 
in English and partially in Turkish, as necessary. The audio recordings of the interviews were 
transcribed and translated into English by the researcher and stored securely on the researcher’s 
password-protected computer.  
 The interviews were semi-structured and a list of established questions was prepared 
prior to each interview. Semi-structured interviews were most appropriate for this study because 
the specific expertise, experience, and professional knowledge of the interviewees was unknown 
prior to the start of the interview. A semi-structured interview format allows the researcher to 
have a list of questions that are important to the study but allows the interviewee to respond to 
the predetermined questions and expand on them freely. Semi-structured interviews also give the 
researcher the flexibility to pursue points that may not have emerged otherwise. The questions 
were categorized into the following groups: professional background of the interviewee, general 
questions about the selected cases, questions about the domestic situation in Turkey as it relates 
to the cases, general questions about implementation, questions about implementation in Turkey 
specifically, and projections for the future.  
5.3.2 Secondary Sources: Government Documents, Media Sources, Archives 
Government documents, media sources, and archival materials formed the third set of data 
included in this study. These documents and sources were searched and analyzed simultaneously 
with the collection and analysis of other data points. The data collected from these sources 
provided additional information on the context of each case, including the domestic hearing, the 
execution phase, and information about the variables that were under examination. 
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Documentation from government institutions included: the United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (uscirf.org), an independent, bipartisan federal government 
commission that provides annual reports on religious freedom throughout the world; the 
International Religious Freedom Report, an annual report on religious freedom issued by the US 
Department of State; legislative resolutions from the US House and Senate; US Central 
Intelligence Agency World Factbook; the EU’s European Commission’s annual progress reports 
on enlargement for Turkey; documentation from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs; annual 
reports of Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate for Religious Affairs); documentation from the 
Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior, Education, and Finance; Turkish legal 
and regulatory documents, including the Constitution, laws, regulations, and codes; and AKP, 
Cumhuryiet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s Party), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, 
Nationalist Action Party), and Halklarin Demokratik Partisi (HDP, People’s Democratic Party) 
political party platforms. NGO sources included the annual Civic Freedom Monitor Report for 
Turkey by the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law; documents and reports from İnsan 
Hakları Ortak Platformu (Human Rights Joint Platform); websites of Alevi organizations in 
Turkey; Human Rights Violation Reports from the Association of Protestant Churches of 
Turkey; the Jehovah’s Witnesses website; and Ateizm Derneği’s (Association of Atheism) 
website. Media sources included the websites of major Turkish news outlets. All of this 
information was analyzed to triangulate the emergent events and themes that arose from the case 
judgments and interviews, and under the thematic dependent variables.  
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5.4 Data Analysis 
As with many qualitative studies, data was collected and analyzed simultaneously. After the 19 
cases had been selected, interviews were conducted in Strasbourg and the analysis of the 
government documents, media sources, and archives began. 
After the data for each set of cases had been collected, it was analyzed and scored 
according to the factors that had contributed to the case being brought forward and to the closure 
(implementation) of the ECtHR’s judgment. Each independent variable was given two scores 
from 0-5, with 0 indicating there were no apparent factors from that category, and 5 indicating 
there were a significant number of events that had had a significant impact. The first two scores 
indicated factors that contributed to or hindered the institutional barriers that caused the violation 
in the first place. The second two scores indicated factors that facilitated or hindered the process 
of implementation. As mentioned earlier, this is a qualitative study that takes the broader picture 
of Turkish history and contemporary events into account, making it challenging to quantify 
which factors were more consequential. However, though a loose quantitative examination may 
not provide a perfect understanding of the elements that impacted each set of cases, it can shed 
light on general trends present across thematic and structural issues, across different groups 
affected, and across violations of different ECHR articles.  
 The cases were further analyzed and scored according to their progress in the execution 
of judgments. Again, all of the cases in this study except one are still pending and were passed to 
the CoM at different times. As a result, the Turkish government has had more time to take action 
in some cases than in others, making it difficult to make accurate comparisons across cases. Still, 
this analysis can be an indicator of variations in the execution of judgments across the same 
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parameters mentioned in the above paragraph. The cases were scored on a scale of 0-2, with 0 
indicating that no action has been taken, 1 indicating that partial action has been taken, and 2 
indicating that conclusive action has been taken, either as a result of language in the judgment or 
assumed necessary action taken to remedy the harm (general measures or individual measures). 
As indicated earlier, payments of just satisfaction are generally explicitly outlined in the 
judgment in terms of deadline, currency, recipient, and default interest, while the terms of 
general or individual measures often are not. However, it is often assumed that some form of 
general and/or individual measures are required, whether indicated in the judgment or not. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, cases where no explicit just satisfaction awards were 
indicated in the judgment were classified as “NI” (not indicated) in the assessment. The 
assumption was made that general and individual measures were expected.  
 Considering both if judgments have made progress towards implementation (scoring for 
action taken on general measures, individual measures, and just satisfaction) and how judgments 
have progressed (scoring for factors that encourage or discourage implementation) provides a 
more holistic picture of execution in the cases selected for this study, and perhaps insight into 
inferences that can be drawn for similar cases in Turkey or in countries that have similar 
domestic conditions. 
Only including this set of cases, however, potentially underestimates implementation 
because all of these cases (with the exception of Tarhan and Küçükergin v. Turkey, which was 
closed in 2010) are still pending before the CoM and had judgments entered at varying dates. 
Sample size also makes it difficult to generalize across countries and across violations of other 
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articles. Nonetheless, due to the domestic commonalities of these cases, some general trends can 
be observed from the results.  
Within the aforementioned framework, the next chapter offers a complete analysis of the 
19 selected cases. The cases are categorized thematically based on common issues addressed in 
each case: associational laws (foundation and association non-profit organizations); property 
rights; places of worship and public provision of religious services; identity cards; education; and 
conscientious objector cases. The sections each contain a description of the context for the theme 
under examination, followed by an explanation of the domestic remedies the applicants 
attempted prior to the case being heard at the ECtHR. Each thematic section concludes with an 
analysis of the case set, in consideration of the independent variables, the research questions, and 
the literature areas examined in Chapter 2.  
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CHAPTER 6. Violations of Religious Freedom against Turkey 
Turkey had the highest number of cases brought against it in the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) between 1959 and 2017, with 2,988 judgments finding at least one violation 
among 17,307 cases with the same findings for all member countries (European Court of Human 
Rights 2017). Even considering that Turkey has one of the largest populations among Council of 
Europe (COE) member countries, Turkey still ranks highest with 37 percent per million 
population of cases finding at least one violation, which places it far beyond the 75th 
percentile.41 It is also worth noting that in the same period, Turkey had the highest number of 
Article 9 violations (13 of 71 total violations).42 However, as this study demonstrates, while 
violations of religious freedom extend beyond Article 9, they still fall within the scope of rights 
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Moreover, a mere glance 
at execution statistics indicate that Turkey today has the second highest rate of non-implemented 
judgments, with 1,446 cases pending in the Committee of Ministers (CoM) among a total of 
7,584 cases (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers 2018, 64-66).  
This chapter examines the selected cases in light of the research questions and 
independent variables that were explained in the previous chapter. The cases are analyzed 
categorically according to the issue that is addressed in each of them: associational laws 
                                               
 
41 Again, it is important to keep in mind that many Eastern European countries did not join the Council of Europe 
until the 1990s or even 2000s, and Russia joined in 1996. Specific statistical data regarding applications and 
judgments from the ECtHR by year and country was unavailable, so a country-to-country comparison was not 
possible.  
42 As mentioned above, the first ruling of an Article 9 violation did not occur until 1993 in Kokkonakis v. Greece. 
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(foundation and association non-profit organizations); property rights; places of worship and 
public provision of religious services; identity cards; education; and conscientious objector cases. 
Each section begins with the contextual background of the issue and a description of the 
domestic proceedings of each case.43 This is followed by an analysis of each set of cases.  
  
                                               
 
43 The descriptions of the domestic proceedings for each case were largely taken from the language as described in 
the final judgments of the ECtHR, as reported in the HUDOC database. 
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6.1 Association and Foundation Laws  
Though there have recently been changes to the legal structures pertaining to how religious 
communities are permitted (or not) to organize themselves and gain legal personality in Turkey, 
an examination of the background of the governance of religious groups dating back to the pre-
Republican era is in order. These frameworks have largely determined how religious 
communities continue to be administered by the Turkish state and clarify the context in which 
the relevant laws and bureaucratic rules have evolved.  
The Treaty of Sèvres was signed in 1920 and divided Ottoman territory up between the 
various powers who had been victorious in World War I. Only a portion of the remaining land 
was left for the Turks. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, incensed by what he and many others perceived 
as an unjust redistribution of Ottoman territories, and provoked by the 1919 Greek invasion of 
Anatolia, led the resistance movement to secure lost land in the Turkish War of Independence. 
The Turks proclaimed victory and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923, assuring Turkish 
sovereignty and establishing the terms of the newly founded Turkish Republic. For Turkey, the 
concepts of nation building and state building were inextricably linked and concepts such as the 
millet system were carried forward into the Republican era. This is evident in the Treaty of 
Lausanne where Greece and Turkey agreed to a compulsory population exchange based on 
religious identity—Turkey’s Orthodox Christians would resettle in Greece, and Greece’s 
Muslims would do the same in Turkey, with the exclusion of the respective populations in 
Istanbul, the Turkish islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada, and western Thrace (Trakya, part of 
Greece). The exchange, proposed by Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, would be 
drawn up and carried out by the League of Nations. The exchange was mutual, but was rooted in 
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the belief that non-Muslims (namely Christians) had played an essential role in Western 
interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire (Yıldırım 2015, 167). The Treaty also 
established a legal framework for the religious minorities that remained in both Greece and 
Turkey, granting them language rights and freedom of religion, as well as the right of pious, 
social, educational, or religious community foundations to acquire, use, and sell property 
(Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 8). It is worth noting that the Treaty extended these rights to all 
non-Muslim communities; however, in reality, Turkey has only extended these rights to the 
Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish communities.  
Yıldırım has identified at least four factors that have determined the manner in which the 
Lausanne Treaty is interpreted: the protection of minorities (particularly Christians) has been 
relegated to the realm of foreign affairs rather than being viewed as a fundamental aspect of 
human and minority rights; the Turkish state views minority rights claims as a mechanism 
through which foreign powers can interfere in Turkey’s sovereignty; minority rights being 
understood as begrudgingly granted privileges or exceptions, as opposed to legitimately 
conferred rights; and finally, the principle of reciprocity (with Greece) being extensively 
employed, leading to the conditional expectation of protection of Muslims, particularly in 
western Thrace (Yıldırım 2015, 168).44 Though numerous other factors can certainly be listed, 
these four are the primary determinants that have shaped the modern governance of collective 
rights in Turkey, particularly those of religious groups.  
                                               
 
44 Kurban and Tsitselikis provide a comprehensive overview of the challenges related to Turkish-Greek reciprocity 
as it relates to minority foundations in Greece and Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne in a TESEV report (2010). 
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Foundations Law 
Without delving too deeply into the distinction between public and private law, generally 
speaking, non-profit law in Turkey is governed by private law (Akbaş 2014, 1). However, as this 
study illustrates, there are a number of realms in which public law confers rights to belief 
communities, such as vakıflar (foundations), including the most considerable of all vakıf, the 
Diyanet. It is worth noting that the vakıf is a vestige from Ottoman times and a tool of 
governance under Islamic law. Whereas Roman law recognizes the legal personality of a 
collective of individuals and considers the property acquired by that group to be owned by the 
entity, Islamic law views the property itself to have legal personality and the “owners” as “those 
benefiting” from the property (Yıldırım 2015, 204). Thus, a collective of believers would not 
enjoy legal personality as a vakıf, although they would be able to collect revenues and make use 
of the land/facilities. The vakıf structure under the Ottomans was not created to provide legal 
personality to belief communities, nor was it considered to be a governing structure for such 
communities, although they de facto cultivated the community through service acts in the areas 
of education, charity, and health “for the benefit of a belief community” (Yıldırım 2015, 221). 
Considering that the most common founding functions of vakıfs today are related to social 
welfare, education, health, and culture (Akbaş 2014, 13), it is easy to recognize that modern 
Turkish law governing vakıfs, which falls under public law, deviates very little from the Ottoman 
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form; today, vakifs are defined as “real estate entities” that do not have members, partners, or 
shareholders45 (Türk Medeni Kanunu 2001, Article 101).    
There are generally two categories of foundations: those established prior to the Turkish 
Civil Code of 1926 (tesis) and those established after (mülhak vakıflar46). Both are administered 
by the Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü (VGM, General Directorate of Foundations).47 The 
“community foundation” system (cemaat vakif) is based on the Ottoman system, where Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities could only acquire property by establishing a foundation on land 
granted by the Sultan via a firman (decree) (Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 7). The foundation was 
regarded as privately owned property but was, in essence, considered property of God. Over 
time, the foundations came under the control and supervision of the state (Kurban and Tsitselikis 
2010, 7). The Treaty of Lausanne codified the status of foundations under one umbrella, the 
“minority community property foundation,” yet the discrepancies of asset ownership remained 
unclear due to the elimination of the previous foundation categories (family foundation, 
educational foundation, etc.) that had managed these properties (Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 
10). Foundations were not allowed to conduct religious activities; they were only allowed to 
manage the property, which is quite unlike the leadership of the religious communities actually 
                                               
 
45 On April 17, 2008, the Turkish Constitutional Court (Case No. 2005/14, Decision No. 2008/92) allowed 
foundations to accept members if the deed of the trust had a provision for membership (Akbaş 2014, 20-21). 
46 The original term used for these foundations was tesis meaning “institution,” but the word tesis is commonly used 
today to designate a facility, premise, or site, which is indicative of the intent behind the selection of this term to 
signify the distinction between the property and the community itself. Tesis was replaced with vakif in 1967 in an 
amendment to the Turkish Civil Code (Yıldırım 2015, 231). 
47 The Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü was established in 1924, replacing its predecessor, Şer’iyye ve Evkaf Vekaleti 
(Ministry of Sharia Courts and Religious Foundations), that had carried out similar functions (Yıldırım 2015, 226). 
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using the property (Oehring 2011, 2). While granting rights to establish new foundations, Article 
74 (2) of the 1926 Turkish Civil Code explicitly prohibited the establishment of such foundations 
in support of a religious community. Yet the application of the law at this time permitted 
foundations to maintain property for religious purposes or religious activity, including the 
construction of mosques, churches, and synagogues and the maintenance thereof (Yıldırım 2015, 
232). Thus, there were (and continue to be) unresolved legal issues arising from the conflict of 
the constitutionally specified secular nature of the Turkish Republic, and Turkey’s requirements 
under the Lausanne Treaty (Yıldırım 2015, 223-224). Considering that non-Muslim community 
foundations did not have charters/deeds,48 since they are essentially being grandfathered into 
modern Turkish law, they reside in a somewhat grey legal area—they themselves do not have 
legal personality, but their properties (buildings and lands) essentially do. As of 2016, 167 
exempted foundations that had been founded before the enactment of the long-standing law 
prohibiting foundations from being established based on a religion or ethnicity existed (United 
States Department of State 2016, 3). 
In 2006, the Turkish Parliament passed a new law on foundations, which was rejected by 
then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Vakıflar Kanunu 2006) due to concerns that its language 
would chip away at Turkey’s long-standing secular principles. A new law was adopted in 2008 
(Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü 2008), albeit reluctantly and with strong opposition, as part of the 
                                               
 
48 As mentioned above, Ottoman foundations were allowed to acquire property through a firman by the Sultan; 
however, there were no regulations issued on this and foundations that were established prior to the 1926 Civil Code 
had no founding deed or charter. This created property rights issues, which are discussed in the section on property 
rights. 
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Third Harmonization Package for European Union accession (Yıldırım 2015, 233). Article 4 of 
the Regulations for Foundations, which came into effect on September 27, 2008, states that a 
foundation may be established through a declaration of intent to establish a foundation, the 
decision of a court to grant permission (following an opinion issued by the VGM), and its 
registration with the VGM (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü 2008). Foundations may also be 
established under the Civil Code (Article 101), but faith groups have rarely used method of 
registration.  
Associational Law 
The right to form an association in Turkey is granted under Article 33 of the Constitution, which 
regulates freedom of association, including the right to form associations, become a member of 
an association, and withdraw from an association (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası 1961). This 
right can be restricted on the grounds of national security and public order, prevention of crime, 
or protecting public health and morals. The laws and regulations governing associations have 
undergone fewer changes compared to those related to foundations.  
 Prior to the founding of the Turkish Republic, associations were governed by the 1909 
Cemiyetler Kanunu (Association Law), which was replaced by the 1938 Cemiyetler Kanunu 
(Law No. 3512) (Cemiyetler Kanunu 1938) in the Republican era. This law remained in effect 
until a provisional law was passed on July 1, 1960 that expanded the right to form associations 
after the May 1960 Military Coup (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının bazı Maddelerinin 
Değiştirilmesi ve Geçici Maddeler Eklenmesi Hakkında Anayasa Değişikliği 1971). A 
referendum on what would become the 1961 Constitution was held and passed on July 9, 1961. 
Article 29 outlined the rights to form associations as: “Every individual is entitled to form 
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associations without prior permission. This right can be restricted only by law for the purposes of 
maintaining public order or morality” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası 1961). Association rights 
were restricted by an omnibus package of provisional laws after the 1971 coup (Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesi ve Geçici Maddeler Eklenmesi 
Hakkında Anayasa Değişikliği 1971). A new associations law was adopted on November 22, 
1972 (Dernekler Kanunu 1972) that outlined regulations on associations. Yet another coup 
occurred on September 12, 1980 and associational rights were again circumscribed. The 1982 
Constitution, which governs Turkey today, again recognized the right to form new associations 
in Article 33 (Dernekler Kanunu 1983; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının Bazı Maddelerinin 
Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun 2001). 
In 2004, Associations Law No. 5253 was passed to regulate freedom of association 
(Dernekler Kanunu 2004). The By-law of Associations (March 31, 2005) further regulates 
associations (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanliği 2005). Situations where there is no specific 
provision for an association are regulated by the Turkish Civil Code No. 4721 (Akbaş 2014, 12). 
Article 56 of the Civil Code defines associations as “a society formed by unity of at least seven 
real persons or legal entities for the realization of a common objective other than sharing of 
profit by collecting information and performing studies for such purposes” (Türk Medeni Kanunu 
2001). Article 2(a) of the regulation states: “The societies are founded with the status of legal 
entity by at least seven real persons or legal entities by continuously pooling their knowledge and 
efforts in order to realize a given and common objective not prohibited by the laws, excluding 
those of profit-sharing purposes” (Türk Medenî Kanununun Yürürlüğü ve Uygulama Şekli 
Hakkında Kanun 2001). In contrast to foundations, associations have legal personality.  
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The below case is illustrative of the issues that religious organizations (whether 
foundation or association) often encounter.  
6.1.1 Ozbek et al. v. Turkey  
Sixteen Turkish citizens brought Özbek et al. v. Turkey ([Application No: 35570/02] 2010) to the 
ECtHR on August 29, 2002. They claimed they had been denied their right to freedom of 
assembly and association by Turkish authorities’ refusal to allow them to establish a charitable 
foundation called the Kurtuluş Kiliseleri Vakfı (Foundation of the Churches of Liberation) in 
Ankara.  
 Domestic proceedings began in 2000 when representatives of the Kurtuluş Kiliseleri 
Vakfı applied to the Court of First Instance in Ankara, where the Foundation was located, under 
(former) Article 74 of the Civil Code.49 The Court requested an opinion from the VGM, which 
informed the former that it was officially opposed to the registration of the Foundation due to the 
fact that its fundamental purpose was to serve only the Protestant community, contrary to Article 
74§2 of the Turkish Civil Code that prohibited exclusive service to a specific community. The 
Court rejected the application on these grounds. In 2001, the applicants appealed to the Court of 
Cassation (Yargıtay, Supreme Court of Appeals of Turkey), arguing insufficient judicial 
reasoning based on broad and abstract considerations with no legal basis. They further contended 
that the court had failed to exercise impartiality in their request for an expert opinion from the 
                                               
 
49 Article 74 § 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 903 of July 13, 1967, read at the time: “Foundations that 
have been created contrary to the law, morality and public morals, or to the interests of the nation, or those which 
have been created to support a particular political idea or race or the members of a particular community cannot be 
registered.” Article 74 reads essentially the same as Article 101(4) of the current Civil Code.  
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VGM. The Court of Cassation upheld the Court of First Instance’s judgement, declaring that 
Article 74§2 of the Civil Code should be interpreted in the context of the Constitution, which can 
limit freedoms to guarantee public safety and public order, prevent crime, and protect public 
health and morals. It also referred to two existing organizations, the İstanbul Protestan Kilisesi 
Vakfı (Istanbul Protestant Church Foundation) and the İstanbul Süryani Katolik Vakfı 
(Foundation of the Assyrian Catholic Church in Istanbul), which the applicants had mentioned in 
their testimony, as examples consistent with the above requirements. Both foundations had legal 
personality through their lawful registration with the courts.  
 In 2002, the foundation applied to the Court of Cassation for a correction of judgment for 
a misinterpretation of the Foundation’s statutes. The Court had assumed that the Foundation 
would provide services only to Protestants. However, the Foundation argued that Article 3 of 
their constitutional documents stated their intended provision of material and moral support to 
victims of natural disasters, regardless of religious affiliation. The Court again dismissed the 
Foundation’s application. The Turkish government informed the Court in 2007 that some of the 
foundation’s members had established an association, Kurtuluş Kiliseleri Derneği (Association 
of the Churches of the Liberation).  
 The Turkish government initially objected to the admissibility of the case at the ECtHR 
based on the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The government also objected to the lack of 
victim status of the applicants since they had established an association in the same name with 
the same purpose. The applicants contested this, stating that an association must not prove any 
capital to be established, but a foundation must have funds and the ability to raise funds to be 
able to operate. The applicants argued that they could no longer fulfill their financial obligations 
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to establish a new foundation because of these increased requirements. They confirmed that 
some applicants had established an association, but that the public prosecutor had applied to 
dissolve it. Furthermore, they stated that no legal provision existed for changing a foundation’s 
statutes when civil action was pending. Through these arguments, both the Turkish government 
and the applicant foundation agreed that there had been an interference with the right to freedom 
of association. However, the government argued that it was justified in order to defend public 
safety, public order, and the rights and freedoms of others (as outlined in Article 34 of the 
Turkish Constitution).  
 The ECtHR ruled that there had been a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR on the 
grounds that the national courts had failed to register the Foundation’s statutes. The Court 
considered this to be an interference with the right to freedom of association. The Court, citing 
relevant case law on the freedom of association (i.e., Gorzelik et al. v. Poland [Application No. 
44158/98] 2004, §92-93), confirmed that Article 11 did include the right to establish a 
foundation and that by refusing to register the foundation, the government had exceeded the 
margin of appreciation within the bounds of what is “necessary in a democratic society.”  
The Court awarded the applicants €2000 for pecuniary damages, to be paid to the 
Foundation’s representative who would be responsible for distributing the sum to members who 
had advanced notary fees for the registration of the Foundation’s statutes; €500 to each applicant 
for non-pecuniary damages; and €5,200 jointly to the applicants for costs and expenses. The 
Court’s final judgment did not explicitly mention general or individual measures. 
 From the time of application to when the judgment was issued, the case spent 85 months 
in the Court. From the time of the final judgment to July 15, 2016, the case had been under 
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standard supervision in the CoM for 78 months. According to the Status of Execution report 
listed on the online database of the Department for the Execution of Judgments (HUDOC 
EXEC), Turkish authorities indicated in an action plan dated November 8, 2011 that just 
satisfaction had been paid in due time; however, the CoM awaits further information on 
individual measures (Department for the Execution of Judgments 2016). The same action plan 
stated that the judgment had been translated into Turkish and published on the official website of 
the Ministry of Justice and had been disseminated to the relevant authorities; however, the CoM 
awaits further information on additional measures taken/to be taken to prevent further violations 
(Department for the Execution of Judgments 2016). According to the HUDOC EXEC site, the 
CoM reported they would resume consideration at the 1108th meeting (March 2011); more 
recent information regarding the case was not available as of June 2017.  
6.1.2 Analysis 
Cases that relate to associational rights hit right at the heart of religious identity and how 
governments, legislatures, and courts regulate these rights. Because these issues are sensitive to 
handle within domestic legislative domains, largely due to contentious theological, 
philosophical, and identity questions, applicants have turned to domestic courts to seek rights 
recognition (see examples below), and in the above case, to the European Court of Human 
Rights.  
As demonstrated at the beginning of this section, for a number of reasons, the laws and 
regulations governing foundations and associations have undergone various iterations since the 
founding of the Turkish Republic. This would seem to indicate that, if there is sufficient 
momentum, either politically, socially, or institutionally, changes can be (and have been) made 
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to the constitution, laws, bureaucracy, and temporary provisions/statutes. However, the 
predominant element that has remained in each version of these laws is an underlying restriction 
on the right to association—particularly as it applies to religious minorities. The Law on 
Associations does not explicitly prohibit establishing associations with a stated religious purpose, 
but they must not be contrary to law and morals. However, Article 101(4) of the Civil Code 
states that foundations that aim to support a certain race or community (i.e., religious 
community) are prohibited (Türk Medeni Kanunu 2001). In practice, the courts and 
bureaucracies differ in their interpretation of these laws and regulations (Yıldırım 2015, 240). In 
addition to the Özbek et al. case above, where the domestic application was rejected because it 
intended to establish a foundation to support a specific denomination or religious community, 
two other domestic examples include the İstanbul Protestan Kilisesi Vakfı (IPKV, Istanbul 
Protestant Church Foundation), and the Yedinci Gün Adventistleri Vakfı (YGAV, Seventh Day 
Adventists’ Foundation). The IPKV, following the regulations of the VGM, was established by a 
decision of the court, but the VGM appealed to the High Court of Appeals; the decision was 
upheld and the foundation was established (Yıldırım 2015, 240).50 On the other hand, a domestic 
court rejected the YGAV’s application on the same grounds as the Özbek et al. case . These three 
cases are representative of a number of other cases that have been heard domestically and 
received mixed decisions. The inconsistency of decisions at all levels of government, coupled 
with the fact that there were no specific general measures listed in the Özbek judgment, implies 
                                               
 
50 18th Chamber Court of Appeals, E3402/2000, K5989/2000, May 29, 2000  
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that, inevitably, similar cases could find their way to the ECtHR, leading to greater 
judicialization at the ECtHR.  
 The social pressure on citizens that do not identify as Hanefi Sunni Muslims to either 
conform or remain quiet has manifest in covert and overt ways. This has ranged from the social 
stigma attached to “outing” oneself or one’s organization when applying for public services (due 
to the public nature of the application process), to media propaganda, and outright violence. A 
non-exhaustive list of examples of these acts include: 
• A grenade was tossed into the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul in 2005. 
• In February 2006, Catholic priest Fr. Andrea Santoro was murdered in Trabzon while 
praying, and his assailant was said to shout “Allahu akbar” (“God is great”) while 
carrying out the act (New York Times 2006); Father Pierre Francois Rene Brunissen, 
Fr. Santoro’s replacement, was also stabbed and wounded a few months later by a 
Muslim claiming to be opposed to the priest’s “missionary activities.” 
• Three Protestants that worked in a Bible publishing house were murdered in April 2007 
in Malatya (King 2007). Their lawyer, Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who is also a well-
known journalist, received death threats for defending their case. The trial was not 
concluded until 2016. 
• Roman Catholic bishop Luigi Padovese, the apostolic vicar of Anatolia (the Vatican’s 
representative in eastern Turkey), was stabbed to death outside his home in 2010. 
Though officials claim that the murder had no political or religious motivations, at 
the murder trial, the bishop’s driver said that he was the Masih ad-Dajjal (“false 
Messiah”) (Donadio 2010). 
• An assassination plot was revealed against Armenian Patriarch Mesrob Mutfayan. 
Turkish society and the media also participate slander51: 
• “During Christmas and the period around New Years, the following caused apprehension 
during Christmas celebrations: billboard notices with hate filled slogans, brochures 
distributed on the street which also contained hate language, newspaper and television 
programs, and especially a street show featuring a Santa Claus with a gun pointed at his 
                                               
 
51 The Association of Protestant Churches has published an annual report of human rights violations since 2007 that 
lists acts of violence, threats, intimidation, and other discriminatory acts against the Protestant community.  
  
 
 
139 
head. Christmas celebrations, due to this language and terror threats, were carried out 
under heavy security.” (Association of Protestant Churches 2017, 3) 
• In 2016, Dion Ross Bremner, an Australian national, won a case (Bremner v. Turkey 
[Application No. 37428/06] 2016) against Turkey in the ECtHR in an Article 8 (right to 
private and family life) violation. He took the case to the Court on the grounds that 
footage of him talking about Christianity had been filmed surreptitiously and used as part 
of a documentary on “foreign peddlers of religion” in Turkey. For this, he was prosecuted 
for insulting God and Islam.  
• Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal were put on trial in 2006 for “insulting Turkishness” 
under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. More specifically, they were accused of 
joining a Protestant church, proselytization, and collecting data on locals for a Bible 
correspondence course.  
• In 2008, church goers were asked for their identities and why they attended the church in 
an attempt to determine which attendees were foreign, local foreigners, or possible 
converts (Oehring 2008b). 
• Habername.com began a series of articles titled “New Trap for Young People: House 
Churches” (Oehring 2009a). 
• An Ilgazetesi article “Local Missionaries” published on June 17, 2009 stated that: “The 
primary goal of missionary activity is to break the resistance of people to imperialism and 
abuse. Making them Jewish or Christian is the second goal” (Oehring 2009a)  
• On October 21, 2009, Haberler.com reported that Muslim clergy were warned by the 
Mufti in Muğla that “missionaries are in town” (Oehring 2009a) 
• Dr. Adnan Odabaş, owner of Üsküdar and Hergün, published a book of allegations called 
Dikkat Misyoner Geliyor (Beware, the Missionaries are Coming) (Odabaş 2005) 
 
A significant source of paranoia about non-Hanefi Sunni Muslims is rooted in a concern 
about “missionary activities” and the conversion of Turkish citizens to Christianity. Again, this 
paranoia is perpetuated by the media and government. This deep-seated suspicion has inspired 
the government to keep religious minority leaders under surveillance. Their telephones have 
been tapped and mail opened before delivery (Oehring 2006). For example, the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization (MİT) is known to have kept the locations of the murders of Fr. 
Santoro and the Zirve Publishing House in Malatya under surveillance and the media has 
reported that the Jandarma (Turkish military police) track missionary activities (Oehring 2008b, 
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2009a). A February 2005 Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (MGK, National Security Council) evaluation 
indicated “a need for social activities that will prevent the spreading of organizations and 
ideologies that will have an impact on Turkey’s unity…Abusive missionary activities should not 
be permitted” (Ceyhan 2007).  
Government officials reaffirm and bolster this belief with their own public statements. 
Following the Malatya murders, then-Ministry of Justice’s Director-General of Laws Niyazi 
Güney remarked to Turkish members of Parliament that “missionary work is even more 
dangerous than terrorism” (Milliyet 2007). Addressing parliament in 2006, MP Muharrem Kılıç 
warned his colleagues of missionaries who “have attacked the Turkish people” (Genel Kurul 
Tutanağı 2006). The Diyanet had also issued a Friday sermon in March 2005 urging caution 
against the dangers of missionary activity, which it described as “a scheme of foreigners to steal 
the faith of the young” (NTV MSNBC 2005a). Minister of State Mehmet Aydin also affirmed the 
unofficial state stance on missionaries by asserting that “the goal of missionary activity is to 
break up the historical, religious, national, and cultural unity of the people of Turkey” (Sabah 
2005).  
Given this atmosphere, the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular in June 2007 requesting 
the protection of non-Muslim houses of worship and dedicate resources to uncover attacks 
against them. These measures did thwart some attacks, namely a plot to assassinate the pastor of 
a church in Antalya (Oehring and Ceyhan 2009). A plot labeled “Operation Cage” (“Kafes 
Eylemi”) was also uncovered, this time in connection with the Ergenekon investigations. 
Ergenekon is a secret secularist group consisting of members of the military, parliament, and the 
media suspected of attempting to overthrow the government. Evidence appeared to demonstrate 
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that members of the Turkish military were clandestinely involved in acts of political violence and 
assassinations against non-Muslim Turks. Operation Cage was designed to generate perceived 
hostility towards non-Muslims and to challenge the authority of the governing Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) party by exploiting the burgeoning 
concern in society about the government’s alleged hidden agenda to create an Islamic state, or at 
least implement a more Islamist agenda. However, in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, it 
was revealed that the Ergenekon accusations and arrests (and the related plots, namely Balyoz 
Harekatı (“Sledgehammer”)) were brought forward on falsified evidence in connection to cleric 
Fethullah Gülen52 and the accused were acquitted. 
 From the above, one can conclude that there is an unspoken “strategy” amongst the 
media, the public, and the government, with each set of actors subtly crystallizing various forms 
of discrimination and violence against non-Hanefi Muslims. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, the lawyer in 
the Malatya murder cases who also represents the Kurtuluş Protestant Church and the 
Association of Protestant Churches, summarized this situation in an interview with Bianet, a 
media outlet. He declared that missionary activity is not a crime in Turkey and that politicians 
and the media have, by constant repetition, invented such crimes and then tried to punish the 
crimes (Ceyhan 2007). Ordinary citizens carry out these heinous acts or slanderous activities, but 
                                               
 
52 Fethullah Gülen is the reclusive leader of a global initiative called “Hizmet.” He is in self-imposed exile in the 
United States, but Turkey has repeatedly made demands for his extradition based on charges that he is heading a 
terrorist organization (FETO, Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization) and organized the 2016 attempted coup.  
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they are either unreported, unacknowledged, or trapped in a seemingly never-ending bureaucratic 
or legal black hole and the perpetrators rarely face justice.  
 Beyond statements that stigmatize or slander non-Hanefi Muslims, the government has 
taken actions that have directly inhibited the minority rights outlined in the ECHR, even while 
seemingly attempting to “correct” the inconsistencies in foundation and association laws. 
Abdullah Gül first discussed reforming the Law on Foundations in late 2002 in response to EU 
pressure to bring Turkey’s law in line with European standards (Oehring 2005). In 2003, an 
official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—which is often tasked with handling relations with 
many of the indigenous non-Muslim religious communities that existed before the Lausanne 
Treaty—requested that a respected Istanbul professor of law draft a Foundations Law to resolve 
the discriminatory practices, but that it be done quietly so as not to draw attention from Islamists 
and nationalists. Just as quietly as the suggestion was made, it disappeared because it was too 
politically risky at the time (Oehring 2007a). As mentioned above, parliament proposed a new 
foundations law in 2006, which was met with fierce opposition by the opposition parties in the 
government at the time (Cumhuryiet Halk Partisi [CHP, Republican People’s Party], Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi [MHP, Nationalist Action Party], and Demokratik Sol Partisi [DSP, Democratic 
Left Party]). The MHP criticized the legislation53 harshly and it was vetoed by then-President 
Sezer on December 2, 2006. This move was criticized by the media, but Sezer justified his 
                                               
 
53 The Özbek et al. case was decided in 2009, after the 2008 Foundations Law had been passed.  
  
 
 
143 
rejection stating that the provisions interpreted the stipulations outlined in the Lausanne Treaty 
that dictate Turkey’s obligations to ethnic and religious minorities too liberally (Oehring 2007a).  
There were a number of incidents in Turkey around the time that the legislation was 
proposed that provoked reactions from some segments of society. These include, for example, 
the resurgence of identity politics related to Kurdish and Alevi issues as a result of the EU 
harmonization process; the announcement of a new strategy for resolving the Cyprus issue; fear 
on both the left and right of developments in the Middle East and the loss of national 
sovereignty; fear of foreign invasion; and fear that the Treaty of Sèvres would once again be 
implemented and the public would be “Christianized” by foreign missionaries (Çarkoğlu and 
Toprak 2007, 19). Nonetheless, a Foundations Law was passed two years later, in 2008. The 
CHP, the main opposition party, challenged the law in the Constitutional Court in 2011 on the 
grounds that the law contradicted the Republic’s secular nature (Constitutional Court January 11, 
2011, E22/2008; June 17, 2010 K82/2010, RG: 27812, as cited in Yıldırım 2015, 233). The 
articles of the 2008 Foundations Law the CHP cited in their case, which placed community 
foundations and ordinary foundations in the same class of organization, included: “establishing 
branch offices (Article 25), election of the executive board of community foundations from 
among the community (Article 6), acquisition of new property (Article 12(1)), possibility of 
altering ‘purpose and function’ (Article 14), international activities, receiving donations from 
abroad (Article 25), [and] establishing economic corporations and companies (Article 26)” 
(Yıldırım 2015, 234). While the Constitutional Court’s ruling on this case demonstrates that it 
has made progress in its jurisprudence regarding religious minorities, viewing such rights as 
fundamental and needing to be widely interpreted (Yıldırım 2015, 234), there is still much work 
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to be done to bring domestic legislation and bureaucratic regulations in line with the 2009 
ECtHR ruling in the Özbek et al. case and to address other issues that may arise in contradiction 
to other ECHR associational articles.  
The Foundations Law has historically been linked to religious groups protected under the 
Lausanne Treaty. However, the Associations Law has become a new tool that religious groups 
that are not in that class of citizens can use to establish legal personality for themselves. The 
inconsistency with which the laws and regulations on associations and foundations are 
implemented and interpreted has been a source of frustration for the groups applying for status 
and has also generated domestic court cases that may very well find their way to the ECtHR.  
One egregious example of such variance is the long-standing presence of the Diyanet and 
the Türk Diyanet Vakfı (TDV, Turkish Diyanet Foundation). The TDV was established in 1975 
to support the activities of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs, better 
known as the Diyanet), an official state body. The Diyanet, established in 1924, is responsible 
for “the delivery of service to citizens without discrimination in regards to religious sect or 
understanding or practice of religion” (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2012). The Diyanet is the 
successor institution of the Office of the Şeyhülislam (Sheik al-Islam, Grand Mufti) of the 
Ottoman Empire. When the Empire fell, the state confiscated the financial resources of all 
Islamic foundations, which remained under the control of the Diyanet. The Diyanet is currently 
regulated by Law 6002 (published July 1, 2010) that made changes to Law 633. Law 6002 
expanded the scope the institution’s work and elevated the institution from a general directorate 
to the level of undersecretary, which is overseen directly by the Office of the Prime Minister.  
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The website of the TDV clearly states the connection between it and the Diyanet and the 
purpose of each: “The Presidency of Religious Affairs aims to support activities set out by the 
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV)” (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı 2018a). The TDV has played an 
important role in “reaching a wider audience of religious operations and in the upbringing of 
future generations to take part in conducting these religious services” (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı 
2018b). Although Article 101(4) of the Turkish Civil Code expressly states that no foundation 
may be established that contradicts the characteristics of the Republic as defined by the 
Constitution, constitutional rules, laws, morals, national integrity, and national interest or with 
the aim of supporting a distinctive race or community” (emphasis added), this has not been 
challenged in courts or by administrative authorities (Yıldırım 2015, 243). Yet the very 
foundation (TDV) that cooperates with the Diyanet, a government agency, states in its mission, 
in no uncertain terms, that “in accordance with the purpose of the establishment of the Diyanet, 
the TDV provides significant support services for mosques, Kuran courses, and assists in 
meeting the needs of training muftis and education centers” (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı 2018b)—
which is clearly in violation of Article 101(4) of the Turkish Civil Code.  
The Diyanet has been a stumbling block not only for non-Muslims, but for Muslims as 
well. The Caferi community, a sect of Shia Islam, has publicly voiced concerns on this subject. 
“Our constitution says we are a secular state, but unfortunately it is not so,” CHP MP Ali 
Özgündüz said, pointing to the annual $3 billion budget allocated to the religious affairs 
department. “This is a Sunni state, whose state-run religious-affairs department serves only 
Sunni Islam, and only the Hanafi school at that” (Güsten 2013). At one point, stressing the 
importance of the principle of secularism, former Diyanet leader Ali Bardakoğlu issued a 
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statement through the newspaper Radikal that the Diyanet should be an autonomous institution 
with its own resources and that Turkey was ready for such a move (İnsel 2010). Just a few weeks 
later, Bardakoğlu “retired” (“Diyanet İşleri Başkanları, Prof. Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu” 2013).54 
 Foundations and associations also face substantial bureaucratic and administrative 
burdens when maintaining their organizations. Established foundations, which are under the 
control of the General Directorate of Foundations, must obtain permission for even minor upkeep 
to their properties. Additionally, though foundations are recognized, the communities behind 
them are not and so individuals must be named on the bank accounts (Oehring 2007a). 
Oftentimes, these communities are small and unable to meet the demands to establish or 
maintain their foundation, including financial auditing, accounting, and reporting (Oehring 
2007a). Associations face similar issues. Decisions to grant permission to establish an 
association are often up to the subjective views of the Dernekler Dairesi Başkanlığı (Ministry of 
Interior’s Department of Associations) or judges, as has been the experience of some Protestant 
churches.  
Furthermore, state bureaucracy also interferes in the internal governance of non-Muslim 
foundations. Regulations guiding the election or appointment of the communities’ religious 
leaders are drawn up by the communities themselves, yet the Ministry of Interior has the ability 
to approve, deny, or change them if they are deemed to be incompatible with existing 
regulations—whether or not this is in the regulations (Yıldırım 2010a). “Christian Churches are 
                                               
 
54 There was speculation surrounding Bardakoğlu’s departure as to whether he was fired, dismissed, or did actually 
retire. 
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led by spiritual leaders whose authority derives from their position, not from being elected,” 
which is the required format of a foundation; and yet “the state has frequently interfered with the 
election of board members, removing persons or entire boards it does not like.” Armenian 
Apostolic and Greek Orthodox foundations have been disproportionately impacted by this 
(Oehring 2005). As of 2013, no regulation existed to govern the election process for non-Muslim 
foundations, which prevented such organizations from electing board members (European 
Commission 2016, 77). The government also takes a heavy hand in determining the leaders of 
the spiritual communities that fall under the Lausanne Treaty. In June 2007, a domestic court 
ruled that Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew can only be referred to as the head of the local 
Greek Orthodox community, with no jurisdiction outside the country, and, moreover, rejected his 
title of “Ecumenical Patriarch.” The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issued an 
opinion against the domestic court’s decision in 2010, stating that the interference of Turkish 
authorities in restricting religious rights to legal personality is a violation of Article 9 read in 
conjunction with Article 11 of the ECHR (Sejersted 2010). Furthermore, the Commission 
indicated that there is no reason to restrict the Patriarch’s use of the historically recognized title. 
The Commission recognized that Turkish authorities are not obligated to use the title, but saw no 
reason why they would not (Sejersted 2010, paras. 6 & 9). One might concede that Turkish 
officials fail to recognize that other spiritual communities (non-Muslim) have a formal 
organizational structure and hierarchy that simply does not exist in Islam; however, that should 
not prevent authorities from recognizing these communities’ rights to legal personality, the 
enjoyment of their associational rights, and their right to internal governance.  
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 The long-standing reciprocity between Greece and Turkey, as established in the Lausanne 
Treaty, has also caused deadlock on Turkey’s movement towards alignment with the ECHR. 
Article 2(2) of the 2008 Foundations Law upholds this by reaffirming that reciprocity shall be 
reserved by continuing to employ the reciprocal nature of the Lausanne Treaty that permits 
Turkey and Greece to play tit-for-tat in restricting the rights of non-majority spiritual 
communities in each country. 
Beyond the ECtHR, international human rights law mandates that states cannot deny 
legal personality to an association of individuals and that doing so restricts the exercise of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief. Authorities’ refusal to register a group or decisions to 
withdraw its legal personality directly affect both the group itself and also its presidents, 
founders, or individual members (European Commission for Democracy through Law [Venice 
Commission and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)] 
2014). Furthermore, Turkey ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) on September 16, 2002, one year before it ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), further solidifying its obligations 
to uphold religious and associational freedoms for Turkish citizens. Though progress has been 
piecemeal, Turkey’s attempts to bring its associational laws in line with international standards 
have been a result of pressure from the EU. However, given that relations between Turkey and 
the EU are currently strained, these efforts have been halted.  
In the Özbek judgment, the ECtHR determined that denying permission to establish a 
charitable foundation was a clear violation of associational rights. The ruling further implied that 
states should be given a margin of appreciation to interpret what is most appropriate to restrict 
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rights “in accordance with law” and as “necessary in a democratic society” (Council of Europe 
1950, Article 11). However, it is clear that Turkey’s domestic law is incompatible not only with 
its ECHR obligations, but also with the ICERD, ICCPR, and the EU. It is worth noting that the 
violation of associational rights, as understood by the organizations mentioned above, contradicts 
Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution and the primacy of international human rights treaties that 
Turkey has ratified (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 90).  
Because of the laws that govern associational rights in Turkey, non-Hanefi Sunnis face 
challenges in collectively organizing. In the Özbek case, in which a Protestant group attempted to 
formally establish itself, the group faced barriers to doing so for a number of reasons. For 
Protestant Christians, navigating the intricate web of governmental institutions that govern 
associational rights in Turkey can be opaque and complex, leading to situations akin to the Özbek 
case. One might assume that this convoluted institutional set-up is intentional, with the 
government purposefully establishing a system that is difficult for Protestant Christians to 
navigate, which effectively leaves their and other religious minorities’ legal status in limbo, 
prohibiting associational activity. Alternatively, if it is not willful on the part of the government, 
the institutional embeddedness, and long-standing configuration of these structures is incredibly 
difficult to change. Furthermore, the socially constructed aspects of this group’s identity by both 
government actors and society itself have led to their stereotyping as having a clandestine 
missionary agenda to shift Turkey’s well-established national identity as a Sunni country through 
religious conversion.   
In sum, reasons related to public opinion, including influences from the government and 
the media in combination with long-standing stereotypes about the Protestant population in 
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Turkey, seem to be hindering actual progress towards not only the execution of the Özbek 
judgement, but also any real reform in favor of equal associational rights for non-Hanefi groups. 
While various governments have attempted to shift associational law since the ECtHR’s ruling, 
the changes seem to be vaguely cosmetic. The actual implementation of these laws leave 
associations and foundations in limbo. The Court and the CoM could be working more closely 
with their counterparts in Turkey to arrive at a more clear-cut resolution, although again, this 
could be quite difficult considering the tangled web of domestic institutions involved in such 
reforms. The complex domestic institutional arrangement, where the Diyanet is the primary 
determinant for Hanefi Sunni affairs, and the VGM (which is under the Prime Ministry) and the 
Dernekler Müdürlüğü (which is housed under the Ministry of Interior) rely on a convoluted 
matrix of laws and regulations governing various types of foundations and associations. 
Although the EU accession process has proven instrumental in pushing some reforms in this 
area, a holistic, durable, and just solution has yet to be in place. Therefore, it seems that the 
Özbek case could be the first among other cases to find their way to the ECtHR because 
applicant associations and foundations denounce Turkey’s inconsistent and arbitrary 
interpretation and implementation of relevant domestic laws and regulations. The next section 
addresses another issue that foundations have encountered in Turkey: property rights. 
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6.2 Property Rights   
As described in the previous section, the associational rights of non-Hanefi Sunni Muslims in 
Turkey are governed by a complicated matrix of foundation and association laws that are often 
inconsistently interpreted and implemented. One particular set of cases that has come before the 
ECtHR concerns properties belonging to religious foundations and how these properties are 
governed by the state.  
Until 1912, the Ottoman Empire did not provide legal personality to foundations (vakif). 
After that date, foundations were permitted to own property and register it with the Land 
Registry, thus granting the property legal status. After the Turkish Republic was founded in 
1923, the legal framework for regulating non-Muslim communities was established through the 
creation of community foundations. These foundations were permitted to own properties, 
including houses of worship, educational buildings, orphanages, hospitals, and other similar 
institutions. With the passage of Foundations Law No. 2762 in 1935, the governance of 
foundations and their properties was transferred to the VGM. The following year, under the so-
called “1936 Declarations,” the government demanded that the foundations declare the purpose 
behind their existence, as well as their assets and income, supposedly to formalize the 
organization of the national land registry. Foundations were also required to submit 
documentation of property deeds to prove ownership; however, because these foundations had 
acquired the properties by firman under Ottoman rule,55 they did not have these deeds. As a 
                                               
 
55 See the previous section for a description of the Ottoman firman. 
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result, the VGM determined that the submitted documents would serve as the constitutive 
documents of each foundation (Yıldırım 2015, 227). Starting in the 1960s, these declarations 
were used against the foundations to seize their properties, claiming that the foundations did not 
have the legal capacity to acquire property and that all property acquisitions after 1936 were null 
and void (Yıldırım 2015, 227-228). Importantly, this policy was implemented at the peak of 
tensions between Turkey and Greece in connection to Cyprus (Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 12). 
In general, any category of foundation can be closed by court order.56 If the court, at the 
government’s request, deem a foundation to be “inactive,” all assets are transferred to the state 
(United States Department of State 2016, 4). As such, the properties that these foundations had 
acquired from 1936-1970 (which were recorded in the land register with documentation provided 
by the governorship, lending them the appearance of legality) were confiscated by either the 
VGM, the Treasury, or National Real Estate (Yıldırım 2015, 227). From the 1970s to 
approximately 2010, “the VGM has seized 16 Greek Orthodox foundations and 24 Jewish 
foundations, taking over their management and confiscating hundreds of properties belonging to 
them” (Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 11). 
 Minority communities that are permitted to maintain community foundations (Greek 
Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, and Jewish communities) are permitted to own 
their places of worship. However, for Catholics and Protestants who have not historically been 
given such permission, though title deeds state that the congregations or the communities own 
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the buildings, the state frequently fails to acknowledge this. Another manner in which the state 
has seized properties is through unclear ownership claims. Turkey has asserted that because 
some Christian churches owned by foundations are the property of the individual saints after 
which they are named, and because these saints or their heirs cannot be located, the properties 
cannot be returned to their rightful owners. The state, therefore, seizes them (Oehring 2007a). 
The state has also used the rules governing the foundation’s board elections to acquire 
property. If the state determines that a foundation has not held regular elections, it can declare 
that the foundation is no longer in use, which justifies the seizure of property.57 Yet it has often 
been state policies themselves that have worked against some foundations’ holding regular 
elections (Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 11). The executive regulation on the Law on Foundations 
states that the board candidates must reside in the district in which the foundation is located; 
however, for a number of foundations, there are few to no non-Muslims left in these areas 
(Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 11).  
The VGM has made concessions to this in recent years, yet non-Muslim foundations still 
complain of the “ad hoc, arbitrary, and unpredictable nature” of a system that places serious 
restrictions on the autonomy of these groups, as granted in the Treaty of Lausanne (Kurban and 
Tsitselikis 2010, 11). Thus, in 2002, the legislation governing foundations was amended to allow 
religious community foundations to acquire immovable property (Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik 
Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun 2002, Article 4). Additionally, in 2003, Law No. 4778 reaffirmed the 
                                               
 
57 Officially “inactive” foundations are labeled “seized foundations” (mazbut vakıf) (Kurban and Tsitselikis 2010, 
12).  
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ability of community foundations to secure immovable properties to “meet their religious, 
charitable, social, educational, health, and cultural needs through the permission of the General 
Directorate of Foundations” (Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun 2003, 
Article 3). Finally, in spite of substantial opposition, Law No. 5737 on Foundations repealed Act 
No. 2762 on Foundations. 
In a 2011 action report the Turkish government submitted to the CoM, the government 
claimed that this final law enabled 181 non-Muslim community properties to be registered 
(Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers 2011). This law, adopted on October 1, 2011 (5737 
Sayılı Vakıflar Kanununun Geçici 11inci Maddesinin Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik 2011) 
allowed community foundations to apply to regain property confiscated from them by the state 
since 1936. On the surface, this seemed like a win for the foundations who had been victims of 
confiscations; however, there are exceptions. The decree only includes property that was 
“nationalized [and] property confiscated by the state from community foundations and handed 
back to previous owners from whom the foundations had legally acquired;” however, it 
conveniently ignores the property of community foundations seized by the VGM (Yıldırım 2015, 
238).58 Instead of loosening the restrictions on the right to own property, in 2012, a land registry 
law was passed that included measures to restrict property acquisition by Greek nationals. As can 
be seen in the cases below, Turkey has taken some steps to compensate the plaintiffs for their 
seized properties or to return these properties.  
                                               
 
58 It is worth noting that the decree was passed when the government had been granted temporary authority to issue 
legislative decrees for the six months after May 2, 2011 (Yıldırım 2011). 
  
 
 
155 
6.2.1 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v. Turkey  
The Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi (Fener Greek Boys’ High School Foundation) v. Turkey case 
was submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights on November 25, 1996 and 
transmitted to the Court on November 1, 1998, when Protocol 11 came into effect (Fener Rum 
Erkek Lisesi Vakfı v. Turkey [Application No: 34478/97] 2007). The foundation provides 
educational facilities at the Greek Orthodox High School in the Fener neighborhood of Istanbul. 
It has been in operation since Ottoman times and, as required by Section 44 of Law No. 2762, in 
1936 registered its purpose and immovable property. With this, it acquired legal personality. In 
1952, the foundation received a donated property in Istanbul that was registered with the Land 
Registry and the foundation paid the property taxes due on the property. In 1958, the foundation 
purchased another part of the same building through co-ownership; the title to the property was 
again registered in the Land Registry and the property taxes paid.  
 However, in 1992, the Turkish Treasury applied to the District Court of Beyoğlu (in 
Istanbul) to annul the foundation’s title to these properties and to return them to their former 
owners. Citing established case law, the Treasury claimed that the foundation did not have the 
right to obtain immovable property and further alleged that, because the properties were not 
mentioned in the documents filed in 1936 (the foundation’s constituting documents), the 
foundation was not eligible to obtain the land title. In 1994, the District Court requested an 
expert opinion on the case. Referencing the established case law of 1974 (that such organizations 
cannot obtain property, this report reaffirmed the Court’s opinion and stated that the foundation’s 
title should be annulled and the property re-registered in the name of its former owners. The 
foundation objected, claiming that the documents filed in 1936 did not amount to constitutive 
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instruments and that foundations could, in fact, acquire property, as determined in the Land 
Registry Act (Law no. 2644 of 1934, which was in effect at the time of application).59 In 1996, 
the District Court ordered both the annulment of the foundation’s title and the re-registration of 
the property in the former owners’ names. The foundation appealed later that year and received a 
dismissal. Soon thereafter, the foundation applied for rectification of the judgment, which was 
also dismissed. In 2000, the foundation applied to the Directorate General of Foundations to 
amend its constitution to permit the acquisition of immovable property, but the request was 
rejected.  
 In its decision, the ECtHR affirmed that Article 1 of Protocol 1 does not guarantee the 
right to acquire property, and that states should be granted a wide margin of appreciation in 
governing the acquisition of land or immovable properties. The Court further noted that the 1996 
judgment of the District Court of Beyoğlu relied on the 1974 case law based on Law No. 2762, 
which in fact does not state anywhere that foundations that fall under that legislation are 
prohibited from acquiring property. Furthermore, the ECtHR argued that the authorities who had 
validated the land certificates in the 1952 and 1958 property acquisitions did not object and that 
judicial interpretation was the impetus behind the restriction. Additionally, the ECtHR noted that 
the foundation could in no way have reasonably foreseen that its title would be annulled in the 
                                               
 
59 After the application was submitted to the ECtHR, but prior to the hearing, an amendment was made to the 
legislation regulating foundations (Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun 2002, Article 4) that 
explicitly stated that “Religious community foundations, whether or not they have a constitution, shall be entitled to 
acquire or possess immovable property, with the authorization of the Council of Ministers [of Turkey], in order to 
meet their needs for religious, charitable, social, educational, sanitary, or cultural purposes.” Furthermore, Law No. 
4778 ensures that such foundations can acquire immovable property, whether or not they have a constitutive 
instrument (Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun 2003, Article 3). 
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future due to new judicial interpretation. The Court thus ruled that Turkey was in violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1.  
In the measures stemming from the judgment, the Court considered that the re-
registration of the disputed property in the applicant’s name in the Land Register would serve, to 
the greatest extent possible, to place the foundation in a position equivalent to that which might 
have occurred had Turkey complied with Article 1 of Protocol 1. Should re-registration not occur 
within three months of the final judgment, Turkey was to pay the foundation €890,000 for 
pecuniary damages as a result of the annulment and non-enjoyment of possession from 2002 
forward. A September 2011 action report indicated that the VGM had accepted the foundation’s 
requests on October 31, 2012, and that Turkey had paid the requisite just satisfaction on time. As 
mentioned above, in compliance with the general measures, Turkey also issued a regulation on 
the implementation of Provisional Article 11 of Law on Foundations 5737 in 2011 by declaring 
that the immovable properties of non-Muslim communities that had been adversely impacted by 
the 1936 Declarations could be registered in the foundation’s name upon request.  
Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v. Turkey was not declared admissible until 2004, and was 
heard in September 2005. The case spent 121 months in Court, which is an unusually long period 
of time for the court to hear a case. The delay was most likely a result of the volume of 
submissions the Turkish government made to support its actions. From the date of the final 
judgment to July 15, 2016 (i.e., 111 months), the case was under standard supervision by the 
Committee of Ministers. It is the leading case in a group of four related, repetitive cases (below) 
that brought similar structural issues forward.  
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6.2.2 Samatya Surp Kevork Ermeni Kilisesi, Mektebi ve Mezarlığı Vakfı Yönetim Kurulu 
v. Turkey  
The Samatya Surp Kevork Ermeni Kilisesi, Mektebi ve Mezarlığı Vakfı Yönetim Kurulu (Samatya 
Surp Kevork Armenian Church, School, and Cemetery Foundation) Board of Directors filed their 
case with the ECtHR on October 17, 2002 (Samatya Surp Kevork Ermeni Kilisesi, Mektebi ve 
Mezarlığı Vakfı Yönetim Kurulu v. Turkey [Application No: 1480/03] 2008). The foundation was 
established in 1832 during the Ottoman Empire and is compliant with the Lausanne provisions. 
In 1955, the foundation received a property in Istanbul by donation and subsequently registered 
it in the Land Registry in the name of the foundation. In 1998, the Istanbul Regional Foundation 
Authority filed with the District Court of Şişli (where the properties were located in Istanbul), for 
the annulment of the title to the foundation’s immovable property (three contiguous houses) 
citing the aforementioned 1974 case law that ruled that such organizations did not have 
permission to obtain immovable properties because the 1936 constitutive documents did not 
include the property. In November 2000, the court of first instance ordered the annulment of the 
title and the re-registration of the houses in the name of their former owner. In September 2001, 
the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment and, in 2002, rejected the request for appeal. In 
2005, the Council of State issued a judgment that the legislative and regulatory amendments 
enacted in 2002 (Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun 2002, Article 4) and 
2003 (Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun 2003, Article 3) governed only 
property registered to specific foundations, not those properties registered by third parties.  
In hearing the case, the ECtHR ruled in favor of the foundation, concluding that the 
Turkish government had violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 by infringing on the applicants’ right to 
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peaceful enjoyment of the foundation’s possessions by striking the name of the foundation from 
the land registry 40 years after the acquisition of the property. The Court also cited its judgment 
in the Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi case, recalling that the application of the 1974 case law did 
not meet the requirements of foreseeability. The Court ruled unanimously that Turkey must re-
register the Şişli properties in the Land Registry in the foundation’s name within three months of 
the final judgment of the case. If it failed to do so, Turkey would be required to pay the 
foundation €600,000. There is currently no specific information available from the HUDOC-
EXEC database as to whether Turkey has taken individual measures (return and reregister the 
properties in question) or paid the just satisfaction. 
 The case spent 74 months waiting for the ECtHR’s judgment and, from the date of the 
final judgment to July 15, 2016, spent 88 months under standard supervision as part of the 
repetitive cases under the Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi case.  
6.2.3 Yedikule Surp Pirgi Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfi v. Turkey (No. 2) 
Yedikule Surp Pirgi Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfi (Foundation of the Armenian Hospital Surp Pırgiç 
of Yedikule) was established in 1832 under the Ottoman Empire, in conformity with the 
Lausanne Treaty. The foundation applied to the ECtHR on July 16, 1999 and August 20, 1999 
(Yedikule Surp Pirgi Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfi v. Turkey [Application Nos. 50147/99 and 
51207/99], respectively), alleging an infringement on their peaceful enjoyment of property as 
stipulated in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. The case was heard by the Court, and on May 
29, 2006, the Registrar proposed that the parties agree on a friendly settlement within the 
meaning of Article 38§1(b). On March 16, 2007 and March 29, 2007, the applicant and the 
government, respectively, submitted formal declarations of a friendly settlement in the case. The 
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properties were returned to the applicant and the foundation received €15,000 for costs and 
expenses. This was the first case where Turkey returned properties (Hrant Dink Foundation 
2012). The CoM closed the case at their 1128th meeting in December 2011 (European Court of 
Human Rights, Committee of Ministers 2011). The foundation, however, applied to the ECtHR 
again with another application on July 24, 2002 (Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfı v. 
Turkey [Application No: 36165/02] 2008). 
 The applicant acquired a property by donation in 1962 in Beyoğlu (Istanbul) upon which 
an immovable structure was built. The title to the property was registered in the land registry. In 
November 1998, the State Treasury applied to the Beyoğlu District Court to nullify the 
applicant’s title and reinstate the property in the name of the former owner. The Treasury argued 
that the immovable property was not mentioned in the original declaration in 1936 and that the 
applicant’s status did not grant it the right to acquire immovable property. In 2001, the District 
Court ruled to annul the applicant’s title and to reinstate the property in the land registry under 
the former owner. The judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation in 2001, which rejected 
the request for a correction of judgment in 2002. As such, the property was re-registered in the 
name of the donor, the late Ms. Virkinya Basreisyan. Ms. Virkinya Basreisyan’s heirs applied for 
a license in the Beyoğlu District Court since they had decided to sell the apartment in question 
by tender. In January 2007, the property was sold to Mr. H.D. Erseven for 771,000 TL.  
 In hearing the case, the ECtHR drew on the judgment in the Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi 
Vakfi case to determine that the annulment of the title was illegal and had infringed upon the 
applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. The Court ruled that there had 
been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1. Turkey was to pay the applicant €275,000 in 
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pecuniary damages (the market value of the property at the time of the case). The properties were 
returned and fines were paid. The case spent 77 months in Court and 88 months in the CoM. The 
case remains under standard supervision as a repetitive case within the Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi 
group of cases.  
6.2.4 Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi Vakfi v. Turkey  
The Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum Ortodox Kilisesi Vakfı (Foundation of the Bozcaada 
Kimisis Theodosian Greek Orthodox Church) is a foundation in Çanakkale, Turkey, established 
through the provisions related to religious minorities under the Lausanne Treaty.  
In the first set of cases in the ECtHR (Application Nos. 37639/03, 37639/03, 26736/04, 
and 42670/04), the Foundation claimed to have acquired three properties and an immovable, 
which was used as a chapel. Though these properties had been in the Foundation’s uninterrupted 
possession for more than 20 years, they had not been registered in the Foundation’s name in the 
land registry. In 1991, the land registry divided the plots and new numbers were assigned to each 
plot. Since the applicant did not file its declaration of the properties according to Law No. 2762 
on foundations, the names of the owners of the properties were left blank. In spite of this, experts 
and witnesses verified that the Foundation was in fact the owner of the properties.  
In 2000, the VGM sent a letter to the Foundation requesting that the applicants bring the 
matter to court to legally register the properties in the land register. The Foundation did so with 
the Bozcaada Cadastral Court in 2001 and 2002. The court granted the request and ordered the 
registration of the properties in the land registry. The State Treasury filed for an appeal of the 
decision and the Court of Cassation reversed the judgments, noting that the Foundation had not 
filed a declaration as required by Law No. 2762 and claiming that foundations did not have the 
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right to obtain property. The Court of Cassation dismissed the Foundation’s appeals for 
rectification of the judgment. In 2002, Law No. 4771, which amended Law No. 2762, became 
effective, allowing foundations to register their immovable properties in the land registry. Yet in 
2003, two cases were heard before the Land Titles Court claiming that the Foundation could not 
be considered the owner of the properties according to the 1974 case law on the subject. The 
properties were ordered to be registered in the name of the State Treasury. On November 20, 
2003, and November 3, 2004, after a number of appeals and dismissals, the Foundation applied 
to the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR ruled that, based on government’s refusal to register the properties in 
question in the Foundation’s name, Turley had violated Article 1 of Protocol 1. Turkey’s actions 
violated the Foundation’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The Court considered 
that the registration of the disputed properties in the land registry in the name of the Foundation 
would place the Foundation as far as possible in a situation equivalent to that which they would 
have been had Article 1 of Protocol 1 not been violated. In the absence of such action, Turkey 
should compensate the Foundation €100,000 for all damages. The Court also awarded the 
Foundation €5,000 in costs and expenses. The case spent 70 months in the Court until the 
judgment, and 88 months in the CoM from the time the judgment became final to July 15, 2016. 
Two properties were considered rectified on October 2, 2010. The case remains under standard 
supervision in the CoM as a repetitive case under the Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı cases.  
 The circumstances regarding the second set of properties (Application Nos. 37646/03, 
37665/03, 37992/03, 37993/03, 37996/03, 37998/03, 37999/03, 38000/03) were similar to the 
previous applications in that they were in possession by the foundation for a significant amount 
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of time but had not been registered in the land registry. Again the work carried out by the land 
registry in 1991 and 1992 did not indicate the name of the Foundation as the rightful owner of 
the properties and the applicant did not file them as required by Law No. 2762. The VGM sent a 
letter to the Foundation, inviting them to file with the courts to register the properties in question 
in the land registry. The request was granted in 2001. The State Treasury filed an appeal in 2002 
with the Court of Cassation, and the court determined that the Foundation could not acquire 
property according to Law No. 2762, further noting that since one of the properties in question 
was a cemetery, it should be registered in the name of the municipality. The Foundation applied 
for rectification but was dismissed and the court ordered that the property in question be 
registered in the name of the Bozcaada municipality. The remainder of the properties in this set 
of cases were immovable properties (some in a state of ruin, including a pension, chapels, a 
monastery, and a depot that the government had refused to register in spite of the fact that the 
Foundation had regularly paid property taxes on the properties and had held them uninterrupted 
for an extended period of time, as witnesses and experts attested.  
 In hearing the case, the ECtHR cited its decision in the Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum 
Ortodoks Kilisesi Vakfı (1) judgment, ruling that there had been a violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 based on domestic officials’ refusal to register the properties in the land registry in the 
Foundation’s name (Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi Vakfı v. Turkey 
[Application Nos. 37639/03, 37639/03, 26736/04, and 42670/04] 2009). The Court considered 
that registering all properties in question in the Foundation’s name in the land registry would 
place the Foundation, to the greatest extent possible, in a situation equivalent to that in which 
they would have been had there not been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1. The Court listed 
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three particular properties that should be returned, with their return being the only appropriate 
form of redress. Should the remaining properties not be returned, Turkey was ordered to pay the 
foundation €173,000. The foundation was also awarded €5,000 in costs and expenses. The case 
spent 72 months in the Court until it was heard, and 78 months in the CoM from the final 
judgment to July 15, 2016. It remains under standard supervision as a repetitive case under the 
Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı group of cases.  
6.2.5 Fener Rum Patrikliği v. Turkey 
The case of Fener Rum Patrikliği v. Turkey ([Application No: 14340/05] 2010) first came to the 
Court in 2005. The Fener Rum Patrikliği (Ecumenical Patriarchate of Fener) is the representative 
of the Orthodox Church established in Istanbul that is charged with the representation and 
coordination of the global Orthodox community. It is represented by His Holiness the 
Ecumenical Patriarch.  
 The applicant acquired a plot of land in 1902 by contract of sale on Büyükada Island 
(Istanbul) that had a building and an annex on the property. Because the property was acquired 
under Ottoman law, the acquisition of the property was confirmed by the issuance of a firman. In 
1903, the property was ceded to the “Büyükada Greek Orphanage for Boys Foundation.” When 
Law No. 2762 came into force in 1935, the Foundation acquired legal personality and the 
property was declared to be a registered property managed by the Foundation. In 1995, the 
Foundation made an arrangement with a private company to manage and renovate the buildings. 
Two years later, the VGM issued a decree that classified the formerly mülhak (attached) 
Foundation as a mazbut (seized/disused) foundation, stating that, because the foundation no 
longer conducted charitable activities, the board of directors had been revoked and the 
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management handed over to the VGM. The Foundation applied for an annulment but the court 
dismissed the application in 1998. In 2001, the Council of State reversed the judgment 
dismissing the Foundation’s application. In 2002, the Court dismissed the Foundation’s 
application again and, this time, the Council of State upheld the judgment. In the meantime, the 
VGM, on behalf of the Foundation, appealed to the Adalar High Court for an annulment of the 
title and the reinstatement of the property in the land register. The property was subsequently 
reregistered but the Court of Cassation invalidated the judgment on procedural grounds. The 
District Court once again annulled the title and ordered that the property be reregistered. The 
Court of Cassation upheld the appeal and declared that the Foundation was no longer the owner 
of the property.  
 In hearing the case on July 8, 2008, the ECtHR ruled that there had been a violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 due to the fact that Turkish authorities had deprived the Foundation of 
their property without providing adequate compensation, even though the government sought to 
preserve the original purpose of the property in question. Furthermore, citing case law from 
Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi, the Court determined that the application of the 1974 domestic 
jurisprudence, by which the government confiscated properties that did not have “appropriate” 
articles of foundation from 1936, did not meet the requirements of “foreseeability.” At the time 
of the hearing, the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the ECHR was not ready for 
decision, and the Court invited the government and the foundation to submit their arguments 
within six months, which both parties did. The Court deliberated in private on May 25, 2010 and 
issued a judgment that was adopted on June 15, 2010. In the deliberations, the Court determined 
that reinstating the property in the land registry in the Foundation’s name would serve as the only 
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adequate measure to redress the damage incurred. As a result, there was no need for pecuniary 
compensation. The Court also awarded the Foundation €6,000 in non-pecuniary damages for 
“moral injury” inflicted on the applicant and €20,000 for costs and expenses. The case spent 62 
months in the Court awaiting judgment (including delays related to Article 41 decisions) and 70 
months in the CoM from the final judgment to July 15, 2016. The case remains under standard 
supervision as a leading case on its own.  
6.2.6 Analysis 
The cases included in this category differ slightly from the others in that they relate to what has 
become a relatively technical process of property acquisition and restitution, as opposed to issues 
relating directly to the manifestation of religious freedoms or rights. Yet the number of 
applications at the ECtHR religious minorities have made for property restitution demonstrates 
that the applicants were unable to have their properties returned to them through purely domestic 
legislative or even judicial means. This set of cases points to the judicialization of non-Hanefi 
Sunni Turkish rights recognition by these groups seeking recourse through the ECtHR. 
Naturally, the Turkish government has been reluctant to move forward on taking action 
regarding the return of properties or compensation for the illegal acquisition of such properties 
out of concern for the large sum of money that would be required in direct payments or the 
financial burdens that would arise from the transfer of properties that are currently used for other 
purposes. Indeed, when the 2008 Foundations Law passed, then-PM Erdoğan indicated that 
restitution would be costly and the issue should be dropped (Oehring 2008a). It is unclear from 
the action reports that Turkey has submitted to the CoM precisely the amount of money that has 
been paid or which properties have been returned (and under what terms). The United States 
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Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2016 report on Turkey states that, according 
to the Turkish government, “more than 1,000 properties—valued at more than 2.5 billion Turkish 
Lira (1 billion U.S. Dollars)—had been returned or compensated for” between 2003 and 2014 
(United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2016, 186). No figures could be 
found for the total cost Turkey incurred during this period.  
Nevertheless, according to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs site, after the new 
Foundations Law was implemented, 70 percent of the cases where the property of Greek 
Orthodox pious foundations had been expropriated “were dismissed as inadmissible” (Hellenic 
Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). The United States Department of State’s 2016 
International Religious Freedom report noted that none of the properties that had been seized in 
previous decades had been returned that year. The report further noted that, since the 2011 
provisional amendment to the Foundations Law, 1560 religious minority foundations had applied 
for compensation for seized properties, only 333 of which were returned while only 21 received 
financial compensation. The remainder of the applications were rejected for not meeting the 
criteria of the aforementioned law (United States Department of State 2016, 11). The rejection of 
such a high volume of cases under Law 5737, even after the provisional amendment was added 
in 2011, indicates that financial compensation is not the only deterrent for resolving these 
reparations.  
As mentioned above, the history of associational law in Turkey has been piecemeal, 
inadequate, and not uniformly implemented or consistently interpreted. Yıldırım (2015, 228) 
claims that this is largely due to the inadequacy of regulations and “the lack of a regulation that 
should have accompanied the 1949 amendments to the then-Law on Foundations.” These grey 
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zones have allowed “de facto rule-makers” such as police officers to widen the scope of their 
authority to interpret associational law (Yıldırım 2015, 228). This extends to other government 
institutions, such as the Forestry Directorate, which filed a lawsuit in 2012 that requested the 
cancellation of the property deeds that had been returned to the Ecumenical Patriarchate (United 
States Department of State 2016, 12). More significantly, had the language of the law been more 
explicit and included properties the VGM (mazbut vakiflar) had confiscated from religious 
communities or had a more comprehensive regulation been issued when provisional Article 11 to 
the Foundations Law (5737) was adopted, many applications for restitution would have been 
accepted and the properties could have been returned.  
Without explicit national laws in place, legal interpretation is left to local districts and 
municipalities that often have no incentive or desire to see properties returned. These seemingly 
deliberately structured loopholes in laws and regulations essentially authorize discriminatory 
intervention by any level of government into the establishment, operation, and property rights of 
religious communities. It can become a political issue, left to the whim of the party in control of 
whatever level of government is left to decide. 
Politics has, indeed, played into decisions regarding the restitution of religious 
communities’ properties. All parties in Parliament have consistently opposed compensating 
groups whose properties have been confiscated. This sentiment extends not only to the return of 
the properties themselves or compensation, but also to the legal structure establishing any kind of 
rights for such groups. For example, after Parliament passed the 2006 version of the Foundations 
Law (No. 5555), then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch secularist, vetoed it and sent it 
back to Parliament for review. He stated that no special status should be granted to religious 
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foundations, as this is already granted in Article 101 of the Civil Code and has been provided 
through the Lausanne Treaty and Turkey’s secular nature. Parliamentary elections held in 
November 2007 changed the makeup of the body slightly: the AKP party remained in power but 
lost seats; CHP (secular, social democrat) also lost seats; and the MHP (nationalist) gained a 
significant number of seats. Just a few months after being in power, the AKP faced potential 
closure in a case brought forward by the Chief Public Prosecutor for violating the secular 
principles of the country. The party defied closure, but was hit with a 50 percent cut in public 
funding.60  
In the following session, the AKP introduced a bill almost identical to the one Sezer had 
vetoed. The bill passed, but not without opposition from within the AKP itself and from the CHP 
and MHP. It was then signed by newly-appointed President Abdullah Gül, who was an AKP 
member prior to his appointment.61 Soon thereafter, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan made a 
statement to Parliament signaling his preference for state non-interference with the “Ecumenical 
issue,” leaving the decision to the Patriarchate. This was viewed by some as a positive step 
towards increased rights recognition for such communities yet, to date, no action has been taken 
to allow the Patriarch to assume the “Ecumenical” title.62 As well, the return of some properties 
                                               
 
60 According to the Constitution, political parties receive public funding. The amount allocated to each party is 
determined by a scheme based on national thresholds.  
61 The office of the president was a non-partisan position until a referendum was held in April 2017 to convert 
Turkey into a presidential system, which allows for the president to have a party affiliation.  
62 Under current law, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch must be born a Turkish citizen. Furthermore, the Turkish 
government can oppose any candidate that is presented for the position. To resolve this, the government proposed to 
grant citizenship to any approved candidate, but they have yet to accept any that have applied. Furthermore, the 
government does not recognize the title of the Patriarch, instead referring to him as the “Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
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has been criticized as being politicized in that they are returned with great fanfare, as was the 
case with the return of an Armenian orphanage property to the Gedikpaşa Armenian Protestant 
Church Foundation. The property was returned after then-PM Davutoğlu intervened just weeks 
prior to a national election.  
Some political parties have taken more overt action to express their opposition to 
increased rights recognition for religious communities—particularly those that are seen as 
“foreign” to Turkey. At the time the 2008 Foundations Law was about to pass in Parliament, the 
Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi (HEPAR, Law and Equity Party) was formed with virtually no other 
agenda than to advance Turkish nationalism. The party took out full-page advertisements in a 
number of newspapers, attacking what it deemed as missionaries’ “colonization” of Turkey 
(Oehring 2008b). The creation of such an overtly nationalist party can be seen as a reflection of 
the sentiments of the society at the time. The brief list of incidents in the previous section are 
evidence of some of the nationalist and anti-non-(Sunni)-Turk attitudes held by certain segments 
of society. As well, in 2008 when HEPAR was founded, the country was still reeling from the 
assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, a proponent of human rights and the 
deeper integration of Armenians into Turkish society. The trial of his 18-year-old assassin was 
ongoing and the Ergenekon trials were just starting.  
                                               
 
of Fener” (Fener Rum Ortodox Patriği, named after the neighborhood where the Patriarchate is located). To simply 
call him Patriarch would imply recognition of his role as an international religious leader.  
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Nevertheless, domestic court cases related to property expropriation and restitution 
continue to be filed and heard, the most notable of which related to the Syriac Orthodox Mor 
Gabriel Monastery.63 The Forestry Ministry, Land Registry, and three villages opened a case 
against the monastery in 2008 for their alleged occupation of Forestry land. The monastery lost 
this case, but won another case brought against it by the Ministry of the Treasury. It is important 
to note that there was significant pressure to resolve the Mor Gabriel property issue coming from 
international organizations and institutions, including the Syriac Universal Alliance (which 
represents the interests of Syriacs globally), the European Syriac Union, the European Union, 
and the Council of Europe. The properties were returned piecemeal over the years, transferring 
hands from the Diyanet, to the VGM, and finally back to the foundation in 2017.  
The European Union continues to pressure the government to return properties and 
respect religious communities’ rights in the Commission’s annual progress reports. In 2006, the 
Turkish government welcomed the Commission’s suggestions, requesting that experts from the 
EU travel to Turkey to work on issues related to religious communities; the EU obliged, but 
Turkey backed out at the last minute, claiming they had no need for such assistance (Oehring 
2006). Though some reforms have been made as part of the EU accession process reform 
packages, namely to associational laws, some EU states’ (for example France and Germany) 
                                               
 
63 In 2014, the status of Mardin was changed to be a metropolitan municipality, and the title deeds to the properties 
of the Foundation of the Mor Gabriel Monastery were transferred to the Department of the Treasury, under a 
“transfer and liquidation” process that confiscated properties of “expired” legal entities. 
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clear opposition to Turkey’s candidacy from has diminished the leverage that the EU has to 
influence the Turkish government.  
The United States government and US NGOs have also been quite vocal and active in 
compelling Turkey to return confiscated properties and/or award compensation. For example, 
representatives of the American Hellenic Educational and Public Affairs Association, the 
American Hellenic Council, the American Hellenic Institute, the Armenian National Committee 
of America, the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Syriac Universal Alliance have made a 
number of visits to congressional and departmental leaders to express their views on the return of 
confiscated properties. These primarily diaspora organizations wield an enormous amount of 
influence on congressional representatives and have persuaded them to sponsor or vote for 
legislation favorable to their respective causes. Their actions prompted the House of 
Representatives to pass H. Res. 30664 in December 2011 that urged Turkey to end religious 
discrimination and return confiscated religious properties. A related bill (S. Res. 392) was 
introduced in the Senate but did not receive further action. The language from H. Res. 306 was 
then used in H.R. 2583, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 2012, which passed in 
the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Act again called on Turkey to “allow church and lay owners 
of Christian church properties to organize and administer religious and social activities” and to 
“return to their rightful owners all Christian churches, monasteries, schools, hospitals, 
                                               
 
64 H. Res. indicates that the bill is a “House Resolution,” meaning that it merely expresses the sentiment of the 
chamber and is not legally binding.  
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monuments, relics, and other religious properties, and allow their preservation and reconstruction 
as necessary” (Part II: Country-Specific Provisions Section 1165, HR 2583 112th Congress).  
A stand-alone bill called the “Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act” was 
introduced in March 2014 in the 113th Congress and passed Foreign Affairs markup in June of 
that year. The bill (according to Congressional Research Services):  
Directs the Secretary of State to report annually to Congress until 2021 on the 
status and return of stolen, confiscated, or otherwise unreturned Christian 
churches, places of worship, and other properties in or from the Republic of 
Turkey and in the areas of northern Cyprus occupied by the Turkish military. 
Requires such report to: (1) list all the Christian churches, places of worship, and 
other religious properties, including movable properties such as artwork and other 
artifacts, in or from Turkey and in the territories of the Republic of Cyprus under 
military occupation by Turkey that are claimed as stolen, confiscated, or 
otherwise wrongfully removed from their Christian church owners; and (2) 
describe all engagement over the previous year on this issue by Department of 
State officials with representatives of the Republic of Turkey. 
Requires that a summary of such information be included in the annual Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices and the International Religious Freedom 
Reports (Royce 2014). 
 
The language of the bill requests the United States Department of State’s collaboration in 
exerting pressure on Turkey through its annual human rights reports by highlighting any progress 
(or lack thereof) made in Christian property restitution. Importantly, though the State 
Department, through the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of State, acts independently of 
congressional direction in meetings with counterparts in Turkey, diaspora organizations often 
have input and influence in these meetings.  
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Confronted with the formidable domestic grassroots power of the Greek and Armenian 
diasporas, the Turkish government has in the past employed “hired guns” to handle its lobbying 
efforts in the United States or has indirectly funded pro-Turkey grassroots efforts. However, in 
recent years, the Turkish American community has become much more involved in grassroots 
activism. This can be seen in the 2009 emergence of the Turkish Coalition of America, which 
receives no support from either the Turkish or US governments, and the creation of the Ten 
Thousand Turks Campaign, which established five political action committees in 2007. Diaspora 
groups’ relative silence on property restitution issues in recent years, and the subsequent lack of 
political action by Congress, could very well be due to the increased political activism of Turkish 
Americans in the US.  
In sum, the fact that Turkey made such concrete steps toward the execution of the 
judgments in these cases is unique. According to Gökçe Türkyılmaz, a lawyer at the Registry of 
the ECtHR, the execution of judgments related to property rights is simply a matter of returning 
the properties, which is more of a technical issue and not necessarily a policy issue (Türkyılmaz 
2017). Yet as mentioned above, the actual percentage of properties that have been returned 
seems surprisingly small, and the return of properties in ECtHR cases is likely due to the 
judgments themselves or as a result of the 2011 reforms. The judgments have been quite clear in 
their language by indicating, in a majority of the cases, that individual measures include the 
return of the property or monetary compensation, and that general measures would include a 
change in the relevant regulations. Though the properties in question at the ECtHR have been 
returned, the CoM is reluctant to close these cases. This is likely due to the fact that the requisite 
general measures have not fully been implemented, as is evident in the very recent domestic case 
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of the Mor Gabriel properties, mentioned above. There are still no barriers to the government’s 
expropriation of religious minority properties, meaning that this issue will likely continue to be 
judicialized at the ECtHR as properties continue to be confiscated and the structural issues that 
require attention on this issue are fully addressed.  
The Lausanne Minorities, who have been the most disproportionately affected group by 
property rights issues, face a unique institutional framework in Turkey. Their official recognition 
by the Lausanne Treaty formally established their rights, though not fully applied in reality.    
The cases considered in this section have included properties that have existed for a 
number of years and the issues at the Court were related to the historic trajectory of the 
ownership of those properties. Minorities in Turkey today face another issue—the establishment 
of newer places of worship and how the government recognizes the group in terms of services 
provided (or denied). The following section considers four such cases. 
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6.3 Place of Worship/Public Provision of Religious Services 
The first clause of Article 9 of the ECHR, which deals with freedom of religion, affirms the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and the right to manifest that religion or belief 
either alone or in community with others “in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.” The 
second clause provides further details regarding manifestations; they are “subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health, or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” The Court and CoM have embraced rather narrow interpretations 
of the term “manifestation,” causing challenges for applicants to prove that this right has been 
restricted (Evans 2001, 101). Nonetheless, these cases continue to come before the Court and, as 
in the cases examined in this section, the Court has concluded that rights to religious freedom 
related to manifestation were violated.  
More than half a century ago, Arcot Krishnaswami issued a report for the United Nations 
on religious discrimination and noted that: “The right of a group to manifest its religion or belief 
through public worship is also sometimes curtailed—and occasionally even negated—by 
unreasonable regulations. Licenses for the opening of places of worship may be arbitrarily 
withheld, or permits for the assembling of a group of worshippers arbitrarily refused. Or, if the 
license or permit is not withheld or refused, it may be granted on terms which are onerous or 
difficult to comply with, and which may in effect negate — or at least seriously curtail — the 
right to worship in common” (1960, 31). As the following cases illustrate, Turkey has been 
found to be in violation of Article 9 in this regard. It is worth noting that Article 9 is often read in 
conjunction with Article 14 (as in Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey 
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[Application No. 32093/10 ] 2014; İzzettin Doğan et al. v. Turkey [Application No. 62649/10] 
2016), which establishes the protection of Convention rights without discrimination on a number 
of grounds, one of which is religion. This applies to cases not only related to the manifestation of 
faith or beliefs, but also to the public provision of religious services and the manner in which 
communities of faith are privileged with or denied access to services or recognition as it relates 
to collective manifestation. According to Evans, “‘worship’ has been given the highest status of 
the manifestations listed in Article 9(1)” of the ECHR (2001, 107). However, as manifestations, 
the Court and Commission have thus far assumed that the terms “worship” and “observance” are 
self-evident and do not need to be explicitly defined (Evans 2001, 108). Furthermore, states seem 
to have been given a wide margin of appreciation in practice, and as such, case law has made it 
difficult to concretely identify cases of discrimination or “unnecessary restrictions” (Yıldırım 
2015, 127).  
Places of worship, as defined by Turkish law, are limited to mosques and mescits (small 
mosques), churches, and synagogues as they relate to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, 
respectively. However, there is no particular procedure for obtaining the status of a “place of 
worship” in Turkish law (mabed/ibadethane). A number of regulations have been issued by the 
Turkish Council of Ministers that regulate taxes from which certain organizations and buildings 
are exempt, including “houses of worship.”65 Tax exemptions include electricity and gas costs, 
property taxes, environmental cleanliness taxes, and income tax.  
                                               
 
65 The July 19, 2003 amendment to Act No 4928 specifically replaced the term “mosque” with “house of worship.” 
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Turkey has been ruled to be in violation in cases related to restrictions on places of 
worship and discrimination in the public provision of worship services. As of 2016, “holding 
religious services at a location not recognized as a place of worship is illegal and may be 
punished with fines or closure of the venue” (United States Department of State 2016, 3). 
Religious minorities continue to report difficulties and file cases related to challenges in opening 
and operating houses of worship (United States Department of State 2016, 1). A few domestic 
cases have mentioned the Diyanet’s continued refusal to provide financial support for the 
construction of Alevi houses of worship (cemevi), while it continued to support the construction 
of Sunni mosques. As of 2015, the Diyanet was also continuing to pay the salaries of nearly 
120,000 Sunni religious officials of mosques but refused to pay the salaries of any other religious 
officials, in spite of an appeal by the Boyacikoy Surp Yerits Mangants Armenian Church 
Foundation (United States Department of State 2016, 16). The Istanbul Municipality offered the 
Syriac Orthodox community land to build a second church that had previously belonged to the 
Latin Catholic community. According to the Regional Board for the Preservation of Cultural 
Heritage, this requires a written agreement between the communities that has yet to be signed. 
These are just a few examples of the institutional difficulties that non-Sunni groups face when 
attempting to open or operate houses of worship. The following ECtHR cases are examples of 
Turkey’s violations in relation to houses of worship and the pluralist public provision of religious 
services. 
6.3.1 Tanyar and Küçükergin v. Turkey 
On June 28, 2001, Mr. H Zekai Tanyar and Mr. Ali Cengiz Küçükergin brought their case to the 
ECtHR (Tanyar and Küçükergin v. Turkey [Application No: 74242/01] 2006). The applicants 
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had purchased housing on the ground floor of a building in İzmir that, as they informed the 
Prefect of İzmir, would be used as an independent Protestant place of worship, prayer, assembly, 
and study. The Security Directorate of the Prefecture of İzmir responded, explaining that a 
private room could not be used as a place of worship unless approved by the co-owners. The 
applicants continued to assemble at the dwelling in question, even though they did not have all 
the co-owner’s prior agreement. Furthermore, the applicants affixed a plaque with the name of 
their community at the entrance to the building. The public prosecutor of İzmir dismissed the 
case that had been brought against the applicants, citing the protection of freedom of religion. 
The public prosecutor then fined the applicants 15,000,000 TRL for holding the aforementioned 
meeting. The applicants did not pay the fine within the fixed time. Once again, the İzmir Police 
Court found the applicants guilty of organizing a religious ceremony (in violation of Article 529 
§1 of the criminal code) and ordered a fine of 22,500,000 TRL. The applicants lodged a 
complaint against that order with the İzmir Criminal Court, citing Articles 9 and 6 of the ECHR. 
On December 15, 2000, the applicants were notified that the Criminal Court had dismissed the 
complaint without a hearing. The applicants then took the case to the ECtHR.  
 The ECtHR ruled that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR because the 
applicants were not granted a public hearing. Though the applicants had also filed the complaint 
as a violation of Article 9, the Court held that Tanyar and Küçükergin’s argument regarding 
religious freedom was manifestly ill-founded in that the fine they were handed was “justified in 
principle and proportionate to the intended objective of protecting the rights and freedoms of 
others and order” (Tanyar and Küçükergin v. Turkey [Application No: 74242/01] 2006). The 
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Court granted the applicants €1500 for costs and expenses; the finding of the violation itself 
deemed just satisfaction. 
 The case was one of 31 repetitive cases under Adem Arslan v. Turkey ([Application No. 
75836/01] 2006), all of which related to Article 6 violations. The case spent 65 months in Court 
and 39 months in the CoM prior to the leading case and repetitive cases’ closure by the CoM’s 
ResDH(2010)64 on June 3, 2010. The costs and expenses awarded by the Court were paid by the 
government on June 1, 2007. Since the payments had been made and since the Turkish 
Constitutional Court had declared in June 2004 preventing the holding of public hearings was 
unconstitutional, the case was closed on June 3, 2010. 
6.3.2 Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey 
The case of Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı (CEM Vakfı; Foundation for 
Republican Instruction and Culture) v. Turkey was filed with ECtHR on May 7, 2010 
([Application No: 32093/10] 2014). The CEM Vakfi was established in 1995 as a public benefit 
foundation. As a cultural foundation, it manages a number of cemevis throughout Turkey, 
including the Yenibosna Pir Koca Ahmet Yesevi Cem Kültür Merkezi (Yenibosna Cemevi). The 
Yenibosna complex houses the foundation headquarters, a restaurant, a library, a conference 
room, a classroom, a funeral hall, and a cemevi. In August 2006, the Director of the Foundation 
sent a letter to the management of Boğaziçi Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. (BEDAŞ), a private electric 
distribution company, stating that, as a house of worship and a funeral hall, the Yenibosna 
Cemevi should be exempt from payment of electricity bills. The request was rejected by BEDAŞ, 
which claimed that since Turkey’s adoption of the CoM’s Decision No. 2002/4100, the provision 
of electricity, which had been granted to places of worship, had been transferred to a fund under 
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the Diyanet. In a May 2008 judgment, the District Court dismissed the claims based on the 
Diyanet’s view that Alevism is not a religion and that cemevis are not houses of worship. The 
CEM Vakfı appealed against the first instance judgment but, in March 2009, the Court of 
Cassation upheld the judgment.  
 While the scope of Article 9 does not guarantee that religious groups are granted a 
particular legal status or a special tax status, special status for places of worship was written into 
Turkish law after the CoM’s decision. This status means, for example, that electricity bills are 
paid through a Diyanet fund. This denied cemevis the status of a house of worship because the 
Diyanet does not recognize them as such and is discrimination based on religion (Article 14), 
taken together with Article 9.66 The question of the application of Article 41 of the ECHR was 
not ready for hearing, as the Court rejected the portions of the case concerning the other invoices 
the applicant had submitted and considered the present case to be relevant only to the electricity 
bills for the Yenibosna center. The Court thus granted the parties six months to come to an 
agreement for the remaining invoices submitted as part of this case. At the March 8-10, 2016 
meeting of the CoM, Turkish authorities submitted the government’s overall Action Plan 
(announced on December 10, 2015, received by the CoM on January 5, 2016), which envisages 
giving a legal status to “spiritual knowledge centers” (geleneksel irfan merkezleri) and “assembly 
houses” (cemevleri). The case spent 35 months in the Court and 15 months in the CoM. It 
remains under enhanced supervision in the Committee of Ministers.  
                                               
 
66 In a separate judgment on June 20, 2017, the Court awarded the applicants €44,400 for material damages and 
€10,000 in moral damages.  
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6.3.3 İzzettin Doğan et al. v. Turkey 
İzzettin Doğan et al. v. Turkey is a leading case submitted to the ECtHR on August 31, 2010 by 
203 Turkish Alevi citizens67 ([Application No. 62649/10] 2016). The case was originally 
assigned to the Second Section of the Court, but the judges of the section relinquished 
jurisdiction so that the case would be heard by the Grand Chamber in a public hearing on June 3, 
2015.  
 Domestic proceedings had begun in June 2005 when the applicants submitted a petition 
to the Prime Minister complaining that the Diyanet confined its activities to a single school of 
Islamic thought (Sunni Islam), while disregarding other faiths. The petition stated that Alevi 
rights had been infringed upon due to the fact that Alevi cemevi were not recognized as houses of 
worship; that numerous obstacles prevented cemevi from being built; that no budgetary provision 
in the national budget was allocated to the operation of cemevi; and that Alevi’s free exercise of 
rights and freedoms was subject to the good will of public officials. The petition requested that 
Alevi religious services be recognized as a public service; that cemevis be given status as a place 
of worship; that Alevi leaders be recruited as civil servants; and that budgetary provisions be 
allocated to the Alevi community. The Prime Minister’s public relations department rejected the 
requests in August 2005, claiming that the Diyanet’s services were general and supra-
denominational and were available to everyone; that it would be impossible to grant cemevi the 
status of a place of worship; and that no privileges could be given to a group based on faith or 
                                               
 
67 The primary applicant, İzzettin Doğan, is the founding president of the CEM Vakfı, the applicant in the 
Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey case above. 
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belief, including allocating budgetary funding for services not provided for in the Constitution. 
The applicants were among 1,919 Alevi citizens who applied for judicial review with the Ankara 
Administrative Court. The Court dismissed this particular case in July 2007. The applicants 
appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court on points of law, but the case was dismissed in 
February 2010. The applicants then took the case to the ECtHR. 
 When reviewing the case in light of Article 9, the Court considered that the government 
had interfered with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion by refusing to recognize the Alevi 
faith and its practices (cem), thereby denying cemevi and religious leaders (dede) legal 
protection. The Court considered the government’s approach to Alevi practices, community, and 
places of worship to be incompatible with the state’s obligation of neutrality and impartiality. 
Furthermore, by maintaining that the Alevi were a “Sufi order,” the government placed them in a 
position to be further discriminated against under Law. No 677,68 which, among other punishable 
offenses, prohibits the use of the term dede.  
 Although states are granted a margin of appreciation in their relations with faith groups, 
in this case, the Court determined that Turkey had overstepped the boundaries of this 
understanding. While there are varied interpretations of the precepts and practices of Alevism 
and Alevis, respectively, the government had not identified the community’s common requests, 
                                               
 
68 Law no. 677 of November 30, 1925, “Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of 
the Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles,” was one of the first laws of the Turkish 
Republic that explicitly restricted a specific religious group. It was primarily aimed at Sufis and Bektaşis, whom 
some believe have similar origins and beliefs as the Alevi. 
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particularly related to autonomy, fundamental elements of faith, and the functions and purpose of 
cem, cemevi, and dede.  
 The Court ruled that Alevis—who did not enjoy legal protection as a religious 
denomination, whose houses of worship were not recognized, whose religious leaders had no 
legal status, and who did not enjoy any of the benefits of the public religious services provided 
by the government—faced discrimination, as understood under Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 9, due to the imbalanced de facto and de jure interpretations of Turkish laws and 
regulations. The Court further ruled that the Alevi were unable to freely practice their faith and 
that the government had refused to provide public religious services to Alevi citizens, which 
were included under a separate violation of Article 9. The Grand Chamber considered that the 
finding that Turkey had violated Article 9 and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 was 
sufficient just satisfaction. The Court jointly awarded the applicants €3,000 in miscellaneous 
expenses. The case spent 66 months in the Court awaiting judgment and three in the CoM from 
the time of the final judgment to July 15, 201669. It remains under enhanced supervision.70 
6.3.4 Association of Solidarity with the Jehovah’s Witness et al. v. Turkey 
The case of the Association of Solidarity with the Jehovah’s Witnesses et al. v. Turkey originated 
in two separate applications to the ECtHR, filed in June 2010 and December 2012. The 
                                               
 
69 The case spent such a short amount of time in the CoM because the final judgment was issued being just prior to 
the cutoff date of this study.  
70 The Turkish Government submitted an Action Plan to the CoM on February 9, 2017 (DH-DD(2017)166) 
indicating that a translated judgment was circulated to institutions such as the Prime Ministry, the Constitutional 
Court, the Court of Cassation, the Religious Affairs Department, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the 
Ombudsman Institution, and the relevant court.  
  
 
 
185 
Association (Yahova’nın Şahitlerini Destekleme Derneği) was established in 2007, but prior to 
that, the Mersin branch of the community was represented by the Mersin Congregation of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
Mersin Case (Application No. 36915/10) 
Until 1998, the Mersin Jehovah’s Witness congregation met for worship in the “Gazi apartment” 
in Mersin and relied on authorizations granted by the Mersin security section. In September 
1998, the congregation requested to worship, pray, and assemble in a new location (the “Akdeniz 
apartment”). In December 2000, during a religious ceremony at the Akdeniz apartment, police 
officers arrived to conduct a search and ordered the closure of the apartment, claiming that the 
congregation did not have permission to organize religious ceremonies in that location. The 
public prosecutor charged 12 members of the congregation, but they were later acquitted. In 
August 2001, the Directorate of Security of the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular for 
requests to open places of worship, citing Section 1 of a by-law of Planning Act No. 3194, which 
states that it is forbidden to open a place of worship not intended for such a purpose. The 
applicants informed the prefecture of their intent to re-open the Gazi apartment as a place of 
worship, but were denied permission by the prefecture’s security directorate that stated that it 
was not allowed without modifying local planning laws. On July 15, 2003, Article 2 of Act 3194 
was amended by Act 4928, replacing the term “mosque” (cami) with “place of worship” (ibadet 
yeri). The Ministry of Interior responded with a circular cancelling the 2001 circular, thus 
making it possible to establish houses of worship other than mosques.  
In August 2003, the Security Directorate informed the applicants that they should submit 
a request to register their place of worship within 15 days or it would be closed. The same day, 
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the applicants requested that the Gezi apartment be included in the list of places of worship in the 
local planning scheme but the request was dismissed because the building was listed as a place of 
residence. The Gezi apartment was closed by the police on August 27, 2003, on the grounds that 
the local urban plan did not provide for a place of worship. The applicants successfully applied 
to the Mersin Administrative Court for the decision to be annulled. The prefecture appealed on 
points of law. In October 2007, the Council of State reversed the Administrative Court’s 
decision, siding with the municipality by claiming that a residential space in the urban plan could 
not be used for other purposes. The applicants appealed on points of law, but the Council of State 
upheld the judgment of the Mersin Municipal Court. The applicants applied for rectification, but 
were rejected by the Council of State in 2009.  
İzmir Case (Application No. 8606/13) 
In 1999, the Kule Kitaplari Ticaret Limited Sirketi, an LLC under Turkish law, obtained land in 
the name of the Jehovah’s Witness Community in İzmir to construct a building, the ground floor 
of which was to serve as a house of worship. Construction was completed in 2005. During 
construction, in January 2000, Kule applied for an amendment to the local urban plan to hold 
“meetings” on the ground floor and received approval in May 2000. In 2004, the Deputy Prefect 
of İzmir sent a letter to minority groups within its jurisdiction informing them of the recent 
amendments to the Planning Act (No. 4928) and reminding them that groups were required to 
make a request to the local administrative authorities for a building permit to create a house of 
worship or to amend the local plan. The letter indicated that a permit for the construction of a 
house of worship could be issued after a needs assessment, taking into consideration the number 
of members of the religious community in question. The Jehovah’s Witness Community of İzmir 
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made a request to the İzmir Municipality for land on which to construct a house of worship in 
February 2004 and, in March 2004, also applied for an amendment to the local planning scheme 
to use the ground floor of the constructed apartment as a place of worship. The Municipality 
rejected the application, stating that the local urban plan did not include land to be used for the 
construction of a house of worship. The amendment application was also rejected as contrary to 
planning rules and the principles of city planning.  
 In January 2005, Kule applied to the İzmir Administrative Court for the decision to be 
annulled. The annulment was granted based on the court’s view that the denial of the request 
amounted to suppression of religious freedom, as guaranteed in the Turkish Constitution. The 
Karsiyaka Municipality appealed and the Council of State reversed the judgment, referring the 
case to Administrative Court. In May 2010, the Administrative Court of İzmir dismissed the 
application, stating that changes could be made to the municipal plans to accommodate the needs 
of smaller congregations.  
Though the law had been amended, places of worship were still required to have a 
mandatory minimum surface area of 2,500m2. Following the passage of this act, the Jehovah’s 
Witness congregation was denied use of the apartment in a block of flats, as well as the ground 
floor of another building, on the grounds that a building that was used as housing could not be 
used as a place of worship and that, in any case, a place of worship must comply with the 
aforementioned minimum surface area requirements. The municipality also informed the 
community that there were no other locations available for a place of worship and no available 
land suitable for one’s construction. The applicants then filed their case with the ECtHR.  
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 The ECtHR ruled that there had been a violation of Article 9 due to the fact that the 
community could not acquire a venue for practicing their faith, which infringes on their religious 
freedom. While states are often given a broad margin of appreciation in the implementation of 
urban development policies, when states consider the right to obtain a place of worship, they 
have an obligation to “preserve genuine religious pluralism” (Association of Solidarity with 
Jehovah’s Witnesses et al. v. Turkey [Application Nos. 36915/10 and 8606/13] 2016). 
Additionally, the Court rejected the government’s claims that the applicants had repeatedly 
received permission to meet (based on Act 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrations) because 
authorization was required for each religious activity the group organized and decisions were left 
to the goodwill of local authorities. These actions directly and disproportionately infringed on the 
community’s right to religious freedom. The applicants from Application No. 36915/10 and 
Application 8606/13 were each awarded €1,000 in non-pecuniary damages and €4,000 jointly for 
costs and expenses. No explicit individual or general measures were stated. 
 The cases were in the Court for 71 months before a judgment was made. The case 
became final and was transferred to the CoM on October 17, 2016, after the cutoff date of this 
study (July 16, 2016). After the final judgment, the Turkish government informed the CoM that 
the İzmir and Mersin Administrative Courts have accepted requests to reopen the proceedings.71 
The cases remain under enhanced supervision in the CoM.  
                                               
 
71 In the same Action Plan (DH-DD(2017)722) submitted to the CoM in June 2017, the government relayed 
information about regulations on spatial planning, introduced with Article 44 of Law No. 3194, indicating that small 
houses of worship could be built in a space measuring 1000m2 and large houses of worship could be built in a space 
no larger than 15,000m2.  
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6.3.5 Analysis 
The implementation and interpretation of rules, regulations, and laws regarding places of 
worship and the pluralistic public provision of religious services have been significantly shaped 
by, and are also deployed in ways that shape Turkey’s political and social environment. As 
illustrated in a number of cases throughout this research, non-Hanefi Sunni groups do not enjoy 
the same associational rights as Sunni groups. The institutional structure was established in 1925, 
early in the Republic, with the passage of Law No. 677, “The Closure of Tekkes (Dervish 
lodges), Zaviye (small Islamic monasteries), and Türbes (mausoleums/shrines).” This was largely 
directed at Sufi orders and the Alevi community since these are their primary houses of worship. 
The law further proscribed the use of the honorifics affiliated with the leaders of these 
communities, specifically dede (in Alevism) and derviş (in Sufism). While amendments were 
made to the law in 1950 (No. 5566/1) and in 1990 (No. 3612/5) to allow for the opening of some 
türbeler, the law is largely interpreted and implemented as it was initially written, though the 
government rarely enforces the ban against tarikats and cemaats and such groups “remain active 
and widespread” (United States Department of State 2016, 8). It is worth noting that Article 174 
of the Constitution prohibits changing this law. However, a larger issue remains: the recognition 
of these minority communities. The four cases under analysis in this section are all faith 
communities that are not officially recognized by the Turkish government (Protestant, Alevi, and 
Jehovah’s Witness). Their houses of worship are also unrecognized.  
 The recognition of Alevi identity and houses of worship is a highly debated and sensitive 
issue. The Diyanet, as a matter of policy, does not provide funding for the construction or 
operation of cemevi, yet it allocates significant portions of its budget to the construction and 
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operation of Sunni mosques throughout the country and provides a number of other religious 
services to the Sunni community. The budget appropriation to the Diyanet has generally 
increased each year—particularly under the AKP government. From 2015 to 2016, the allocation 
went from ₺3.6 billion TRY to over ₺5.9 billion TRY (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başkanlığı, Diyanet 
İşleri Bakanlığı 2016).72 Since 2006, the number of mosques in Turkey has increased from 
78,608 to 87,381 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başkanlığı, Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı 2016). According to 
the Diyanet’s 2017 performance plan, the institution employs 117,378 personnel, of which 
115,218 are muftis (religious clergy). The funding allocated to the Diyanet regularly exceeds the 
funding allocated to important ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European 
Union Ministry, the Culture and Tourism Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry of 
Interior, among others.  
The massive budget granted to the Diyanet, and the blatant exclusion of other religious 
communities, are indicative of government’s general policy towards non-Hanefi Sunni citizens. 
The argument frequently put forward by the Alevi community is that taxes are collected from all 
Turkish citizens, regardless of faith, and as such, the provision of public religious services should 
be delivered equitably for all citizens, and not just Sunni Muslims. As illustrated above, this is 
simply not the case. The challenge that the Alevi community faces as a whole on this issue is 
intra-community division about how to resolve the issue. For example, the Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim 
ve Kültür Vakfı (the plaintiff in the case above) and the Dünya Ehlibeyt Vakfı (Global Ehlibeyt 
                                               
 
72 Some media sources have reported that the final version was upwards of ₺ 6.5 billion TRY. 
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[Ahl al-Bayt] Foundation) would prefer to have either a separate directorate for Alevi within the 
government (similar to the Diyanet) or distinct representation within the Diyanet, including 
payment of the salaries of Alevi dede (Köse 2010a, 11). In contrast, the Alevi-Bektaşi 
Fedarasyonu (the Alevi-Bektaşi Federation) wants to see the Diyanet abolished entirely and does 
not want any government involvement in any religious activities (Köse 2010a, 11). These 
internal disagreements about how to optimize the associational rights of the Alevi community 
make it difficult to make progress, especially in terms of reaching an agreement on identity 
claims and presenting a united position to the government.  
As has been noted several times throughout this dissertation, the government refuses to 
acknowledge the Alevi as a religious community independent of Sunni Muslims, going so far as 
to reject cemevi as houses of worship and instead recognizing them as “cultural centers.” The 
government maintains that Alevis are “de facto” Sunni Muslims. Yet in 2015, the Supreme Court 
ruled that cemevi are, indeed, houses of worship (ibadethane); as such, they would have their 
electricity paid for by the specified Diyanet funds and municipalities would be able to allocate 
space for and recognize cemevi. Even prior to this decision, the municipalities of Konak and 
Karşıyaka (both located in the province of İzmir, which is generally a stronghold for the CHP 
party), moved to recognize cemevi as houses of worship. The Turkish government did submit an 
action plan to the CoM on January 11, 2016 (DH-DD(2016)13) that stated that the government 
announced in its program and Action Plan that spiritual knowledge centers (geleneksel irfan 
merkezleri) and assembly houses (cemevleri) would be given legal status. However, no 
legislative action has been taken to clarify this situation. This could be due to the number of 
legislative changes required, as the AKP 2015 platform underscored: “On this subject, we will 
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recognize the legal status of geleneksel irfan merkezleri and cemevi. Likewise, we will make the 
necessary amendments to Municipal Law No. 5393, Construction Law No. 3194, and Electricity 
Market Law No. 6446 to meet the needs of geleneksel irfan merkezleri and cemevi” (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi 2015). The government’s inaction could also be a concern for revenue. Reform 
could set precedent for other houses of worship to apply for official recognition, cutting a 
potential source of tax revenue from the state since places of worship are exempt from certain 
taxes, not limited to property, water, and electric.  
There has been progress. In 2016, the Turkish government paid for the utility costs of 419 
minority places of worship, including 355 churches, 24 chapels, and 40 synagogues (United 
States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2016, 189). Yet any steps taken toward 
the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments have been piecemeal due to the sheer number of 
changes that would be required to a number of interconnected institutions (i.e., organizations, 
laws, and social norms). Foremost among these institutions is the Diyanet, whose scope and 
budget loom large in establishing the political, social, and inter- and intra-institutional settings 
for both Sunni and non-Sunni groups. 
While these cases were brought to the ECtHR by three different religious groups (Alevi, 
Protestant, and Jehovah’s Witnesses), and while each addresses various aspects of the laws and 
regulations surrounding places of worship and the pluralistic public provision of religious 
services, what is common to them is the Turkish government’s non-recognition. This indicates 
that these groups each face similar issues due to their identity as outside of the widely accepted 
Turkish Sunni paradigm. Their identity is essentialized, contested, and negotiated all at once 
(Fitzgerald 2015, 314). The “othering” of non-Sunni Turks permits the political and legal 
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authorities to categorize what qualifies as religion or not, which aspects of belief systems are 
regarded as legitimate, who their representatives are, and ultimately, who and what are 
suppressed.   
Though the Tanyar and Küçükergin case was closed, this was likely due to the fact that it 
was a repetitive case where the general structural issues were addressed as part of the leading 
case. However, the Court did not find an Article 9 violation (due to the non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies), which very well could have removed this case from the set of cases under 
which it was heard, meaning that fundamental issue the applicants were concerned with—their 
right to worship collectively—was not addressed. The Jehovah’s Witness case is similar in that 
the applicants were attempting to exercise the aforementioned right and were repeatedly 
circumscribed in doing so by municipal authorities. The two Alevi cases were directly related to 
the non-recognition of Alevism as a distinct religion. While there is no legal basis for denying 
the Alevi recognition or the right to operate a house of worship, the de facto application by the 
laws governing associations and foundations (under which the Alevi are organized) excludes 
cemevi as houses of worship. This issue also arose in the CEM Vakfı case (Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim 
ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey [Application No: 32093/10] 2014) where the government 
claimed that Alevism could not be classified as a religion and so their houses of worship cannot 
recognized as such. The government’s argument revolved around the fact that Alevism is not 
offered as an option on one’s Turkish National Identity Card (see section 9 of the judgment). 
This issue is discussed in relation to the Sinan Işık case in the next section.  
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6.4 Identity Cards 
The Turkish national ID card (nüfus cüzdanı) is an identification document used in Turkey that 
all citizens must possess to receive government services such as health care, voting rights, 
property (vehicle, home) acquisition, and domestic utilities. The ID card system was initiated in 
1927 and has been updated a number of times since then. The document contains the following 
information: Turkish ID number, name, surname, father’s name, mother’s name, birthplace, birth 
date, marital status, religion, blood type, registration information (location, number),73 location 
of issue, and date of issue. Gender is indicated through the color of the card (orange/pink for 
women and blue for men). This information is openly displayed on the card.  
The choices for religious categories are Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and, since 2006, blank (Yıldırım 2010b). In 2006, the Population 
Services Act (Nüfus Hizmetleri Kanunu) was amended to allow citizens to leave the box 
indicating religious affiliation blank (Nüfus Hizmetleri Kanunu 2006). Prior to this date, it was 
mandatory to select one’s religious affiliation from the list of recognized religions. The following 
case is illustrative of some of the issues that have emerged stemming from the information 
displayed on the card, as well as the restrictions on options given to complete the requisite fields 
of the ID card.  
                                               
 
73 This is different from the ID number; it is the name, family number, individual number, and location of one’s 
family registration. This system has been adapted slightly from Ottoman times, but is still in place today.  
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6.4.1 Sinan Işık v. Turkey 
The case of Sinan Işık v. Turkey ([Application No. 21924/05] 2010) originated in an application 
against Turkey that was the result of allegations by Mr. Işık that he was unable to use the word 
“Alevi” in place “Islam” on his identity card.  
In 2004, Sinan Işık, an Alevi citizen from İzmir, Turkey, applied to the İzmir District 
Court to change the religion on his ID card from “Islam” to “Alevi.” The court requested the 
opinion of the Diyanet, which responded that listing religious interpretations or subcultures in the 
religion box on ID cards was incompatible with national unity, republican principles, and the 
principle of secularism. They added that “Alevi,” as a sub-group within Islam, was not a separate 
religion but an interpretation of Islam influenced by Sufism with distinct cultural characteristics. 
The court dismissed the request on the basis of these arguments. Işık appealed to the Court of 
Cassation, contending that because it was mandatory to complete the religion field on ID cards, 
he was forced to disclose his religious beliefs publicly without consent in violation of Article 9§1 
of the ECHR and Article 24§3 of the Turkish Constitution. The plaintiff further argued that he 
had lodged two applications, the first to remove the word “Islam,” and the second to insert the 
word “Alevi.” The court had accepted the first and denied the second. Later that year, the Court 
of Cassation upheld the judgment of the lower court, without providing additional reasoning.  
 On June 3, 2005, Işık applied to the ECtHR on the grounds that the denial of his request 
to have the word “Islam” replaced by the word “Alevi” was a violation of Article 9 (freedom of 
religion), Article 6 (right to a fair trial), and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 
ECHR. On January 15, 2008, the Second Section of the Court gave notice to the Turkish 
government that they would rule on the admissibility and the merits of the application at the 
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same time. On February 2, 2010, the Court ruled that freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs had a negative aspect—that is, the right to not disclose or manifest one’s religious beliefs. 
By the time Işık’s case was heard, the 2006 amendment allowing the religious box on the ID card 
to remain blank had been passed and implemented, but the Court did not find this change 
sufficient. The Court maintained that because applicants were required to apply in writing to the 
authorities to have religious indication removed from the ID card and civil registries, there had 
been a violation of Article 9. Furthermore, the Court noted that presence of a religion box on the 
ID card was in conflict with the principle of freedom not to manifest one’s religion or belief.  
 The Court determined that there was no need to examine the violations of Article 6 and 
14 separately, as Işık had requested in his application. As such, the Court only reviewed the case 
under Article 9 and ruled that there was a violation. The Court determined that the individual 
measures and general measures could be resolved together by the deletion of the religion box on 
the ID cards. The applicant did not submit any claims for just satisfaction and so the court did 
not award any. There were no indications of claims for costs and expenses. The case was 
submitted to the CoM on May 2, 2010 for supervision of execution.74 As of July 15, 2016, the 
cutoff date for this study’s collection of data, this case had spent 72 months in the Committee of 
Ministers and was still open under enhanced supervision. It is also worth noting that the case was 
not heard for almost 56 months (55 months and 30 days) from the time of application.  
                                               
 
74 This case was downgraded to standard supervision at the 1273rd Deputies meeting (December 6-8, 2016).  
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 The most recent action plan on record in the CoM database indicates that Turkish 
authorities have undertaken measures to prevent similar violations, including amendments to 
Law No. 5490 (Askerlik Kanunu ve Bazi Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun 2016), 
which introduced the new system of identity cards (Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers 
2016). Pursuant to the Court’s ruling, the legislation states that no religious information will be 
indicated on the card but that citizens may request the addition of religious information on their 
card’s electronic chip. Similarly, the law allows citizens to delete or amend religious 
information, or request the information to be blank on the civil registry. Seeing as the case did 
not put forth arguments about information on the civil registry and only concerned the identity 
cards, the Court’s decision is not binding on amendments related to the civil registry. The pilot 
scheme was introduced in March 2016 and was fully implemented on January 2, 2017. In light of 
the actions taken by the Turkish authorities, the action report also determined that the Sinan Işık 
case continue under standard supervision from then on, downgrading it from enhanced 
supervision.   
6.4.2 Analysis 
One significant push behind the forward movement on seemingly difficult changes to the long-
standing structure of the ID system was the Presidency of the Constitutional Court (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi Başkanı). Ahmet Necdet Sezer, as a member of the Constitutional Court (1988-2000) 
and then as President of that body (1998-2000), was outspoken about his opinion on this issue. 
Sezer, a firm adherent to the principle of secularism, made public statements as a member of the 
Constitutional Court in 1995, such as: “According to Article 15 of the Constitution concerning 
the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, even in cases of war, 
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mobilization, martial law, or extraordinary circumstances, an individual cannot be forced to 
reveal his/her religion. Nevertheless, the rule that is the subject of the objection obliges 
individuals to reveal his/her religion. For these reasons, it is necessary to cancel the religious 
wording in Article 43 of the Population Act, which is contrary to the Constitution” (NTV MSNBC 
2000).  
Following his appointment to the Constitutional Court, Sezer was elected President of the 
Turkish Republic, a position he held 2000-2007.75 Sezer’s position at the Constitutional Court 
was filled by another overtly secular judge, Mustafa Bumin. It was during this time that the Işık 
case was heard in both domestic courts and at the ECtHR. Although the Constitutional Court did 
not hear this case, nor did the Office of the President have any explicit role in the changes that 
were made in 2006 and beyond, one could speculate about the impact of Sezer’s comments and 
those of his successor on the need to protect the secular nature of the state and the importance of 
not allowing faith and politics to be conflated. Bumin and leaders of the AKP disagreed on other 
secular issues facing Turkey during this period, such as the headscarf issue (NTV MSNBC 2005b; 
Milliyet 2005).  
In spite of the discord between the Constitutional Court of that time and the governing 
AKP, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a public statement about the Işık case. 
He said that that he “did not see the European Court of Human Rights’ decision on this matter as 
abnormal” and that the religion box can be removed, as it is not important (Milliyet 2010). The 
                                               
 
75 At the time Sezer was elected, the presidential system was not in place and therefore “election” refers to 
Parliament’s three-round, secret ballot vote to elect a president. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dışişleri Bakanlığı) also declared that the required changes would 
be possible; the Constitutional Court issued an advisory opinion reflecting the same conclusion; 
and the Diyanet indicated that the information was unnecessary and did not have religious 
meaning (Yıldırım 2010b). The government moved forward with testing the pilot procedure for 
the new identity cards. Yet, if then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, who wields a disproportionate 
amount of power, viewed the ECtHR judgment as expected and that the changes could easily be 
made, why did the Işık case make it to the ECtHR? This seems to be indicative of the natural 
nudge that the judicialization of this issue at the ECtHR provided to garner domestic attention 
that had not been concretely acknowledged up to that point.  
Most significantly, the 2006 reforms and subsequent actions taken are also likely a result 
of Turkey’s efforts towards European Union harmonization (Secretariat General for EU Affairs 
2007). Certainly, the Işık domestic court rulings attracted attention. However, considering that 
this reform came prior to the ECtHR giving notice to the government of Işık’s application, which 
occurred in 2008, the government had clearly already been spurred to take action prior to the 
ECtHR’s judgment as European Union accession requirements demanded. It is worth recalling 
that Turkey had opened accession negotiations the previous year (2005) and was likely eager to 
prove its mettle as an EU candidate country.  
The fact that the ECtHR ruling was quite explicit could also partially explain the relative 
ease with which the changes occurred. In its rulings, the ECtHR generally adheres to and 
respects the principle of “margin of appreciation,” which is the acknowledgment that local 
officials are better equipped than the ECtHR to implement judgments within the context of that 
state’s norms, cultural customs, and governmental structure. The language in the Court’s 
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judgments reflects this principle. Except to order payment of just satisfaction, the ECtHR 
typically avoids specifying the measures that a government must take action upon to remedy a 
violation and prevent future infractions (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014, 214). 
Occasionally, though, the judgment will expressly outline what is expected of a state that is 
found to be in violation of an article of the ECHR. In the Işık case, the Court determined that 
individual and general measures were one and the same and that “the removal of the religion box 
could constitute an appropriate form of redress to put an end to the breach it has found” (Sinan 
Işık v. Turkey [Application No. 21924/05] 2010, §60). Thus, Turkey had a clear idea of what 
might be expected from the Committee of Ministers. As such, the Turkish government asserted 
in its April 2016 Action Plan that the legislative amendment that was in the process of 
implementation should serve as sufficient grounds on which to execute the judgment (Secretariat 
of the Committee of Ministers 2016). 
Additionally, an interview with Second Section ECtHR Judge Işıl Karakaş indicated that 
the government was afforded a very narrow margin of appreciation in this case (Karakaş 2017). 
Yet the government chose to retain the religious information on file while removing the 
information on the physical card itself. The government justified this action by claiming that they 
had other uses for that information. Critics assert that this version of the execution is not in line 
with the judgment. 
As mentioned in the ECtHR judgment, the problem with the Işık case also arose from the 
fact that a citizen applying for a new or amended ID card is required to submit the application in 
writing. The Court referenced case law (Folgero et al. v. Norway [Application No. 15472/02] 
2007, § 98; Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey [Application No. no. 1448/04] 2007, § 73) to 
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draw attention to the fact that, although domestic legislation and regulations do not acknowledge 
it, the mere fact of having to apply to change one’s religious affiliation with the civil registry 
could constitute a personal disclosure of religious beliefs (Sinan Işık v. Turkey [Application No. 
21924/05] 2010, §49). This point is all the more salient for religious groups that have a history of 
being victims of discrimination and violence—particularly in a country like Turkey where 
national identity was initially constructed on two elements: Sunni Islam and “Turkishness.” 
Various entities have intentionally solidified that national identity over time, sometimes at the 
expense of those who do not adhere to such identity claims. Sinan Işık identified with one such 
group—the Alevi. The discrimination that Işık faced was illustrated in the fact that the domestic 
courts denied the existence of Alevi as a separate faith category. 
Furthermore, up until the Alevi Revival in the 1980s, Alevi identity remained either non-
manifest, marginalized, or misunderstood. Disagreements amongst the Alevi about what the 
Turkish government’s ideal policy position should look like left them divided about their identity 
and with loose and ineffective networks through which to spur any sort of policy change in their 
favor. The Turkish government, particularly the Diyanet, has maintained a stance that Alevis are 
de facto Sunni Muslims and therefore do not deserve any rights recognition outside that 
paradigm. This has played out not only in court cases like Sinan Işık’s, where domestic courts 
stated that, based on their consultation with the Diyanet, that Alevi faith is an interpretation of 
Islam with specific cultural features (Sinan Işık v. Turkey [Application No. 21924/05] 2010, §9). 
The government has also used this argument to deny equal provision of public services to Alevi 
(İzzettin Doğan et al. v. Turkey [Application No. 62649/10] 2016; Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür 
Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey [Application No: 32093/10] 2014). The coordination between the 
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branches of government demonstrates once again how entrenched Turkish national identity is, 
and how the Alevi are located (constructed) outside of that context. Therefore, the issue of 
changing such an integral and affirmative component of Turkish national identity could be 
understood as an affront not only to the legitimacy of the state, but also to citizens themselves. 
The potential social backlash could have been a factor behind delays in the execution of this 
judgment; however, in comparison to other possible causes that seems to be a minor argument.  
With myriad governmental and political institutions involved, and the path dependence of 
such a long-lived system in place, one might presume that changes to the identity card would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to undertake. Furthermore, the fact that this particular case 
involved an individual applicant who identified with a group that has a long-standing history of 
discrimination and outright violence merely strengthens the argument for resistance to change in 
the ID card. However, the support of key actors in the most influential and involved institutions 
helped overcome potential friction and the historically solidified path dependence of the system. 
Additionally, one can look to the exogenous force of the European Union’s pressure to comply 
with the accession requirements of a candidate country. In doing so, Turkey very well may have 
been attempting to demonstrate to domestic and European audiences its legitimacy and 
commitment to human rights protections by following a “logic of appropriateness” (March and 
Olsen 2004) by behaving as an acceptable EU candidate and member of the COE.  
It was certainly the political impetus and the integration of political institutions that 
worked in the Alevis’ favor to achieve the changes required by the ECtHR ruling. Although it 
took time for the execution of the case to be realized, this could be attributed to the fact that the 
government had to undergo pilot testing of the project, which was a legitimate logistic constraint. 
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Additionally, because the government was already in the process of changing the system, the 
momentum to make the additional changes as required by the ECtHR judgment were 
conceivably expedited.  
The indication of one’s religion on the national ID card directly relates to the Turkish 
state’s negative obligation in terms of religious freedom, which entails the right not to practice or 
reveal one’s beliefs. In this situation, the negative obligation has affected all religious identities 
by being required to reveal one’s religion on a state document that is frequently seen by ordinary 
citizens and government actors alike. It is in and of itself a violation of the negative aspect of 
religious freedom. This violation is further exacerbated by non-Sunni citizens being forced to 
reveal religious identity for purposes of exemption from the mandatory religious education 
courses (discussed in the subsequent section). As such, the Işık case, filed by an Alevi citizen, is 
representative of a broader population of non-Sunni citizens that saw no domestic movement 
towards removing this requirement, and moved to have this issue heard in the ECtHR. The 
judicialization of this issue led the government to begin taking some of the necessary steps to 
remedy the problem. This punctuation was a significant change to a policy that had essentially 
been in place since even the Ottoman period, and could have even wider implications, disrupting 
the incredibly dense institutional structure surrounding the negative aspect of religious freedom.   
 In conclusion, the congruent opinions of a number of domestic institutions certainly 
contributed to this case’s progress toward full execution. Typically, institutional 
interconnectedness would hinder, or at least slow, any attempted changes on a policy issue. Yet 
in this case, the surprising consensus among political actors, the Diyanet, the courts, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Interior allowed substantial changes to the ID card to be 
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made. Additionally, it is indisputable that the explicit language of the ECtHR ruling, which 
viewed the general and individual measures as one in the same and provided specific instructions 
on suggested measures, and the fact that no other obligations were stated (just satisfaction or 
costs and expenses), made this a case that was comparatively easy for Turkey to execute. It 
remains to be seen how the implementation of the new ID card system will play out, particularly 
in light of the fact that two major issues of the Işık case remain unaddressed: the limited options 
available in selecting one’s “religion” and that public officials continue to have access to an 
individual’s religious identification, even if it is not revealed on the ID card itself. This issue is 
tied to the next section of this study, where the religion listed on one’s ID card dictates who is 
and who is not exempt from certain primary and secondary education courses.   
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6.5 Education 
Turkey’s system of education is for the most part nationally governed, as outlined in the 
constitution, national laws and regulations, and national institutions, namely the Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı (MEB, Ministry of National Education). Article 24 of the 1982 (current) Turkish 
Constitution affirms the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief, and conviction. It 
further ensures that there is no obligation to participate in religious rites, reveal one’s religious 
beliefs, or be blamed or accused due to religious convictions (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası 
1961). Article 24 also outlines the nature of the education and instruction of religion and ethics 
in Turkey, in that they are under state supervision and control; that such instruction is 
compulsory in primary and secondary schools; and other religious instruction of minors is at the 
discretion of their legal representatives. The framework is reiterated in Section 12 of the State 
Education Act, which states that “Secularism is the basis of Turkish state education. Religious 
culture and ethics shall be among the compulsory subjects taught in primary and upper secondary 
schools and in schools of an equivalent level” (Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu 1973).  
It was after the 1980 coup that the religious education courses became compulsory. The 
purpose was not necessarily to indoctrinate students in Islam, but rather as part of the “Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis” to tightly control the instruction students would receive on “proper” (Sunni) 
Islamic practices.76 The 1982 constitution thus made the religion and ethics courses mandatory in 
primary and secondary schools, whereas in previous years, these courses were elective. The 
                                               
 
76 See Chapter 3 for further information about the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the 1980 coup.  
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compulsory nature of the courses, the curriculum content and mandate (course content with an 
overtly Hanefi Sunni slant and no instruction in other religious beliefs and practices), and 
manner of instruction (outright indoctrination; forced memorization of Surahs of the Kuran; and 
demonstration of prayer practice) have been frequently questioned by students and parents alike. 
This changed in July 1990, after the Supreme Council for Education granted permission for 
Jewish and Christian students in primary and secondary schools to be exempt from the religious 
culture and ethics courses. Though granted permission for exemptions, the student and/or parents 
were forced to validate their faith through the indication of their religious identity on the national 
identity card.  
  In 2000, Minister of Education Metin Bostancıoğlu77 approved new guidelines for 
Religious Culture and Ethics classes, highlighting the importance of the principle of secularism 
and respect for freedom of religion, conscience, thought, and expression. At the same time, the 
course curriculum continued to place heavy emphasis on Sunni Islam, including education on the 
Koran and pilgrimage. The textbooks for elementary and middle school students included 
sections on Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. As it stands, the courses include 
two hours per week for students grades 4-8, and one hour per week for students grades 9-12 
(United States Department of State 2016).  
                                               
 
77 Prior to being National Minister of Education, Bostancıoğlu was a MP in Parliament for the Demokratik Sol 
Partisi (DSP, Democratic Left Party), a party that espouses the ideology of Atatürk, secularism, and social 
democracy.  
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The ECHR protects the right to education under Article 2 of Protocol 1: “No person shall 
be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions” (Council of 
Europe 1950). This assumes that parents can decide to exempt their child from religious 
education courses. As seen in the cases below, this has not been the case in Turkey. 
6.5.1 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey 
The case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey ([Application No. 1448/04] 2007) was brought 
before the ECtHR in 2004, when the applicants alleged an infringement of their rights under 
Article 2 Protocol 1 and Article 9 of the ECHR. Hasan Zengin initiated domestic action on 
behalf his daughter, Eylem Zengin, in 2001, when Eylem was a seventh-grade student at a state 
school in Istanbul. The Zengins are an Alevi family and submitted a request to the Provincial 
Directorate of National Education in the Istanbul Governor’s Office fort an exemption from the 
compulsory Religious Culture and Ethics course. Citing the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Zengin maintained that parents had the right to determine the nature of their children’s 
education and that these courses were incompatible with the principle of secularism. The 
Directorate responded that such an exemption would not be allowed, citing Article 24 of the 
Constitution and Article 12 of the State Education Act (Law No. 1739). Zengin applied to the 
Istanbul Administrative Court for judicial review, asserting that the Religious Culture and 
Education classes were heavily concentrated on Hanefi Sunni Islam and that no information was 
provided on Alevism. He also argued against the compulsory nature of the course. The 
Administrative Court dismissed the case, again citing the Constitution and the State Education 
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Act. Zengin appealed, relying this time on articles of the ECHR. In 2003, the case was dismissed 
by the Supreme Administrative Court, which upheld the first instance judgment. 
The Zengins applied to the ECtHR on January 2, 2004, maintaining that the content and 
methods of the compulsory Religious Culture and Ethics course violated their rights under the 
ECHR. They argued that the content and syllabi of the Religious Culture and Ethics courses were 
taught from a primarily Sunni perspective and ignored Alevism as a faith. The Court determined 
that the syllabus did not meet the objectives of pluralism and objectivity necessary when 
teaching religious education in a democratic society. Secondly, the Court considered that the 
exemption procedure involved a heavy burden of disclosing the religious or philosophical beliefs 
of the parents and the student. This was especially the case for students whose parents held 
beliefs other than Sunni Islam. As such, the Court ruled that there was a violation of Article 2 
Protocol 1. No separate questions arose under Article 9. The Court stated that the finding of a 
violation of Article 2 Protocol 1 constituted sufficient just satisfaction. According to the Court, 
bringing the educational system and domestic legislation in line with Article 2 Protocol 1 would 
serve as an appropriate form of compensation and would put an end to the violation. The General 
Measures stated in the case were not explicit but did include “bringing educational system and 
domestic legislation into conformity with Article 2 of Protocol 1.” However, one can infer from 
the judgment that the government must either make the Religious Culture and Ethics courses 
non-compulsory, alter the nature of the courses from indoctrination of a specific faith to a 
broader course in both theory and practice, or establish an appropriate exemption practice that 
does not make parents/children disclose their beliefs. Because Ms. Zengin was of college age and 
no longer attending a state secondary school when the decision was made, the court deemed that 
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no further individual measures were necessary. Forty-eight months passed from the application 
date to the final judgment. From the final judgment to the cutoff date of this study (July 15, 
2016), this case was under standard supervision of the CoM for 102 months. 
6.5.2 Mansur Yalçın et al. v. Turkey 
The case of Mansur Yalcın et al. v. Turkey ([Application No. 21163/11] 2014) is a repetitive case 
under the leading case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (above). The domestic case was 
launched by 14 citizens from Istanbul, including parents and former, current, and future students. 
In 2005, the applicants requested that the Ministry of Education engage in a consultation process 
with Alevi leaders to redesign the Religious Culture and Ethics courses to include information on 
Alevi culture and philosophy. Additionally, the applicants asked that teachers take a compulsory 
training course and that monitoring and supervisory mechanisms be established. The Religious 
Education Department of the Ministry of Education rejected the proposal and responded that, at 
the primary school level, the courses focused on teaching ethics and religious values common to 
society as a whole while at the secondary school level, the syllabus had a supra-denominational 
approach and included other understandings of Islam. The Department defended its inclusion of 
information on other interpretations of Islam, drawing attention to its 12th grade syllabus, which 
contained information on Alevi-Bektaşi culture, and noting that Alevi topics were included in the 
secondary school curriculum in the 2005/2006 academic year.  
 In response to this rejection, the 14 applicants and 1,905 other citizens took the case to 
the Ankara Administrative Court. They asserted that the courses were not objective or respectful 
of pluralism, citing case law and Articles 9 and 14 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. 
They supported their argument with reports by experts who had examined the textbooks. In 
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response, although the expert examination presented by the applicants had investigated the 
textbooks that were in place prior to the changes that had taken effect in March 2005, the Ankara 
Administrative Court gathered its own committee of experts to examine the post-reform 
curriculum. The new syllabus was reported to have a supra-denominational approach and 
included topics related to Alevism that were sourced from publications written by prominent 
Alevis. The report suggested that more information on Alevism be included and also indicated 
that the cemevi was not a place of worship, but rather a cultural gathering space.  
 The applicants retorted in 2009, arguing that cemevi are in fact houses of worship for 
Alevi and that the textbooks presented Alevism in a cultural light, as opposed to as a faith on its 
own. Later that year, the Ankara Administrative Court rejected the claims, again insisting that 
the textbooks presented a supra-denominational approach. The applicants filed an appeal on 
points of law in July 2010, which the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed, upholding the 
first instance judgment.  
 The original group of 14 Alevi citizens applied to the ECtHR in February 2, 2011 on the 
grounds that the Religious Culture and Ethics courses were a violation of their rights under 
Article 2 of Protocol 1, Article 9, and Article 14 of the ECHR. While the Court recognized that 
both the government and the applicants agreed that changes had been made to the mandatory 
course, both since the Zengin judgment and since the case in question had been lodged, it noted 
that the modifications did not significantly change the key elements of the syllabus. Additionally, 
although information on the Alevi faith had been added, the Court agreed with the applicants that 
the course content continued to be presented from a Sunni perspective, maintaining that Alevism 
is more of a cultural tradition instead of a faith in its own right. The Court also noted that the 
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courses have the potential to create a “conflict of allegiance” for the children between the 
instruction received at school and the values imparted by their parents.  
Moreover, the exemption process in and of itself created a problem in that if the 
compulsory course were indeed presented in a supra-denominational manner, there should be no 
need for exemption (which as it stands, is only permitted for Christian and Jewish students, thus 
requiring a disclosure of belief). On the other hand, a course that intends to teach Islam or any 
other specific religion, should not be mandatory and should respect parents’ philosophical 
convictions. For these reasons, the Court ruled on September 16, 2014 that Turkey was in 
violation of Article 2 of Protocol 1. Because the children of the applicants in this case had 
completed their secondary education at the time of the judgment, they did not file for just 
satisfaction and the court stated that there was no need for individual measures. The general 
measures were in accordance with the leading case of this group (i.e., Hasan and Eylem Zengin 
v. Turkey). The Turkish government applied for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber but 
the request was dismissed and the judgment became final. Forty-three months passed from the 
date of application to the date of judgment. From the time of referral to the Committee of 
Ministers to the cutoff date of this study, the case was under standard supervision for 17 months. 
Because this case is relatively recent, the short time in the CoM should not serve as an indicator 
of the ease of execution of the case. In fact, this is a repetitive case of a leading case that was 
decided three years prior to the application date of the Mansur Yalçın et al. v. Turkey case.  
6.5.3 Analysis 
During the period in which these cases were heard both domestically and at the ECtHR, there 
were essentially three political parties in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (parliament), and 
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a fourth party was able to exceed the 10 percent threshold in the July and November 2015 
elections.78 The AKP held a majority of seats throughout this period without the need to form a 
coalition government;79 and the CHP, the MHP, and the Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP, 
People’s Democratic Party), which finally managed to cross the threshold after years of running 
independent candidates. The party platforms have remained relatively consistent over the years, 
and because the final judgments by the ECtHR of these cases is fairly recent (the Zengin case in 
2008 and the Yalçın case in 2015), it is instructive to examine the most recent electoral platforms 
of each of the aforementioned parties.  
As a secularist party that has consistently espoused Atatürkist values, the CHP expressly 
maintained their goal of abolishing the mandatory nature of the courses, which would be 
considered execution of the relevant judgements in the CoM. However, the party does not seek 
to eliminate the courses entirely, instead stating: “We will bring these courses into a more 
pluralistic context and make them optional” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2015, 43).  
The MHP also indicated its dedication to pluralistic courses, with special attention paid to 
the Alevi matter: “An ‘Alevi Research Center of Turkey’ will be established to meet the needs of 
qualified educators and staff. … A ‘Specialization Commission’ will be established within the 
Ministry of National Education to ensure that the curriculum of the religious lessons will include 
objective and scientific information on the Alevi with their direct participation and input” 
                                               
 
78 Turkey uses the D’Hondt method in general elections, and its 10 percent threshold is the highest in the world.  
79 With the exception of the June 2015 election, where there was a hung parliament. Elections were held again in 
November 2015. 
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(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2015, 218). What is interesting about the MHP position is that they 
did not call for the elimination of the courses, but instead affirmed their high regard for 
secularism and insisted that the state’s provision of religious education would ensure national 
unity and integrity and eliminate certain types of prejudices (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2015, 
201).  
The HDP was more straightforward in its position on religious education courses, 
proclaiming: “The implementation of compulsory religion courses will be ended, and each 
student will have the right to choose courses and education based on their own beliefs. Civil 
religious education will be completely liberated” (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2015, 19). 
The governing party, the AKP, was the only party of the four that did not categorically 
mention the mandatory religious education courses. Instead, it reiterated the need to “ensure that 
our children are educated as conscious, well-educated, respectful and self-confident individuals 
with human and moral values” (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 2015, 80) and prided itself on the 
addition of new elective courses. “We have included optional lessons on the Life of the Prophet 
Muhammed, the Koran, and Basic Religious Information in the curriculum” (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi 2015, 63). Though these courses are electives, they are mandatory in imam hatip 
schools—parochial vocational schools funded by the government.  
 The issue is not only with religious public schools themselves, but also with the 
proliferation of such schools under the AKP. These schools were nearly all shuttered in the 
aftermath of the 1997 post-modern coup but have since grown exponentially. Some claim that 
this is retaliation for their elimination. Since the AKP has controlled the government, enrollment 
in state-funded imam hatip schools has increased 15-fold, from approximately 65,000 to almost 
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one million (Makovsky 2015, 5). Though there are no precise official figures to support this 
claim, 1,477 general high schools were phased out and converted to other types of schools in the 
2010-2011 and 2013-2014 academic years, many of which became imam hatip institutions 
(Makovsky 2015, 9). One of the most controversial educational reforms of the AKP period has 
been the transition from the elementary to secondary education system, which requires an exam 
to determine high school placement. The system has been heavily criticized for placing Christian 
and Jewish students in imam hatip schools. Alevi families have also expressed frustration with 
the placement system as they are forced to answer questions that they may not have taken classes 
in, nor are there any alternative questions not related to the religious education course that can 
act as substitutes (Gürcan 2015, 1).  
The 2014 reforms also included the purge of senior bureaucrats at the Ministry of 
National Education and the dismissal of more than 8,000 provincial and district administrators; 
however, in a case brought forward by an opposition teachers’ union, the Council of State 
(Danıştay) ruled that the dismissed administrators should be reinstated within 30 days 
(Çetingüleç 2015). The Danıştay, which has a history of defending the secular nature of 
education, also concluded in an 8th Section ruling that the Religious Culture and Ethics courses 
amounted to “religious education” (Hürriyet 2015). Still, the AKP pushed forward with its 
agenda of raising a “pious generation” (Radikal 2012) by permitting girls as young at 9 years old 
to wear the headscarf in the classroom (Daloğlu 2014) and the Ministry of National Education 
extending the mandatory Religious Culture and Ethics courses to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd grades of 
primary school (Oehring 2009b). 
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 The aforementioned reforms in education indicate that the AKP has the political will to 
make a number of changes to design the system as they see fit. Yet these reforms have done little 
to move the education system in line with ECtHR judgments; indeed, these reforms have pushed 
public education in precisely the opposite direction. The AKP’s strong hold on Parliament and 
the Ministry of National Education have facilitated the implementation of a slew of conservative 
initiatives. In spite of domestic judicial decisions to uphold the principle of secularism, the 
AKP’s reforms to the educational system have gone entirely contrary to ECtHR execution 
requirements. The most odious of these reforms is the Ministry of National Education’s General 
Directorate of Religious Education directive circulated to the governors’ offices that mandated 
that all students, with the exception of Christian and Jewish students, were required to enroll in 
the Religious Culture and Ethics courses—regardless if a religion other than “Islam” is listed on 
their ID card or if that section is blank (Koca 2015).80  
 As indicated in the above judgments, the recommended modifications addressed not only 
exemption from the compulsory course, but also the content of the curriculum. The content of 
the curriculum and textbooks in general courses have also contained defamatory or inaccurate 
information about other faiths. For example, the 8th grade textbook used in 2009 for a course on 
the “History of Turkish Republican Reforms and Atatürkism” stated that missionaries “try to 
fulfil their goals through the significant financial support of foreign powers, some non-
governmental organizations and from their own supporters...They are a threat to the national 
                                               
 
80 With the new electronic ID cards, where the “religion” box is not visible, the implementation of this directive is 
yet to be seen. See the Sinan Işık case. 
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unity and integrity of our state and nation” (Oehring 2009b). The inclusion of such disparaging 
content in state-run education further entrenches the public opinion regarding Turkey’s non-
Sunni citizens. This is evidenced in a 2010 survey published by the International Republican 
Institute in Washington, DC, in which 63 percent of respondents claimed that schools should 
provide more religious education to students (“International Republican Institute: Turkish Public 
Opinion Survey” 2010). Furthermore, though content on the Alevis was added to the curriculum 
for 7th-12th grades in 2011, some Alevis contended that the content was insufficient and 
sometimes simply incorrect. For example, information on Alevism was included in the section 
titled “Sufi Interpretations within Islam” (Gürcan 2015, 10). Textbooks for the 2014-2015 
academic year included cosmetic changes, continued to virtually ignore religious pluralism, and 
labeled Sunni (Hanefi) Islam as “our religion” (Gürcan 2015, 9-10). Additionally, in June 2016, 
Alevi organizations issued a statement protesting a Ministry of National Education memorandum 
mandating that teachers read and study a book that the Alevis said described their faith as 
“distorted” and “decayed” (Cumhuriyet 2016). Despite the Zengin and Yalçın rulings, Turkey 
continues to insist on the inherent domestic nature of this issue and prefers the widest margin of 
appreciation for implementation.  
 The cases included in this category were filed by Alevi citizens, and reflect how 
disproportionately they are impacted by the essentialized version of their identity, not only by 
society, but also by the government. This is manifest in the way that various government 
institutions (Ministry of National Education, the Diyanet, Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu [YÖK, 
Council of Higher Education], and the judiciary) determine and influence the narratives, ideas, 
and ideologies about the Alevi, which in turn shape “subjective mental constructs” that 
  
 
 
217 
determine perceptions and choices (North 1990). Through the construction of course curriculum 
that defines (and according to some Alevi, defiles) what it means to be Alevi, these institutions 
are imposing an externally essentialized identity upon the Alevi, which as seen above, is disputed 
by the Alevi themselves. By doing so, in turn, the government establishes and perpetuates 
institutions that intentionally marginalize and discriminate against the Alevi. As such, the Alevi 
presumably are left with no domestic alternative to attempt to resolve this inherent institutional 
discrimination and take their cases to courts such as the ECtHR. This is an indication of the 
increased judicialization of Alevi issues. When the rulings of the ECtHR are returned to 
domestic institutions for execution, the Alevi continue to face barriers to full implementation of 
these cases, due to the reasons enumerated herein. 
 Looking beyond the AKP’s agenda to explore other potential reasons why there has been 
so little movement to execute the ECtHR’s judgments on these cases, the language in the 
judgments is quite obvious. The Zengin judgment is clear in its expectations that the violation is 
rooted in a problem related to the syllabus and an inability to ensure respect for parents’ 
convictions. It is also clear that an appropriate form of compensation would be to change the 
education system and domestic legislation to ensure that no further violations occur. Turkey took 
no action and the Yalçın decision specifically referenced the structural problems evident in the 
Zengin case and noted that Turkey had yet to provide appropriate methods to ensure respect for 
parents’ convictions.  
NGOs are also permitted to submit information to the CoM on supervised cases, which 
can be instructive for both the CoM and the offending party. On August 12, 2013, the Turkish 
NGO Insan Hakları Ortak Platformu (Human Rights Joint Platform) submitted a communication 
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to the CoM with clear directions on how to ensure that the judgments in this group of cases was 
executed: 1) change the nature of the Religious Culture and Education courses from compulsory 
to optional; 2) modify the lessons from indoctrination of one specific religion to a culture lesson 
in both theory and practice; or 3) take measures to ensure that parents’ convictions are respected 
and that neither parents nor children are required to disclose their religious beliefs (Altınparmak 
2013, 4; Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers 2013). Not only have Alevi groups been 
directly organizing to exert pressure to make these changes, but other general human rights 
organizations have participated, as seen above.81  
 Turkey’s domestic judicial system has played an interesting role in relation to religious 
education. Since the founding of the Republic, the military has been heralded as the guardian of 
secularism. Following the coup in 1971, the military government amended the Constitution 
substantially, including diminishing the authority of the judiciary. These changes only 
exacerbated divisions within society, leading to yet another coup in 1980. The 1982 Constitution 
maintained the basic principles that Atatürk had instituted in the Republic’s early years; the 
principle of “secularism” retaining its prominent placement in Article 1. While the judiciary has 
retained its independence in writing, in reality, the principle of secularism reigns supreme. Thus, 
prior to the AKP’s election in 2007, the Constitutional Court closed a number of parties with a 
similar ideology for betraying the principle of secularism. Along with the military, the 
Constitutional Court has also seen itself as a defender of state secularism. Following the re-
                                               
 
81 The Alevi Düşünce Ocağı (Alevi Philosophy Center) also submitted two communications to the CoM regarding 
the Yalçın case. 
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election of the AKP in 2007, the 2010 referendum increased the number of Constitutional Court 
judges from 11 to 17 (three selected by Parliament; four directly appointed by the President from 
practicing judges, lawyers, and prosecutors; three selected by the President from nominations 
made by the Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu (YÖK, Council of Higher Education), three from 
nominations from the Court of Cassation, two from nominations from the Council of State, one 
from nominations of the Military Court of Cassation, and one from the High Military 
Administrative Court) (Özbüdün 2011, 193-194). On the surface, it is not clear that this would 
impact the Constitutional Court’s decisions, but the Court’s new composition circumscribes the 
role of Parliament in the appointment process by decreasing the number of members they are 
permitted to appoint, and leaving the President to select from individuals he has already 
appointed to political posts. For example, YÖK has 21 members, seven of which are appointed 
by the President. These 21 members constitute the pool from which the President then chooses 
three Constitutional Court judges.  
The effects of the 2010 referendum and the “new” make-up of the courts manifest in the 
Constitutional Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the 2012 Education Reform Law. This 
ruling reaffirmed the state’s interference in religious education and confirmed that offering more 
elective courses on Sunni Islam did not constitute a violation of secularism in a democratic 
country; rather, it is merely an expansion of services to believers of the majority religion. While 
one cannot categorically assert that the new composition of the Constitutional Court is a 
reflection of policy directives from the AKP leadership, there are definite parallels with this 
judgment and the AKP’s party platform. In spite of this apparent shift in the Constitutional 
Court, in a case brought forward by an atheist family, the Court of Cassation ruled that the 
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Religious Culture and Ethics Course was indeed “religious instruction” and cited the ECtHR’s 
judgment on the Yalçın case. 
Turkey’s membership/participation in other international organizations and platforms 
with a heavy focus on education and the role of religion therein provide, at a minimum, 
inspiration and more optimistically guidance on a pluralist and just education system, especially 
when issues of faith are involved. For example, along with Spain, Turkey co-founded the United 
Nation’s Alliance of Civilizations in 2005, which was established to bring “mutual respect 
among peoples of different cultural and religious identities…and embrace diversity” (“UNAOC: 
Who We Are” 2017). One of the top four priorities identified early on was education and the 
“Education about Religions and Beliefs” program includes a web-based portal for resources on 
education about religions and beliefs, a platform for research on religious education theory and 
practice, and a network to promote the positive role of religion and interfaith harmony 
(“UNAOC: Education about Religions and Beliefs” 2017). In spite of much fanfare surrounding 
Turkey’s early role in the Alliance of Civilizations, there has been seemingly little activity on 
Turkey’s part in recent years. Turkey is also a member of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In 2007, OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) gathered experts from member countries (Turkey included) in Toledo, Spain, to 
write the “Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching About Religions and Beliefs in Public 
Schools,” a comprehensive theoretical and practical overview on the intersection of human 
rights, religion, education, and the state (“Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching About 
Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools” 2007). Moreover, as mentioned throughout this 
analysis, Turkey’s EU accession process is complementary to its membership in the COE in that 
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the issues that arise in the ECtHR that Turkey fails to implement are often scrutinized in the 
European Commission’s annual progress reports. For example, in their two most recent reports, 
the Commission called on Turkey to amend and implement the necessary legal frameworks to 
comply with the judgements related to compulsory religious education courses (European 
Commission 2015, 63, 2016, 71). While the EU has no binding force on these rulings, the 
attention its opinions bring to the issue are certainly of consequence. However, the fallout 
between Turkey and the EU in recent years may have somewhat softened the influence that the 
EU has to bolster ECtHR judgments.  
 In conclusion, the government has indeed taken measures, even if cosmetic, to attempt to 
resolve the structural issues that non-Sunni students and their families face when applying for 
exemption from mandatory religious instruction courses. However, considering that the 
government has consulted only with groups that would seem to facilitate merely modest changes 
indicates that there is still resistance on the part of the government to fully restructure the 
courses. The sweeping reforms that have been made to the educational system in general over the 
last few years demonstrate that, when there is political will, drastic changes can be made. 
However, it seems that the secular Turkish citizenry exerts tacit political pressure on the 
government to maintain the system as it is, citing the need to reinforce Turkey’s secular system, 
particularly in education. In addition, Sunni citizens would see no need to radically alter the 
course content as it generally adheres to a Sunni perspective. 
 Furthermore, the obligations laid out in the judgment were expressly made: bring the 
educational system and domestic legislation in line with the ECHR. There were no other 
requirements in terms of just satisfaction or costs and expenses. As such, complying with the 
  
 
 
222 
terms of the obligations should be relatively straightforward. Yet the domestic institutional 
structure that this issue is entangled with is quite complicated and complex. Reforms to this 
specific issue would require legislative changes and the issuance of regulations so that reforms 
would be applied universally and not left to municipal authorities. Additionally, the execution of 
other cases that have come before the ECtHR, namely Sinan Işık v. Turkey ([Application No. 
21924/05] 2010), would potentially facilitate the execution of this set of cases. Should Turkey 
make structural changes to what information is maintained in the national ID database and how 
that information is used, there could conceivably be movement on how exemptions from the 
religious courses are determined. Since it seems unlikely that the course will not be removed in 
the near future, Turkey, which has been given a wide margin of appreciation in these cases, must 
fashion a solution that respects parents’ and children’s rights to determine the type of education 
they receive.  
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6.6 Conscientious Objector 
The Turkish Armed Services have a long-held reputation as the guardian of secularism in 
Turkey. According to Global Firepower, Turkey has the 8th strongest military of 133 countries 
surveyed, boasting 743,415 total military personnel (382,850 active personnel), and a defense 
budget of over $8.2 billion USD (Global Firepower 2017). After the US military, Turkey has the 
second largest armed forces in NATO. While the military has played a prominent role in politics 
in the past, conducting military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, a “soft coup” in 1997, and an 
attempted coup in 2016, the AKP government has aimed to reduce the role of the military in 
political life, reasserting civilian control over the military and reducing the role of the armed 
forces in internal security (United States Central Intelligence Agency 2017). The military still 
considers fundamentalism, separatism, and extreme leftism as domestic threats (United States 
Central Intelligence Agency 2017).  
 Compulsory conscription has been in place in Turkey since the founding of the Republic. 
Article 72 of the Turkish Constitution states: “National service is the right and duty of every 
Turk. The manner in which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in 
the armed forces or in public service, shall be regulated by law” (Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey 1982). Law No. 1111 (Law on Military Service), Article 1, regulates this: “Every man 
who is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is obliged to perform military service in accordance 
with this law” (Askerlik Kanunu 1927). Twelve months of military service in Turkey is 
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compulsory for male citizens aged 20 to 41 years.82 The Military Criminal Code states that 
recruited citizens must report once called for service or be held criminally responsible for 
disobeying orders and desertion (Askerlik Kanunu 1927, Article 63).  
There is no article that provides parameters for conscientious objection. In fact, Article 
45 of the Military Criminal Code explicitly states that one’s conscience or religious beliefs do 
not exempt a conscript from punishment (Askeri Ceza Kanunu 1930). There are exemptions, 
reductions, deferments, and options to “buy out” of one’s service based on criteria such as 
mental or physical fitness, residence abroad, enrollment in higher education, or loss of a brother 
serving in the military. Yet there remains no provision that accommodates individuals who claim 
to be conscientious objectors. Thus conscientious objectors are considered draft evaders and, 
because of their repeated failure to report for duty, are considered to have repeatedly disobeyed 
orders and are subject to criminal prosecution. The scope of punishment for draft evasion and 
desertion (or aiding and abetting such) are described in Articles 63-81of the Military Criminal 
Code (Askeri Ceza Kanunu 1930) and vary in severity from fines to extensive prison sentences. 
Turkey is the only member of the Council of Europe that does not recognize conscientious 
objection to military service. The number of conscientious objectors in Turkey is unknown and 
up-to-date statistics are difficult to find.  
 Conscientious objectors face penalties beyond the charges brought against them by the 
military. The Ministry of Defense, since 2016, has been issuing directives to employers in the 
                                               
 
82 Women, therefore, are exempt. The conscription term was 15 months prior to January 1, 2014, when the period 
was reduced.  
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private sector to guarantee that evaders report for duty (Vicdani Ret Derneği [Association for 
Conscientious Objection] 2017). Because these directives are based on Article 93 of the Military 
Law and Article 75 of the Military Criminal Law, employers are legally permitted to “rightfully 
terminate” any employee who does not comply with the call for conscription (Vicdani Ret 
Derneği 2017). As well, according to Article 48/5 of the Law on Civil Servants, those who have 
not carried out their military service are prohibited from working in the public sector. Finally, 
conscientious objectors cannot re-register in the social security system, effectively preventing 
access to public health care and retirement funds (Vicdani Ret Derneği 2017). These de facto 
punishments result in what the ECtHR labeled “civil death,” as described in the Ülke judgment 
below, in that conscientious objectors are excessively punished for exercising their right to 
practice and carry out their sincerely held beliefs.  
 In the context of cases that have come before the ECtHR, the case law of the Court has 
established that principled opposition to military service, as decided in (Bayatan v. Armenia 
[Application No. 23459/03] 2011), is included among the protected coherent and sincerely-held 
philosophical convictions. Two cases included in this study (Savda v. Turkey and Tarhan v. 
Turkey) are the earliest cases in the Court to establish that pacifism is among the convictions that 
are protected under Article 9.  
6.6.1 Ülke v. Turkey 
The case of Ülke v. Turkey originated in an application to the ECtHR on January 22, 1997 
([Application No: 39437/98] 2006). Mr. Osman Murat Ülke had lived in Germany until he was 
15, at which point he returned to Turkey to continue his high school education and go to 
university. He became an active member of Savaş Karşıtları Derneği (Association of Opponents 
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of War) in 1993, but the association was dissolved later that year. He then went on to serve as the 
chairman of the İzmir Savaş Karşıtları Derneği (İzmir Association of Opponents of War) from 
1994 to 1998. In August 1995, he was called to perform the requisite military service but refused 
to comply and publicly burned his call-up papers, citing his pacifist convictions. He was arrested 
in October 1996, and indicted by the military prosecutor at the Ankara Military Court of General 
Staff under Article 155 of the Criminal Code and Article 58 of the Military Penal Code. He was 
sentenced in January 1997 to a six-month prison sentence and a fine. From his first arrest in 1996 
to his last conviction in 1998, Ülke was imprisoned a total of eight times and served a total of 
701 days for both his overt conscientious objection grounds and for “persistent disobedience” 
and refusing to wear the Turkish military uniform. At the time the case was filed with the 
ECtHR, he was wanted by security forces for the execution of his sentence and was in hiding.  
 The case law for the scope of Article 3 is based significantly on the Ireland v. United 
Kingdom case ([Application No: 5310/71] 1978/2018) and the Peers v. Greece case 
([Application No: 28524/95] 2001), which have stated that ill-treatment must attain a minimum 
level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3, depending on the circumstances of 
the case, such as the duration of treatment and its physical or mental effects. Treatment is 
considered to be “inhuman” within the scope of Article 3 if the punishment was premeditated, 
applied over a long period of time, and caused intense physical or mental suffering. Under 
Article 3, punishment is “degrading” if the objective is to humiliate and debase the individual 
and “adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3” As such, 
the Court ruled that there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention and that it was not 
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necessary to examine the applicant’s other complaints under Articles 5, 8, and 9 separately.83 
Ülke was awarded €1000 for costs incurred for legal fees. Furthermore, Turkey was required to 
pay €10,000 for non-pecuniary damages. The remainder of the claim was dismissed for just 
satisfaction. The case spent a total of 108 months in the Court from the submission of the 
application to the date of judgment. From the date of the final judgment to July 15, 2016, the 
case had spent 123 months pending under enhanced supervision in the CoM.  
 The CoM adopted an initial Interim Resolution in October 2007 (1007th meeting) that 
urged “the Turkish authorities to take without further delay all necessary measures to put an end 
to the violation of the applicant’s rights under the Convention and to adopt rapidly the legislative 
reform necessary to prevent similar violations of the Convention.” Seeing that the government 
had not taken any concrete steps to rectify the situation, the CoM issued another Interim 
Resolution (CM/ResDH(2009)45) on March 19, 2009, reiterating Turkey’s obligations under 
Article 46 of the Convention to adopt individual measures to end the violations and actions to 
prevent similar violations in the future. The Court included the prevention of future violations 
because Ülke was still in hiding at the time and was wanted by security forces to serve his 
sentence. 
 In a communication to the CoM on September 6, 2012, the Turkish government relayed 
that Ülke could “fully exercise his civic rights without any hindrance” since the warrant for his 
arrest had been lifted by the Eskişehir Military Court on June 4 of that year and guaranteed that 
                                               
 
83 This was the only case in this category that was not ruled to include an Article 9 violation.  
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his name would be removed from police and gendarmerie records. The CoM did not view these 
steps as sufficient to guarantee Ülke’s rights and prevent further prosecution or conviction and 
urged the Turkish government to take appropriate legislative action to remedy the situation. The 
most recent communication from the applicant’s representative to the CoM dates from March 6, 
2015 (DH-DD(2015)320) and indicates that there had been no developments regarding these 
“necessary legislative measures with a view to preventing prosecutions and conviction of 
conscientious objectors” and that Ülke still faced “victim” and “potential victim” status. The 
communication further claimed that the ECtHR ruling, as well as the CoM’s interim resolutions 
and decisions, had not impacted the government’s attitude “despite the assurances of the 
Government on paper to the CoM and the applicant.” There was no information available as to 
whether the non-pecuniary damage award or costs and expenses had been disbursed to the 
applicant. The case remains pending in the CoM under enhanced supervision and await concrete 
assurances from the Turkish government that general measures have been taken to ensure that 
similar structural issues will not arise in the Turkish courts as they relate to conscientious 
objection. It is the leading case for the remaining five repetitive cases in this set.84 
                                               
 
84 There is one other repetitive case included under the Ülke v. Turkey set of cases, that of Enver Aydemir (Enver 
Aydemir v Turkey 2016), who was the first Muslim conscientious objector in Turkey. The Court ruled that there had 
indeed been a violation of Article 3 (inhuman treatment); however, the Court also ruled that there was no violation 
of Article 9 in that the applicant’s objection arose from a political stance, not a religious one, based on his rejection 
of “secularism.” 
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6.6.2 Erçep v. Turkey 
The case of Erçep v. Turkey ([Application No: 43965/04] 2011) originated in an application to 
the ECtHR on October 6, 2004 by Yunus Erçep, a Turkish citizen who was baptized as a 
Jehovah’s Witness in 1982 when he was 13 years old. Citing his knowledge of the Bible and his 
faith, he refused to perform his military service as required by Section 1 of the 1927 Military 
Act. 
 The applicant reported to the military recruitment office in Şişli (Istanbul) in 1997 and 
was called to duty in 1998. He returned to the military recruitment office in March 1998, stating 
that he could not present himself at the recruitment site in Rize. He voluntarily surrendered and 
the military judge at the Trabzon command office decided that there was no need to prosecute 
and the applicant paid 35,000 TL. Since March 1998, Erçep has failed to report for duty after 
approximately 15 call-ups and more than 25 cases have been filed against him. He has been 
sentenced to prison and fined. At the time of the ECtHR court hearing, the applicant faced 
additional criminal proceedings because of repeated refusal to perform military service.  
 Relying on its recent Grand Chamber judgment in Bayatan v. Armenia ([Application No. 
23459/03] 2011), the Court recognized that Article 9 did not explicitly refer to conscientious 
objection. However, it did note that objecting to military service due to a sincere and 
insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve and one’s conscience constituted a 
conviction or belief that is protected under Article 9. Therefore, the Court ruled that there had 
been a violation of Article 9 because Erçep had been convicted multiple time due to his beliefs 
under circumstances in which there was no alternative civilian service. Furthermore, due to the 
fact that Mr. Erçep was tried before a court of military officers at a time when he had not yet 
  
 
 
230 
reported for duty with a regiment,85 the Court determined that his concerns about the 
independence and impartiality of the court were legitimate and, as such, ruled that there had also 
been a violation of Article 6. The applicant was awarded €10,000 in non-pecuniary damages and 
€5,000 for costs and expenses. The remainder of the claim was dismissed for just satisfaction. 
The case was in the Court for 86 months until the ruling, and has been in the CoM for 53 months. 
It remains under enhanced supervision as part of the Ülke group of cases.  
In a communication to the CoM on May 7, 2015 (DH-DD(2015)627), the Turkish 
government indicated that Erçep was a candidate for appointment as a reserve officer and was 
summoned to military service in February 2015. The government also noted that the applicant 
did not face prosecution under military jurisdiction. Furthermore, he was acquitted of the charges 
that had been brought against him at the 3rd Chamber of the Rize Criminal Court of General 
Jurisdiction. Erçep is still under the obligation to pay an administrative fine for draft evasion. 
There was no information available as to whether the non-pecuniary damages or costs and 
expenses had been awarded to the applicant. 
6.6.3 Feti Demirtaş v. Turkey 
Feti Demirtaş is a Jehovah’s Witness who refused to perform his military service and was 
forcibly conscripted in 2005. He joined the regiment but refused to wear his uniform. 
Consequently, nine sets of criminal proceedings were brought against him before the Air Force 
                                               
 
85 The Jurisdiction Disputes Court ruled on October 13, 2008 that an individual is considered part of the Turkish 
Armed Forces only after reporting for duty. On October 6, 2006, the Turkish Parliament passed a law that military 
courts no longer held jurisdiction to try civilians.  
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Command Tribunal. The tribunal imposed several custodial sentences on Mr. Demirtaş who, 
while in custody and in pre-trial detention, was subject to poor treatment and threatened by 
prison officers. He was eventually demobilized and sent home.  
 The case of Feti Demirtaş v. Turkey was lodged with the ECtHR on January 26, 2007 
(Feti Demirtaş v. Turkey [Application No: 5260/07] 2012). The Court ruled that Mr. Demirtaş 
had experienced inhuman and degrading treatment while in custody and, therefore, that there had 
been a violation of Article 3. Furthermore, the applicant had objected to serving in the military 
for reasons motivated by his genuinely held religious beliefs, which were in serious and 
insurmountable conflict with his obligation to perform military service. Because there was no 
alternative civilian service available, and because of the penalties that had been imposed on him, 
among other reasons, the court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 9. Additionally, 
because the applicant had been forcibly conscripted and had at no point accepted military status 
during the conscription process, the applicant should have been apprehensive about being tried 
by judges affiliated with the armed forces since they could be considered a party to the 
proceedings. As such, the Court ruled that there had also been a violation of Article 6. The court 
awarded €15,000 for non-pecuniary damages and €5,000 in costs. The case spent 60 months in 
the Court awaiting a ruling and 51 months in the CoM, where it remains under enhanced 
supervision as part of the Ülke group of cases. 
 In a communication from the Turkish government to the CoM on May 7, 2015 (DH-
DD(2015)627), the government indicated that Demirtaş had been discharged from the military 
on February 23, 2007 on the grounds that he was medically unfit for service. The applicant’s 
criminal case for persistently disobeying orders is still pending before the İzmir Air Force 
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Command Tribunal. There are no investigations or prosecutions against him under military 
jurisdiction, nor does the applicant have any arrest warrants in his name. There was no 
information available on the payment of the non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses the 
Court had awarded to the applicant. 
6.6.4 Buldu et al. v. Turkey 
The case of Buldu et al. v. Turkey originated in an application to the ECtHR by four Turkish 
citizens: Çağlar Buldu, Barış Görmez, Ersin Ölgün, and Nevzat Umdu, on March 17, 2008 
(Buldu et al. v. Turkey [Application No: 14017/08] 2014). The citizens are Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
The four applicants applied jointly because the circumstances of their conscientious objection to 
Turkey’s mandatory military service were similar.  
 Buldu’s case began domestically after he had repeatedly informed the military authorities 
of his refusal to perform his military service due to his religious convictions. He was notified on 
November 25, 2004 that there was no exemption from compulsory military service. The 
applicant refused to sign enlistment documents on at least three occasions and was arrested on 
the grounds of disobedience on multiple occasions. On February 9, 2006, the Military Court of 
the General Command of the Gendarmerie of Ankara joined the actions brought against Buldu, 
at which point another charge was brought against him and he was sentenced to five months in 
prison. This decision which was upheld by the Military Court of Cassation. The previous charges 
of disobedience were also heard by the Military Court of the General Command of the 
Gendarmerie; the applicant was declared guilty of persistent disobedience and was sentenced to 
seven months and fifteen days in prison. He was “demobilized” on March 2008. Additionally, 
the Military Court of the General Command of the Gendarmerie of Ankara ruled the applicant 
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guilty of three other acts of disobedience and sentenced him to another seven months and fifteen 
days; however, the Court decided to stay the judgment. Throughout the period of 2004 to the 
filing of the application with the ECtHR, Buldu was repeatedly placed in pre-trial detention. He 
had also filed a complaint of inhuman treatment while being held in Mamak military prison, but 
the General Command of Ankara rejected this complaint.  
 The second applicant of this case, Barış Görmez, informed the military authorities as 
early as February 16, 2006 of his refusal to participate in compulsory military service on the 
grounds of his faith and requested alternative civilian service. His request was denied and he was 
informed that he could be considered a deserter. On October 22, 2007, he was arrested by the 
gendarmerie and placed in pre-trial detention at the Maslak Military Detention House until 
November 3, 2007. On several occasions, he was taken to his regiment, but he refused to wear 
the military uniform. On August 27, 2009, Görmez was sentenced to five months and five days 
in prison for two acts of refusal. His appeals were dismissed. On November 19, 2009, he was 
again convicted in military court for two other instances of refusal and was sentenced to seven 
months and fifteen days for each charge. A number of criminal proceedings were filed against 
Görmez and he was subjected to penalties involving deprivation of liberty for his persistent 
disobedience. He was also repeatedly detained or placed in pre-trial detention and subjected to 
medical examinations to determine his fitness for military service. The applicant complained of 
poor treatment while held at the Maslak Military Detention Center, alleging that the individuals 
detaining him mistreated and threatened him. On April 30, 2008, the Hasdal Military Prosecutor 
in Istanbul issued a decision of incompetence regarding the applicant.  
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 The third applicant, Mr. Ersin Ölgün, repeatedly informed military authorities of his 
refusal to perform the compulsory military service on the basis of his religious beliefs. He 
requested an alternative civilian service and was informed it was not available. He was charged 
with two acts of non-compliance with a draft call in the military court and was sentenced to 
custodial sentences. This was commuted to a fine of 2000 TL, which he appealed. After Act No. 
5530 entered into force on October 5, 2006, the Military Court of Cassation transmitted his files 
to the judicial authorities. The applicant was sentenced to the same custodial sentences, which 
were again commuted to a single fine of 2000 TL. On February 1, 2010, the Pendik Criminal 
Court sentenced the applicant to three months and ten days in prison, but stayed the judgment. 
Görmez potentially faces new criminal proceedings due to his refusal to carry out the mandatory 
military service.  
 Nevzat Umdu, the fourth applicant in this case, repeatedly informed military authorities 
of his refusal to perform the compulsory military service due to his religious beliefs and 
requested civilian service, which he was denied. Criminal proceedings against Umdu for non-
compliance began in a military criminal court and he was sentenced to two months and fifteen 
days in prison. This was commuted to a 1,113 TL fine. After the adoption of Act No. 5530, 
which became effective on October 5, 2006, the applicant’s case was transferred to “courts of 
judicial order.” On November 1, 2006, the Gaziantep Military Court determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction and the case was transferred to the Hatay Criminal Court. Umdu was fined in 
the Hatay Criminal Court; the judgment was not subject to appeal on points of law. Meanwhile, 
the applicant was declared unfit for military service due to obesity.  
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 In its judgements, the ECtHR noted that military conscription is mandatory in Turkey but 
that there are no alternative civilian service options available, which leaves conscientious 
objectors with no other choice than to refuse enrollment. Thus, the ECtHR ruled that there had 
been a violation of Article 3 for all applicant parties in this case. The Court, again referencing its 
judgments in Bayatan v. Armenia ([Application No. 23459/03] 2011), Feti Demirtaş v. Turkey, 
([Application No: 5260/07] 2012), and Erçep v. Turkey ([Application No. 43965/04] 2011), 
determined that there had been a violation of Article 9 in all cases because the applicants, as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, held religious convictions that were in “serious and insurmountable 
conflict” with the performance of military service. The Court also determined that there was a 
violation of Article 6(1) in the Görmez case. Similar to the Erçep, Savda, and Demirtaş cases, 
Görmez expressed doubts concerning the “independence and impartiality” of the military court 
where he was tried since the military could be seen as a party to the proceedings. His assertion of 
conscientious objection, forced conscription, and subsequent trial in a military court, as opposed 
to a civilian court, further supported Görmez’s argument. The Court awarded each applicant the 
following sums for non-pecuniary damages: Buldu: €12,000; Görmez: €15,000; Ölgün: €7,000; 
and Umdu: €5,000. The Court also awarded the following sums for costs and expenses: Buldu: 
€5,000; Görmez: €5,000; Ölgün: €5,000; and Umdu: €3,650. The case was in the Court for 75 
months and in the CoM for 22 months from the final judgment to July 15, 2016. There was no 
information available as to whether the non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses have 
been disbursed to the applicants. The case is still pending under enhanced supervision as part of 
the Ülke group of cases.  
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6.6.5 Tarhan v. Turkey 
The case of Tarhan v. Turkey ([Application No: 9078/06] 2012) originated in an application to 
the ECtHR on February 16, 2006. Tarhan claimed that violence is a crime against humanity and 
that his objection to military service is motivated by his sincerely held pacifist convictions.  
 In 2001, Tarhan declared his refusal to carry out mandatory military service. In 2005, he 
was arrested in İzmir and taken to his regiment in Tokat, where he again declared his position as 
a conscientious objector and refused to wear a military uniform. The applicant was sentenced to 
four years imprisonment by the Sivas Military Criminal Court in 2005. However, the Military 
Court of Cassation reversed the judgment because the court had not requested a physical 
examination of the applicant to determine if he was gay, as he claimed.86 The applicant refused 
the examination, arguing that it was against the Turkish Constitution and the ECHR, and the 
examination was not conducted. The applicant was held in pre-trial detention for more than ten 
months while criminal proceedings against him took place. He was subjected to disciplinary 
penalties for refusal to have his hair and beard cut. In the end, both were forcibly cut by seven 
soldiers and the applicant was bruised and scratched and suffered pain as a result. The same day, 
he began a 28-day hunger strike. He deserted in 2006 and the police immediately started a search 
for him. He faces new criminal charges for repeated refusal to perform the compulsory military 
service and will likely be sentenced again.  
                                               
 
86 Homosexuality is grounds for dismissal from the Turkish military. 
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 When he brought the case to the ECtHR, the Court held that there had been a violation of 
Article 3, due to the fact that there was no alternative civilian service available for conscientious 
objectors and considering that Tarhan’s situation that faced was tantamount to “suppression of 
the applicant’s intellectual personality.” The Court used the case law of Ülke (the leading case of 
this set) to reaffirm that Tarhan’s treatment while in detention was tantamount to serious pain 
and suffering, “which went beyond the usual humiliation inherent in a criminal conviction or 
detention.” The Court also ruled that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. 
Although Tarhan did not invoke religious conviction as grounds for conscientious objection, he 
does claim to adhere to a pacifist and anti-militarist philosophy, which is included in the scope of 
Article 9 (as established in Bayatan v. Armenia [Application No. 23459/03] 2011). 
 The Court awarded the applicant €10,000 in non-pecuniary damages and €2,300 in costs 
and expenses. The case spent 78 months in the Court and 45 months in the CoM from the 
judgment to July 15, 2016. It remains under enhanced supervision as part of the Ülke group of 
cases. There was no information available about whether non-pecuniary damages or costs and 
expenses were disbursed to the applicant.  
 Interestingly, a communication from the Vicdani Ret Derneği (Association for 
Conscientious Objectors) to the CoM dated March 6, 2015 (Secretariat of the Committee of 
Ministers 2015) indicated that in spite of the ECtHR judgment, Tarhan was convicted by the 
Sivas Military Court for “failing to obey orders” and was given a sentence of 15 months in 
prison, which was converted into a ₺9000 TRY fine. The domestic military court’s ruling could 
allow Tarhan to apply to the ECtHR once again. 
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6.6.6 Savda v. Turkey 
Savda v. Turkey was originally brought to the ECtHR on November 11, 2005 ([Application No: 
42730/05] 2012). Halil Savda was enlisted in the Turkish military in 2004, at which point he 
declared himself a conscientious objector and refused to perform his military service. He was an 
active member of the anti-militarist movement in Turkey, and is the owner of the “War 
Resisters” website (www.savaskarsitlari.org) that is associated with War Resisters International, 
an organization that supports non-violent protest against war and aids those who refuse to 
participate in war. 
 The applicant had served a prison sentence in 1995 for supporting the Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê (PKK, Kurdistan Worker’s Party), which is considered a terrorist organization in 
Turkey. Savda was called to serve in 1996, but deserted. He was imprisoned again in 1997 for 
aiding the PKK.87 He was released from Gaziantep Prison, tried again, and held for six days 
before being questioned. He was taken to his regiment, where he refused to wear the military 
uniform, claiming conscientious objection. He also cited his objection to the operation that 
occurred in his village in 1993, during which he was violently tortured in the military barracks. 
Criminal charges were brought against him. He was detained and released numerous times for 
desertion and finally taken to court for his actions. Savda challenged the impartiality and 
independence of the Military Court. By 2008, after another cycle of desertion, arrest, and 
                                               
 
87 This case is complicated by Savda’s convictions for affiliation with a domestically recognized terrorist 
organization, the PKK. While there is no formal system in place in Turkey to determine individual claims of 
conscientious objection, Savda had been twice imprisoned for terrorist connections prior to his sentencing in relation 
to conscientious objection. 
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detention, he was transferred to the Çorlu Military Hospital. There, he was diagnosed with 
“antisocial personality disorder” and deemed unfit for military service.  
 Following case law, and particularly Ülke v. Turkey ([Application No: 39437/98] 2006), 
the ECtHR determined that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention due to the 
serious and repetitive nature of the ill treatment Savda received and the pain and suffering 
inflicted upon him that went beyond the bounds of inherent humiliation. Additionally, relying on 
its case law in Bayatan v. Armenia ([Application No. 23459/03] 2011) and Erçep v. Turkey 
(2011), the Court determined that Turkey lacked a procedure for examining applicants who 
declared themselves to be conscientious objectors. This, the Court declared, presented an 
insurmountable conflict between Savda’s obligation to perform his military service and his 
sincere and profound convictions as a pacifist/anti-militarist. Moreover, there is no alternative 
civilian service available for conscientious objectors, preventing a balance between the interest 
of society and that of the objector him/herself. This affirmed the Court’s decision to declare an 
Article 9 violation. Furthermore, because the Court recognized that the applicant would 
legitimately doubt the independence and impartiality of a military court in which he would be 
tried as a conscientious objector, it was established that there had also been a violation of Article 
6(1) of the Convention.  
 The Court awarded Savda €12,000 in non-pecuniary damages and €1,975 in costs and 
expenses. The case spent 80 months in court from the application to the judgment, and 46 
months in the CoM from the final judgment to July 15, 2016. The case is still pending under 
enhanced supervision as part of the Ülke group of cases. The most recent communication from 
the Turkish government to the CoM indicated that Savda was no longer required to perform his 
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military service due to the 2008 medical report that indicated he was suffering from anti-social 
behavior and was not fit to perform his service. The communication also indicated that Savda 
had no arrest warrant or pending investigations against him.  
6.6.7 Analysis 
One of the greatest obstacles to rectifying the situation of conscientious objectors in Turkey is 
political. The current government has, on numerous occasions, reiterated that it has no intention 
of amending legislation to comply with its obligations under the ECHR. While there has been 
action taken in individual cases to remove charges, acquit defendants, eliminate search warrants, 
or annul fines, no concrete steps have been taken to change legislation to permit conscientious 
objection or implement an alternative civilian service. As part of the general measures, Turkey 
has followed through with translating and the ECtHR cases into Turkish and publishing them on 
the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Justice website (Secretariat of the Committee 
of Ministers 2012). The government also reports that it worked on the two-year COE project 
titled “Human Rights Training of Military Judges and Prosecutors,” which aims to “improve the 
knowledge and implementation capacity of military judges and prosecutors and legal 
counsellors” at the Ministry of National Defense. However, the most blatant correction as a part 
of the general measures required—establishing a provision for conscientious objection to 
military service—has seen no attention.  
As early as 2008, Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP, Democratic Society Party) MP Akın 
Birdal and 23 other DTP MPs drafted a proposal to allow conscientious objectors to be exempt 
from military service, but the bill received no attention from the rest of Parliament (cnnturk.com 
2008). In 2011, a bill related to conscientious objection was introduced by opposition MP and 
  
 
 
241 
member of the Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party), Sebahat Tuncel. 
The bill “disappeared without a trace” and responses from the Ministries of Defense and Justice 
to another proposal by Tuncel indicated that conscientious objection was linked to the 
“establishment of a professional army,” which was not on the agenda (European Bureau for 
Conscientious Objection 2014, 25). In November 2011, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin claimed 
that the Defense Ministry was working on a legal regulation on conscientious objection, just as 
that Defense Ministry had claimed after the Ülke judgment was released in June 2008 (Yıldırım 
2012). However, on the day of the Erçep judgment was released, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan 
spoke dismissively of the verdict, declaring that the issue of conscientious objection had never 
been on the government’s agenda and reiterating his praise for obligatory conscription (Hürriyet 
2011). 
The CHP and BDP presented statements at a parliamentary constitutional reconciliation 
commission meeting in 2012, calling for conscientious objection to be protected in the new 
constitution. The AKP proposal, however, did not include such a provision; as the party argued, 
the right to freedom of religion and conscience should not apply to cases of conscientious 
objection (Yıldırım 2012). The Diyanet backed this argument following a query from the Milli 
Gazete (newspaper) to the “Fatwa Line” of the Diyanet. The newspaper asked, “Is there a right to 
conscientious objection in Islam?” within the context of someone exercising their religious 
beliefs. The Diyanet responded that it is not permissible to abandon one’s responsibility to serve 
and that, if “everyone had the right to conscientious objection, who would defend the state?” 
(Milli Gazete 2012).  
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Turkey’s domestic courts have tried a number of conscientious objector cases but, 
because of the inconsistent and occasionally unreliable rulings in the courts of first instance and, 
moreover, due to the fact that there is no law pertaining to conscientious objection, the 
Constitutional Court inevitably hears these cases. The Vicdani Ret Derneği reported that, as of 
February 2017, there were at least six cases pending before the Constitutional Court by 
applicants who had been fined or had arrest warrants issued against them for their claims of 
conscientious objection. These cases had yet to be concluded (Vicdani Ret Derneği 2017). This is 
likely a result of any legislative action on behalf of Parliament to write legislation or make 
amendments in this regard. 
In this sense, the ECtHR and the CoM have been very clear: Turkey must correct its 
legislation to prevent further cases from coming before the ECtHR. The judgments have been 
explicit about the individual and general measures that are to be taken. The judgments vaguely 
declare that the “legal framework is evidently not sufficient to provide an appropriate means of 
dealing with situations arising from the refusal to perform military service on account of one’s 
beliefs” (Ülke v. Turkey [Application No: 39437/98] 2006 and subsequent). It is interesting to 
note, though, that the Ülke case was not ruled to have been a violation of Article 9, but only 
Article 3, and is the only case in this set not to be ruled an Article 9 violation. To reinforce the 
language in the judgments, in repeated resolutions, decisions, and communications to the Turkish 
government the CoM has conveyed in unambiguous terms that part of its obligations under 
Article 46 of the ECHR is to legislation to ensure that similar cases related to the violations that 
were ruled upon would not find their way to domestic courts or the ECtHR again. Not only is 
Turkey obliged, as a COE member, to comply with these rulings, but its own Constitution 
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upholds this responsibility. Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution states: “In the case of a conflict 
between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into 
effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions 
of international agreements shall prevail.” The ECtHR and CoM have made it clear that there is 
very little room for a “margin of appreciation” on this matter, particularly considering that 
Turkey is the only country that does not offer a civilian alternative to compulsory conscription.  
In terms of international obligations, Turkey is not bound to the ECHR alone. It is also a 
ratifier of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which falls under 
the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the ICCPR establish the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. However, 
conscientious objection is not explicitly mentioned.  
 Societal stereotypes and prejudice against “non-majoritarian” religious adherents have 
also indirectly influenced the lack of public outcry for recognition of the rights of conscientious 
objectors. Article 301 of the Penal Code is frequently invoked against authors, journalists, or 
other public figures to legally reprimand actions or expressions that “denigrate the Turkish 
nation, the state of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Parliament, the government of the 
Republic of Turkey and the legal institutions of the state.”88 While none of the cases in this set 
                                               
 
88 Slight changes were made to Article 301 in 2008 as part of the European Union accession process, in particular 
requiring the Minister of Justice’s authorization prior to prosecutors initiating judicial proceedings. Still, Article 301 
continues to be used against what the state perceives as “traitors” as well as in cases that mention the controversial 
terminology surrounding the slaughter of more than one million Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Some well-known 
figures that have been charged under Article 301 include Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk; author and 
activist Elif Şafak; and slain Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink.  
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relate directly to Article 301, this law has certainly aided in the construction and reinforcement 
of how “Turkish identity” is defined, and who is excluded from this definition. Journalist Perihan 
Mağden was prosecuted for an article she wrote on December 25, 2005 in Yeni Aktuel titled 
“Conscientious Objection is a Human Right.” Mağden was tried but acquitted and the court ruled 
that her writing was not a violation of Article 301. Still, military service in Turkey is held in high 
regard and conscientious objectors are perceived as “traitors.” This sentiment manifest in the 
Demirtaş case when a captain told the plaintiff: “Pray not to be assigned to my military base, 
since I will make you lead a dog’s life. I will force you to perform military service.” Another 
officer told him, “Leave Turkey if you do not want to be in the military” (Oehring 2007b). 
 Turkish national and religious identity has been constructed in a way that is deeply 
connected to national pride and its bastion—the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus anyone objecting 
to serving the Turkish military on any grounds is perceived as anti-Turk or non-Turk. Three of 
the six cases included in the conscientious objector category were brought forward by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (of the three remaining cases, two made anti-militarist/pacifist claims, and another 
simply based his claims on conscientiousness). The sincerely held belief of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
requires that in matters involving politics, Witnesses to be “strictly neutral, following Jesus’ 
example of being no part of governmental affairs.” (Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of 
Pennsylvania n.d.). The ECtHR has affirmed this a number of times in cases brought against 
other COE countries, namely Russia and Armenia. Still, Turkey remains the only COE country 
that does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service. Considering all of 
the above factors, in addition to the treatment received while in detention for refusing military 
service, it is no wonder that Jehovah’s Witnesses and others have taken their cases to the ECtHR. 
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Though five of the six of these cases have been ruled to be violations of Article 9, the fact that 
Turkish identity is so thoroughly entwined with service to country in the military, leaves very 
little expectation that Turkey will move to recognize conscientious objection any time soon.  
 The public outcry against conscientious objectors or those who criticize the military may 
also be rooted in Turkey’s battle with the PKK, a group that has been recognized as a terrorist 
organization by Turkey, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
the European Union. The PKK was formed in the 1970s, partly in response to the oppressive and 
assimilationist policies of the Turkish government restricting a number of Kurdish rights inside 
Turkey, namely the use of the Kurdish language. The group resorted to violence in the mid-
1980s, establishing training camps where members would plan to carry out attacks on various 
state institutions. Intermittent periods of armed insurgency have led to the deaths of more than 
40,000 since the start of the conflict. Turkey’s struggle with the PKK has recently been 
complicated by the conflicts in neighboring countries like Syria and Iraq. Kurds in Syria have 
been one of the major opposition forces to the Islamic State (also recognized as ISIS) and created 
a semi-autonomous region there. In Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga forces have also been a key player 
in fending off ISIS in the Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq. Kurdish groups in both 
regions have received the military and financial backing of the United States. This has 
heightened tensions in US-Turkey relations because of Turkey’s concern for the implications of 
greater Kurdish independence in the region.  
Many Turks inherently revere the Turkish military as defending national security and 
even preserving national identity. In a 2015 survey by the Pew Research Center, the military was 
the only institution in the country that received a positive rating from among those surveyed, 
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with 52 percent stating that the military has a good influence on the country (Poushter 2015, 6). 
The same survey reported that only 36 percent supported Turkey joining the US-led international 
coalition against ISIS (Poushter 2015, 10). Interestingly, support for the military has declined in 
recent years, but one study indicates that this is a reflection of AKP supporters’ increased 
criticism of the military’s political role, the increased visibility of AKP supporters since the party 
took office, and the corresponding decreased visibility of those parties that have been viewed as 
historically having a favorable view of the military, like the CHP and MHP (Sarıgil 2015). In 
spite of the military’s declining popular support, its position as the institution with the highest 
vote of public confidence indicates that the armed forces have managed to retain their reputation 
as the defender of Turkey and Turkish nationalism. Those who would challenge the importance 
and function of the military, and thus, compulsory military service, are, as stated above, 
perceived as “traitors.”  
In sum, the reputation of the military both political figures and the general public hold 
contributes to conscientious objectors’ increased judicialization of the ECtHR, as well as the lack 
of substantial changes to laws and regulations surrounding conscientious objection in Turkey. 
The judgments that have condemned Turkey for violations have been very clear in what 
expectations for implementation are: change the laws to be in line with the ECHR. As the case 
law has established, this means the creation of an exemption for military service for 
conscientious objectors. There are few other factors that seem to have hindered progress on this 
front. With Turkey as the sole contracting party to the Council of Europe that does not have 
exemptions for conscientious objectors, it would seem that other late-adopting members’ 
institutional pressure on Turkey, as well as pressure from members that have had such 
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exemptions in place for a long time, would encourage Turkey to move toward full compliance 
with ECtHR judgments. However, the long-standing reputation of the military as a guardian of 
secularism and democracy has shaped and solidified Turkish identity and it will be incredibly 
difficult to shift away from the notion that military service is a national obligation and pride.  
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
Turkey is unique among other high contracting parties of the Council of Europe (COE). Though 
it was one of the earliest members of the COE, it has faced challenges similar to both well-
established democracies of Western Europe and the newer members of the COE that joined after 
the 1990s as a result of how its complicated, complex, and rich history has shaped contemporary 
institutional structures. Turkey has the third highest population in the COE after the Russian 
Federation and Germany at nearly 81 million. Of the 47 member states, Turkey has the greatest 
number of cases at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that have been found to have 
at least one violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Turkey is a party 
in 20 percent of the more than 14,000 cases involving violations of the ECHR. Moreover, Turkey 
has the third highest rate of non-implemented judgments in the Committee of Ministers (CoM). 
The focus of this study is explaining Turkish non-implementation by examining institutional 
barriers for the execution of judgements in Turkey.  
 The study began with an overview of the situation, followed by a review of the relevant 
academic literature that was taken into consideration, namely the concepts of identity, 
institutionalism, judicialization, and implementation. Chapter 3 explained the bodies of the COE, 
with a focus on the ECtHR and the CoM, as well as an explanation of cases involving religious 
freedom in the ECtHR and Turkey’s experience as a party to the ECtHR. Chapter 4 explored the 
history of Turkey and the Council of Europe, with a focus on the ECtHR and the CoM. Chapter 5 
described the methodology of the study, including sample selection, data collection, and analysis. 
Chapter 6 provided a detailed account of the results of the analysis of the 19 selected cases and 
examined the independent variables that work against implementation (political reasons, reasons 
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to do with the reforms required, budgetary reasons, reasons to do with public opinion, language 
of the judgments, and reasons related to obligations deriving from other institutions) and research 
questions. The current chapter is a summary of the conclusions reached and the contributions this 
study makes to the literature. It concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research.  
7.1 Executive Summary 
A cursory glance at Turkey’s history suggests that political reasons and reasons to do with public 
opinion in relation to the identity of non-Hanefi Sunnis have significantly shaped the trajectory 
of the human rights structure to date. This is particularly salient when considering the rights of 
religious minorities in Turkey. Researching the cases in this data set has affirmed that these two 
factors have contributed significantly not only to the emergence of human rights issues related to 
religious identity, manifestation, and association, but also to the perpetuation of such quandaries 
and ultimately, their just resolution. 
The institutional set up initially created during the Ottoman Empire was based on a 
governmental and societal categorization of religious identity and remains in place today, albeit 
loosely. This structure is the foundation for the establishment of the Diyanet, which largely 
determines the nature of the recognition (and non-recognition) of the identity and rights for all 
religious classifications in Turkey. Because “Turkish” and “Muslim” are regarded as 
foundational elements of national identity, a policy of assimilation (and repression) has been 
pursued with a view to strengthening these identities (Nalbant 2017). Among government 
institutions, the Diyanet has taken the lead in producing, propagating, and crystallizing Turkish 
national identity. Its policies have shaped societal opinions and governmental policies that 
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determine what rights are bestowed on certain religious identities and what benefits they will 
enjoy. The long-standing presence and influence of the Diyanet in Turkey is fundamental to the 
interpretation of rights in religious matters (Karakaş 2017). The Diyanet’s initial institutional 
settings have remained in place since its foundation and have shaped the trajectory of religious 
governance, meaning that historical institutionalism is indeed applicable to these case studies. 
Furthermore, the policies of the Diyanet have impacted other institutions, making policy 
change incremental or even impossible. The density of Turkish institutions is evident from this 
study, particularly as it relates to how identity is constructed and regulated. For example, the 
issue of one’s religious affiliation as it appears on the national identity card (as addressed in the 
case of Sinan Işık v. Turkey) largely shapes educational policies, specifically participation in 
religious education courses (as seen in Mansur Yalçın et al. v. Turkey and Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin v. Turkey). In these cases, the requisite changes must occur across a number of ministries 
and governmental bodies, including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, and the 
justice system, to name a few. This study illustrates that while changes can be made, they are 
largely incremental and punctuated due to the Turkish institutional structures—namely societal 
norms, governmental institutions, political parties, and non-profit organizations.  
It is also clear from this research that the religious identity of victims seeking recourse at 
the ECtHR can affect the manner and extent of compliance and implementation. For example, 
Lausanne Minorities (Jewish, and Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities) seem to have 
broader and more extensive implementation of the cases they take to the ECtHR. This could 
likely be due to their long-standing presence in Turkey (and even prior, the Ottoman Empire). 
Though the Lausanne Minorities, as illustrated throughout, are victims of overt and systematic 
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discrimination, their longevity in the country has lent to their “legitimacy” in the eyes of the 
Turkish Government. Longevity, however, is not a determinant for legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Turkish Government for other communities. For example, the Alevi have been part of the 
Turkish fabric for an even longer period of time than the Lausanne Minorities; yet from the 
incomplete or absent movement on cases brought forward by Alevi groups and individuals, it is 
clear that in this case, the government does not differentiate between non-Sunni communities.  
According to Senior Lawyer and Head of Division of the Registry of the ECtHR, Dr. 
Atilla Nalbant, because “secularism” has been an ideology that has been imposed by the Turkish 
state, creating tensions in civil society, religious movements’ demands are dealt with in the 
justice system (Nalbant 2017). Yet the actors that bring these demands to the justice system do 
not find a satisfactory result domestically, and thus turn to international human rights tribunals to 
seek justice. This rising trend is referred to as judicialization. Judicialization is indeed a trend in 
Turkey, according to Gökçe Türkyılmaz, a Lawyer at the Registry of the ECtHR, because 
“governments or parliaments do not want to take the risk of giving too much religious freedom, 
especially to minority groups, who are in the end forced to try [to achieve rights recognition] 
legally” (Türkyılmaz 2017). This resistance on the part of governments points to a lack of 
political will, regardless of the political party, and relates back to the electorate’s general 
animosity toward non-Hanefi Sunni citizens.  
7.2 Contributions to the Literature  
This study’s overall examination of religious identity and rights recognition has provided a 
framework to study the intersection of religious identity, freedom, and associational rights where 
one religion imposes its identity, attempts to silence, or denies rights to others. In the case of 
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Turkey, a fundamental failure to create a pluralistic and just rights recognition scheme at the 
domestic level has disproportionately impacted individuals and groups that are not Hanefi Sunni. 
 An exploration into the religious identities included in the current case studies has 
demonstrated that there are indeed essentialist and constructivist identity formations at play in 
Turkey. Because the Turkish national identity that has been reified over time reinforces the dual 
elements of nationality/ethnicity (Turk) and religion (secular Sunni), any individual or group that 
does not identify as such has been essentialized as “other.” For the Lausanne Treaty faiths 
(Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jewish), their intrinsic religious identities have been 
essentialized by the long-standing history of their faiths, but also by the government because of 
how these groups have been stereotyped as far back as Ottoman times. The institutional 
structures for how to “govern” these non-Sunni groups were carried from the Ottoman Empire 
into the modern Republic. As this research demonstrates, these structures have been quite 
difficult to change, and the changes that have taken place (i.e., property rights laws, national 
identity cards) have been piecemeal and slow to occur. Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses have 
faced similar identity issues, although they do not fall into the historic millet system like the 
Lausanne minorities. Jehovah’s Witnesses are not as well known in Turkish society, which has 
created some distrust because they have a relatively recent vocal presence. One interviewee for 
this study claimed that parts of society do not even believe they are religious people—that by 
knocking on people’s doors [proselytizing] they simply want to sell something. As for atheists, 
agnostics, and deists, they are often dismissed as having irrelevant or baseless beliefs, as both 
President Erdoğan and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Action Party) leader Devlet 
Bahçeli recently claimed in public statements (Ahval 2018; cnnturk.com 2018). Statements by 
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such high-ranking officials only serve to reinforce the well-established, negatively constructed 
identities imposed on non-Sunni citizens. 
The cases brought forward by Alevi (five of the 19 in this set) suggest that the Alevi as a 
group have been most extensively impacted by essentialized and constructed identity issues in 
Turkey. The identity issues the Alevi face are threefold: 1) internal disagreement on what it 
collectively means to be Alevi; 2) the Turkish government’s framing of Alevi identity as “part of 
Islam” (not as having its own distinct practices, beliefs, and traditions); and 3) the Turkish 
government relegating Alevism to the cultural realm (categorizing unavoidably conspicuous 
practices, beliefs, and traditions as folkloric customs).  
 This study has also reaffirmed that it is the institutions and institutional structures that 
influence how certain individual or group identities are constructed. The construction of these 
identities is employed strategically to change institutions or resist change to institutions. For the 
Alevi in this study, the government has indeed imposed an identity on the Alevi as being either 
“within Islam” or as a cultural tradition in order to “distribute benefits and burdens so as to 
reflect and perpetuate these constructions” (Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 2007, 93). As such, 
these identities become embedded (especially through legal means) and difficult to change 
(Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 2007, 111). The government’s embedded construction of Alevi 
identity is evident in the cases in this study, especially in relation to educational issues, the 
refusal to recognize Alevi houses of worship as such, and of course, refusal to allow the 
designation of “Alevi” as one’s personal faith on the national ID card. Alevi issues have also 
been a challenge to tackle in part due to the rift in the community about agreed upon beliefs, 
practices, and collective objectives. Occasionally, however, some groups that agree upon their 
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collective identity can navigate the opportunity structures that policy designs give them and 
influence their socially constructed identity (Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 2007, 111). In the 
current study, the cases that confirm this are those related to property issues.  
The Greek and Armenian Orthodox communities do not have the same intra-communal 
identity issues as the Alevi, and therefore have been able to better organize to ensure 
implementation of the judgments and the return of some of the properties confiscated from them. 
However, the Armenian Orthodox community is divided on how to handle the selection of a new 
patriarch since government regulations do not specify the process and since the government has 
regularly interfered in the nomination and selection process in the past. 
This study also affirmed much of the theoretical literature surrounding institutionalism 
and institutional change. For the sake of this study, institutions were defined broadly and 
included organizations, laws, social norms, and symbols. Each case included in the study 
illustrated how institutional structure constrains or enables actors, particularly by defining 
identities. The institutional environment in Turkey as it relates to religious governance is highly 
integrated and has largely remained structurally consistent since Ottoman times. These two 
factors alone are indications of the obvious path dependence of institutional structure, which 
makes change incredibly difficult, if not impossible. The fact that partial progress has been made 
to the requisite general measures on a majority of these cases, however, demonstrates that change 
is possible, though it may be slow and/or take place on the periphery. Given Turkey’s deeply 
integrated institutional structure, particularly in the form of organizations and laws, it is 
interesting to speculate about what punctuated and evolutionary change could potentially occur 
should one critical shift in a single institution occur. One might suspect that a change to the 
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Diyanet would instigate such a radical transition. However, returning to the theories that affirm 
that stasis and stability (or even incremental change) are the norm, and that such radical 
punctuations are rare, such a revolutionary transformation is highly unlikely. The changes that 
have been made are most often initiated as part of the general measures required from the 
judgments and not from domestic political action. This indicates the supranational judicialization 
of politics in Turkey.  
 The sheer number of applicant cases coming to the ECtHR that relate to Turkey is 
indicative of the turn towards the “judicialization of mega-politics” (Hirschl 2013, 10). Hirschl, 
one of the foremost scholars on judicialization and religion, hones in on judicialization as it 
relates to these two spheres and defines it as the transfer of “fundamental collective-identity 
questions of ‘religion and state’ from the political sphere to the courts” (Hirschl 2008, 27). The 
mere fact that the cases examined in this study, as well as a number of other cases questioning 
other fundamental identity issues, have been taken to the ECtHR indicates that this transfer has 
already occurred in Turkey.  
However, one must be careful about making generalizations about judicialization theories 
and instead differentiate between domestic judicialization and international judicialization. The 
study at hand did not include a review of domestic judicialization trends. However, as Hirschl 
mentions, democracy is one of the key conditions for judicialization to flourish and, as 
dysfunctional as Turkey’s government can appear at present, democracy functioned relatively 
well during the period of this study. Interestingly, as Hirschl and a number of other scholars have 
noted, with democracy comes “bottom-up” judicialization or “judicialization from below,” where 
individuals who have been disenfranchised can mobilize by turning to the courts rather than the 
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political sphere for rights recognition (Hirschl 2006, 2008, 2013; Shapiro 2002; Stone Sweet 
2000; Tate 1995). Again, the very fact that these cases have a domestic judicial history (as 
required to be heard in the ECtHR) indicates that the groups of this study felt compelled to turn 
to the courts, either directly or following fruitless efforts in the political sphere. This is not to say 
that some groups have not attempted to participate in the political process. Indeed, the Alevi 
have played quite an active role in the political (legislative, bureaucratic) realm in comparison to 
the other groups in this study. These other groups engage in very little domestic political 
activism.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, there is very little scholarship on international 
judicialization (in contrast to domestic judicialization), and even less on the international 
judicialization of religion. The judicialization of rights recognition in an international context 
differs from other public policy areas, such as the environment or trade or even social policy 
issues such as sexuality or family life. In any judicial setting, rights issues present an enormous 
challenge to balancing individual rights, state’s obligations, and individual and national 
identities—matters that become even more complicated when dealing with issues of religion.  
Importantly, when viewing these cases strictly through the lens of belief or conscience, 
these matters differ from the international judicialization of other issues, such as the 
environment, labor rights or health care. This is in part due to the more vertical relationship 
between the individual and state in human rights courts and the horizontal (state-to-state) 
relationship in other types of courts. More importantly, the international judicialization of 
religious issues differs from other considerations of international judicialization simply because 
of the profoundly personal and deep-seated manner in which belief or conscience shape one’s 
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worldview. These factors pose considerable challenges to resolving conflicts through legislative 
means, and naturally, through the courts, as well.  
Nevertheless, one can surmise from this study and others that the public regulation of 
religion has indeed drifted into the legal arena, possibly because “religion is seen as a 
fundamental freedom” (de Galembert and Koenig 2014, 4). International courts have served to 
proliferate regulations and in a sense codify how to manage religious freedom in various 
domestic contexts. Yet as demonstrated from the case studies in this study, national institutional 
settings still weigh heavily on the impact these judgments have. As such, we should not leap to 
the conclusion that the “internationalization of the law leaves national models unchanged” (de 
Galembert and Koenig 2014, 11).  
Yet the problem with international judicialization is that while judgments carry weight, 
domestic actors are ultimately responsible for executing them, and it can take time to resolve the 
domestic conflicts that were the impetus for the initial grievances. As seen in this study, 
domestic institutional settings have considerable influence on issues of religious freedom in 
Turkey. As the theories of institutionalism and institutional change suggest, this process is slow 
and long-standing institutional settings or deep institutional embeddedness make change 
difficult. Nevertheless, domestic actors have taken some steps to execute these judgments.  
Though the CoM has closed only one of the 19 cases in this study, this does not indicate 
that steps have not been taken to move closer in that direction. For example, in regards to 
changes in association and foundation cases, a new Foundations Law was passed in 2008, albeit 
reluctantly and later challenged in the Turkish Constitutional Court. These changes were minor 
and still do not provide a holistic solution to foundations’ rights, yet these small steps indicate an 
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acknowledgment of the organizational problems associations and foundations face. Interestingly, 
this change occurred as a result of European Union harmonization reforms, as opposed to ECtHR 
rulings.89 Additionally, though piecemeal, domestic laws and regulations have been passed that 
permit the return of religious minorities’ properties that were confiscated by the government, and 
indeed, a number of properties have been returned. There has been much concrete movement in 
this area; even so, many applications for the return of properties are still denied. Furthermore, the 
Turkish Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that cemevi are indeed houses of worship and so should 
have their electricity bills paid for by the government—a change that was likely influenced by 
three of the ECtHR cases (decided in 2015 and 2016) analyzed in this study. Also in 2016, the 
Turkish government paid for the utility costs of 419 minority places of worship, including 355 
churches, 24 chapels, and 40 synagogues (United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom 2016, 189). What is even more interesting about the category of “places of worship” is 
that prior to these cases coming to the ECtHR, a number of municipal governments determined 
that cemevi should be considered places of worship and were regarded similarly to mosques by 
the local governments, meaning that their electrical expenses were covered and assistance was 
provided for the upkeep of cemevi.  
There has also been meaningful progress to address the structural issues that emerged 
from the Sinan Işık case. The new identity card system that was implemented in 2017 complies 
for the most part with the Işık ruling by removing information about one’s religious affiliation 
                                               
 
89 The Özbek et al. v. Turkey case was decided in 2010, after the Foundations Law came into effect.  
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from the physical card. It is possible that, since the Turkish government has initiated substantial 
structural changes, the CoM could review the case and consider the case executed, though the 
timeline for this is nearly impossible to speculate. The Işık case could also determine potential 
changes to domestic laws surrounding mandatory religious education courses since students must 
prove religious affiliation to apply for exemptions from the course. There have been cosmetic 
changes to the religious education courses to appease Alevi demands for the inclusion of 
information on Alevism or petitions for exemptions. It remains to be seen, however, how the 
government will handle exemptions now that the national identity card does not indicate 
religious affiliation overtly and since citizens may apply to remove their religious affiliation 
from the civil registry.  
The category of cases with the least movement toward execution deal with conscientious 
objection. Six of the cases in this category remain under enhanced supervision and Turkey is still 
the only member country of the COE that does not permit conscientious objection or have a 
civilian alternative available for mandatory military service. While some issues in each 
individual case have been addressed (such as the removal of arrest warrants), the applicants still 
face domestic charges. As well, other potential conscientious objectors face a similar fate since 
the current government has repeatedly claimed that it has no intention of complying with these 
ECtHR judgments. Overall, the cases in this study indicate that the process of implementation is 
slow and incremental and that institutional settings will only occasionally permit the necessary 
changes to domestic institutions (including laws, rules, norms, organizations) that would 
eventually lead to full execution of the judgment.  
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What became apparent from this study but the literature addresses less often is that the 
Court and the CoM themselves have also hindered full compliance and implementation of the 
judgments. The Court and the CoM have acknowledged this fact and have taken steps in recent 
years to reduce their case load and improve the mechanisms to make the process more efficient 
and effective. Still the Court remains overburdened, particularly by repetitive cases from Turkey. 
This can be attributed to the wide margin of appreciation and a lack of explicit guidance from the 
Court and CoM. Judge Karakaş notes: “Sometimes the margin of appreciation is too wide; 
everything is linked to subsidiarity in the Court. We are giving very much credit to the domestic 
authorities, especially to the supreme courts” (Karakaş 2017). But taking into account the 
sensitivities of state concerns and allowing governments to largely determine what an acceptable 
execution might look like does not always lead to fulfillment of obligations under the ECHR. 
Judge Karakaş adds that execution must be viewed holistically: “Especially in religious cases, 
the purpose is not just to pay compensation. You can pay. But you must also change the law. 
You must implement the whole system” (Karakaş 2017). Yet as in the cases studied here, the 
language of the drafted judgments is often vague, leaving domestic authorities with an unclear 
understanding of the expectations of implementation. States can also exploit the vague language 
and only partially implement the judgement, leaving room for similar cases to come before the 
court again. Even though governments are not given a wide margin of appreciation to determine 
what is and is not a religion or religious practice (Türkyılmaz 2017), the imprecise directives in 
the judgments can encourage the offending state to merely pay just satisfaction or make 
“cosmetic” changes to regulations or laws, while the fundamental issue for the infraction remain.  
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Such vague language also makes implementation difficult to measure—for both the CoM 
and those outside the system. The monitoring process is opaque and inaccessible, making the 
measurement of implementation a challenge beyond the benchmark of case closure. The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and a number of INGOs have called 
upon the CoM to make their meetings and documentation more accessible to outside observers 
(The AIRE Center et al. 2015, 4; Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 2017, 22). 
“Although the Committee of Ministers since 2011 has published action plans or action reports on 
its website, this does not always happen immediately or in a way that makes them easily 
accessible” (Donald and Leach 2016, 96).  
Though the measurement of implementation can be opaque and can be interpreted in 
different ways depending on the time frame analyzed and the measurement tools used, it is 
important to consider the effectiveness of ECtHR rulings. In the Turkish context, religious rights 
recognition can be sparked by judgments from the ECtHR. Often times, human rights treaties 
such as the ECHR can produce high levels of effectiveness, even when the outcome seems to be 
low compliance (Meyer 2014, 97). Though the CoM has closed only one of the cases in this 
study, steps have been taken to address some of the structural issues under scrutiny in the 
categories of associational and foundation laws, property rights, places of worship, education, 
and, particularly, identity cards. In terms of effectiveness, the category that has seen the least 
movement by the Turkish government is conscientious objectors; in fact, none of the 
judgements’ general measures have been addressed. Still one can deduce that some of the 
government’s corrective moves in other categories, as piecemeal and incomplete as they may be, 
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have been effective (as defined by Meyer [2014, 94]) in that the rulings have “changed a state’s 
behavior from what it would have been in the absence of the law.” 
7.3 Policy Recommendations 
The ECtHR is regarded as one of the most effective human rights tribunals in the world. Yet 
complete implementation is a challenge, both for the offending state in its creation of an 
“acceptable” solution, and for the bodies of the COE as they measure implementation and decide 
upon the terms of case closure. The overarching challenge facing the COE that emerged from 
this research was finding the balance between the Court and CoM’s attempts to provide a wide 
margin of appreciation to the offending country, but still offering concrete parameters for what 
complete execution means. What follows are some recommendations that could potentially 
narrow the gap between how the COE and member states define and execute judgments.  
The Court should be more explicit in the drafting of judgments and the CoM should take 
a more active role in engaging the states, while still respecting the margin of appreciation that the 
ECtHR is so widely recognized as having. The Court need not identify the precise legislative or 
bureaucratic reforms that are necessary, but should give more concrete suggestions for the scope 
of solutions available, as well as a more precise timeline in which to carry out these obligations. 
Additionally, the CoM should continue to cultivate a more transparent supervision of execution 
process. As more recent cases in this study have suggested, doing so would encourage domestic 
NGOs to contribute to the process by submitting arguments and suggestions to the CoM. The 
advantage of this is twofold: 1) the process would become more democratic, allowing the input 
from organizations that have a stake in the judgments, and 2) it would potentially alleviate the 
burden on the CoM to conduct in-depth research on possible domestic remedies to the 
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judgments. Atilla Nalbant, Senior Lawyer and Head of Division of the Registry of the ECtHR 
agrees, in that when there is no progress at the national level, civil society and other institutions 
must monitor the execution of these judgments (Nalbant 2017). 
 Another policy suggestion that emerged from the interviews that were conducted at the 
ECtHR and the CoM was directed at the trainings provided to national judges. According to 
Judge Karakaş, seminars are held for the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in which a number of 
judges and prosecutors go to the COE every month (Karakaş 2017). Yet, according to some, 
these trainings do not produce immediate or concrete results, or any results at all: “The court 
administrators and lawyers train the national judges to apply the principles of the ECtHR. They 
[the judges] are very happy, they understand; they visit Strasbourg and go back, but are then 
under national pressures and national sovereignty, and end up repeating the same decisions…the 
same violations, endlessly” (Akgönül 2017). Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar of the 
ECtHR, acknowledged that these trainings have the more intrinsic purpose of increasing 
knowledge and familiarity with the Court and the execution process, noting that trainings do not 
always reduce the ECtHR caseload or repetitive cases. He commented that, “They [the trainings] 
have an awareness-raising function. When we meet the judges, they don’t necessarily learn a lot; 
they just become aware” (Bakırcı 2017). It would be worthwhile for the Court and the CoM to 
review the outcomes of these trainings; a survey or an academic study would provide suggestions 
on ways the trainings are effective in their current form, and how future trainings could be 
improved.  
The most interesting policy observation and recommendation to emerge from this study 
concerns the articles the Court determined to have been violated. Nine of the 19 cases in this 
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study were Article 9 violations; yet all cases included in this study were related to one aspect or 
another of religious freedom, association, or manifestation. As Judge Karakaş pointed out in an 
interview, “In Article 9 cases you can see a wide margin of appreciation—sometimes so much 
that you might never see a violation. Discrimination is very easy in Turkey. You can change the 
foundation and association laws to be in line with the Copenhagen Criteria, preparing reform 
packages, but you can still discriminate.” The fact that ten of the cases included in this study 
were not ruled as Article 9 violations ignores the fact that there is an “unspoken” structural issue 
in Turkey regarding how non-Hanefi Sunnis are treated. One must acknowledge the difficultly of 
tasking the court with fully comprehending complex identity issues in each country. However, 
by taking a less essentialist view of identity and understanding it from a more constructivist 
perspective, the Court might acknowledge that some of these cases are indeed Article 9 
violations. Being more open to ruling that cases that involve non-Hanefi Sunnis are violations of 
Article 9 would send a signal to Turkey that these violations arise not only due to structural 
issues (as indicated in the judgments), but the manner in which the majoritarian construction of 
Hanefi Sunni identity in Turkey has been created, perpetuated, and solidified. Furthermore, it 
could potentially instigate the slow-moving and punctuated process of reshaping institutions 
(broadly defined as organizations, laws, societal norms) in a more pluralistic manner over time.  
In conclusion, it is recommended that the Court and the CoM take steps toward even 
further judicialization—becoming an adjudicator that shapes domestic public policy. On the one 
hand, this means that the Court should take a more active role in drafting explicit expectations 
for execution in the judgment itself. On the other, when a case is transferred to the CoM, this 
means opening the supervision of judgments and making the process more transparent to the 
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public and inviting their participation in the submission of recommendations. These two steps 
would make the execution process more accountable, democratic, and more closely in line with 
the expected obligations under the ECHR. Furthermore, judicialization would make the 
measurement of compliance easier and more legal, as opposed to being political and diplomatic 
(Keller and Marti 2016, 849), two factors that have contributed to the notoriously slow and 
incomplete post-judgement execution process, particularly as demonstrated in the cases of this 
study.  
Though increased judicialization may have a positive effect on the execution of 
judgments, practitioners and scholars should be aware of the potential impact that excessive 
judicialization may have on democracy, civil society, and rule of law.   
7.4 Limitations 
This study examined 19 cases based on the criteria set forth in the methodology section, focusing 
primarily on cases that were brought to the ECtHR by non-Hanefi Sunnis that were ruled to be in 
violation of the ECHR’s standards related to religious identity, but not necessarily only Article 9 
(religious freedom) violations. The criteria created a narrow scope for case selection, thus 
limiting some generalizations that might otherwise be made from the analysis.  
 For example, this dataset considers only cases brought against Turkey and not other 
countries within the COE. This is an important factor to consider since the religious groups that 
were parties to the cases in this study also reside in other COE states and occasionally face 
similar restrictions on their religious rights. There are approximately half a million Alevi residing 
in Germany (Dressler 2008, 282) and, although they are not restricted in how they manifest their 
religious identity as are the Alevi living in Turkey, Alevi identity is taking on a more universally 
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agreed upon character, due in part to the increased transnational networks and communication 
among Alevi communities in Turkey and Germany. This study does not take into account that 
relationship, which may have impacted the domestic and international judicialization of Alevi 
rights recognition in Turkey.  
Similarly, this study did not consider the cases of conscientious objectors in other COE 
countries. While Turkey is the only COE member state that does not have an official policy 
permitting conscientious objection, Russia has a high number of conscientious objector cases, 
most frequently brought forward by Jehovah’s Witnesses. Thus, this study examines 
conscientious objection purely through the lens of applicants in Turkey.  
Additionally, this study did not include a comparison of property rights issues in Greece 
that are inherently connected to the property rights issues examined here. This connection is a 
result of a long-standing policy of reciprocity on this issue between Turkey and Greece, largely 
stemming from the Lausanne Treaty. An inquiry into the outcomes of property rights cases of 
Muslims in Greece may have shed light on the successes or failures of the Greek government in 
the execution of that category of cases in comparison to Turkish cases.  
 This study was also limited by the non-inclusion of friendly settlements. Friendly 
settlements, by their very nature, are an opportunity for the applicant and accused state to resolve 
the dispute without a hearing, which is similar to an out of court agreement. By excluding 
friendly settlements, this study does not consider cases where Turkey was able to successfully 
achieve a solution without having the case heard by the ECtHR. However, because one of the 
main considerations of this study was to explore the execution of judgments, friendly settlements 
were excluded from the data set out of necessity.  
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 Furthermore, while Alevi applicants were involved in five of the 19 cases in this study, 
the fact that approximately three million Alevi in Turkey also identify as Kurdish was not 
considered. Because the case criteria mandated that the cases must not be related to the military 
(outside of conscientious objectors) or groups that are considered terrorist organizations, this 
excluded cases that involved the PKK. This certainly does not mean that all Kurds are terrorists; 
the exclusion of this set of actors aimed to narrow the scope of cases specifically to those whose 
claims are rooted in a violation of religious identity and freedoms. This is not to say that Kurdish 
Alevis in Turkey have not experienced similar violations of their associational rights; in fact, 
may face even greater discrimination due to their dual identity as Kurd and Alevi.  
 Finally, this study is limited by access to information about the progress of the cases. As 
indicated previously, the CoM has been a relatively opaque institution. Several factors have 
contributed to this, including the political nature of the process since the members of the CoM 
are representatives of COE member states’ respective foreign affairs offices. While diplomacy is, 
on occasion, best worked out behind closed doors, there is a certain accountability that is 
inherent and expected in international human rights tribunals. The COE has acknowledged the 
calls from outside actors, as well as its own internal bodies (namely, PACE), and has taken steps 
to make the process more transparent and accessible to the public. Thus, action plans and action 
reports of the offending country have been published and domestic NGOs and INGOs have been 
invited to submit opinions and recommendations. Still, access to the case files is not 
comprehensive. This could also be due in part to the failure of states themselves to submit the 
requisite documents as part of their obligations, as ordered by the Rules of the Committee of 
Ministers (namely, Rules 8 and 9). In spite of this, conjectures were made from other publicly 
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available information, such as media reporting, NGO press releases, and reporting by other 
governments. 
Though this dataset is small, and so poses some issues for generalizing outcomes for the 
execution of cases, this study and the larger bodies of literature on this subject are nevertheless 
indicative of a greater trend of supranational judicialization of domestic politics, particularly on 
the issue of human and civil rights. The next section includes suggestions for further research. 
7.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations of this study indicate that there are several potential avenues for future research. 
One avenue would be a case comparison between COE states that have similar religious 
demographic experiences and issues. Such a study might compare Turkey and the Balkan states 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, for example), which could elucidate trends among countries 
that have historically constructed a national identity based on a single religious identity and the 
outcomes of implementation in cases brought to the ECtHR by individuals and groups that do 
not identify with the predominant religion. Additionally, case comparisons in states with state-
sanctioned or state-privileged religions and non-majoritarian belief groups could also indicate 
similarities or differences amongst such countries as Germany, Denmark, Malta, the United 
Kingdom, or Russia.  
 As mentioned above, though the literature broadly views issues with implementation as a 
domestic political problem, this study indicated that the role of the Court and CoM in 
implementation also has an effect on the amount of time a case awaits full execution. As such, a 
comparative case study on recent changes to the Court and CoM (for example, Protocol 11), 
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could suggest the ways in which these reforms have and have not achieved their intended 
purposes.  
 Finally, an in-depth examination of the COE-wide implementation of cases, delineated by 
criteria similar to this study (for example, cases related to religious freedom issues that have been 
ruled to be a violation of any ECHR article, including but not limited to Article 9 violations), 
would allow for greater generalization across the COE. It could potentially elucidate trends in 
religious freedom cases that are not always evident to the Court and CoM and might, therefore, 
allow for a more clear, prompt, and intentional execution of judgments by offending states.  
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Appendix C: Life of an ECtHR Application Flow Chart 
 
Source: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Case_processing_ENG.pdf 
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Appendix D: Case Processing Flow Chart 
 
Source: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Case_processing_Court_ENG.pdf  
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Appendix E: Association and Foundation Law 
Organizational 
Forms Associations Foundations 
Registration 
Body 
Ministry of Interior, Department of 
Associations 
The courts, with possible review made by the 
General Directorate of Foundations 
Barriers to 
Entry 
At least 7 founders required to establish an 
association. 
 
Executive board of at least 5 people 
required. Board must have Turkish majority. 
Foreigners can be members of board 
provided they reside in Turkey. 
In 2016, the minimum endowment amount for 
foundations was increased to 60,000 TRY 
(approx $20,000). 
Barriers to 
Activities 
Standard annual reporting forms and 
numerous mandatory books considered 
cumbersome and time consuming. 
 
All associations are obliged to obtain 
permission from the governorship of the city 
in which they will be conducting the 
fundraising activity and indicate the exact 
amount of money they aim to collect.  
 
Requirement to complete standard forms 
before receiving or using foreign funding or 
opening new branch offices. 
Standard annual reporting forms considered 
cumbersome and time consuming. 
 
All foundations are obliged to obtain permission 
from the governorship of the city in which they 
will be conducting the fundraising activity and 
indicate the exact amount of money they aim to 
collect.  
 
Requirement to complete standard forms before 
receiving or using foreign funding or opening 
new branch offices. 
Barriers to 
Speech and/or 
Advocacy 
Prohibition against directly engaging in 
“political” activities in practice. This is not 
written into any applicable laws, however. 
Websites with "insulting" content may also 
be blocked. Under a post-coup attempt 
decree issued in the State of Emergency, a 
total of 102 media outlets (3 news agencies; 
16 TV channels; 23 radio stations; 45 
newspapers; and 15 journals) and 29 
publishing houses/distribution firms were 
closed down. The prosecutor also issued 
arrest warrants for journalists, media 
workers and executives. Several dozens of 
them were placed in police custody. 
Prohibition against directly engaging in 
“political” activities. This is not written into any 
applicable laws, however. Websites with 
"insulting" content may also be blocked.Under a 
post-coup attempt decree issued in the State of 
Emergency, a total of 102 media outlets (3 news 
agencies; 16 TV channels; 23 radio stations; 45 
newspapers; and 15 journals) and 29 publishing 
houses/distribution firms were closed down. The 
prosecutor also issued arrest warrants for 
journalists, media workers and executives. 
Several dozens of them were placed in police 
custody. 
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Barriers to 
International 
Contact 
Required to notify Government when 
receiving grant from international 
organization. 
Required to notify Government when receiving 
grant from international organization. 
Barriers to 
Resources 
Required to notify Government before using 
foreign funding. 
Required to notify Government within one month 
of receiving foreign funding. 
Barriers to 
Assembly 
Vague grounds to justify restrictions, 
excessive force on protesters, and advance 
notification requirement. 
Vague grounds to justify restrictions, excessive 
force on protesters, and advance notification 
requirement. 
Source: http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkey.html 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
310 
Definitions 
Alevi/Alevilik: A group unique in Turkey who are generally characterized as heterogeneous, 
with distinctive beliefs and practices drawn from a broad scope of sources. Some of these include 
reverence for Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammed), the twelve imams, and 
Haci Bektas Veli. Other beliefs take inspiration from Sufism or other religious practices. The 
Alevi constitute 10-25% of the Turkish population. Alevilik (Alevism) encompasses a broad set 
of beliefs, as well as a common cultural experience of Alevis in Turkey (the practice of being 
Alevi). Defining Alevilik has had consequences for Alevi rights in Turkey, touching on a number 
of policy areas, including education, associational rights, and the public provision of services 
related to religion. For an expansive discussion of the far-reaching implications of how religious 
minorities are defined (the Alevi in particular), see Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s “Alevis Under 
Law: The Politics of Religious Freedom in Turkey” (2014) 
Cem/cemevi: A cemevi is a house of worship in the Alevi tradition (though not currently 
recognized by the Diyanet). A cem (or Âyîn-i Cem) is the worship ceremony/service of the 
Alevi. 
Dergah: Sufi lodges 
Dernek: Association (status of a domestic NGO) 
Diyanet: The Presidency of Religious Affairs. It is a government cabinet directly under the 
control of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey. 
Firman: A formal decree issued by the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire 
Hanefi: The most widely followed sect of Sunni Islam’s four sects and the predominant sect in 
Turkey 
İçişleri Bakanlığı: Turkish Ministry of Interior 
Laïcité: Secularism; particularly a derivative of the French version 
Kemalism: “Kemalism is the name of the Turkish state ideology, characterized by its state-
centric corporatism, a homogenizing nationalism, and an authoritarian secularism. As a political 
program it was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, since 1934 known by the 
honorary name Atatürk (‘Father of the Turks’), who is recognized as the founding father of 
Republican Turkey” (Dressler 2013, xvi). There are six fundamental pillars of Kemalism: 
republicanism, statism (economic), populism, secularism, nationalism, and reformism.  
Margin of Appreciation: The latitude that COE member states are given to determine the most 
suitable way to fulfill their obligations under the ECHR 
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Mezhep: Religious denomination 
Millet system: The governance structure in the Ottoman Empire that administered religious 
groups, namely Jewish, Armenian Orthodox, and Greek Orthodox citizens of the Empire, and 
that granted these groups the right to maintain their own legal and civil systems by paying a 
special tax (ceza) 
Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı: Turkish National Ministry of Education. 
Restitutio in integrum: Legal term to describe compensation to an injured party in a way that 
returns the injured party to the situation they would have been in had no injury occurred. In the 
ECtHR, this can mean restitution for actual losses, diminished gains, or expected losses in the 
future. 
Subsidiarity: Principle exercised by the ECtHR in which the Court is charged with only the 
functions that cannot be suitably executed at the national level.  
Takiye (Taqia): A religious practice where a believer is permitted to conceal his or her faith 
while under threat of persecution; primarily practiced in Shia Islam. 
Tarikat: Religious sect 
Tekke: Dervish house of worship 
Vakif: Foundation (status of a domestic NGO) 
 
